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ABSTRACT
Party Capability Theory hypothesizes that parties with greater resources, usually 
“repeat players,” fare better in the judicial system and are better able to influence legal 
changes than “one shotters.” The theory also points out that “parties who have lawyers do 
better.” The theory has become most influential since its publication and has been tested 
by several studies. However, its importance has not been addressed in the accounting 
academic arena.
The intent of this inquiry is to generalize Party Capability Theory to federal tax 
cases. The research sample consists of 1,010 trial court cases, 744 federal appellate court 
cases, and 29 U.S. Supreme Court cases rendered in 1992-2006. Summary statistics 
indicate that around 34.5% o f trial court cases and 16.4% of federal appellate court cases 
involve pro se litigants.
Success rate analysis indicates that the presumed stronger party does win more 
often in court than the presumed weaker party. However, logistic regression results show 
the opposite direction. That is, the presumed weaker litigant is positively correlated with 
case results and the presumed stronger litigant is negatively associated with case results. 
Surprisingly, pro se representation is positively associated with case results and it reaches 
a statistically significant level in trial courts. The findings of this study have practical 
implications for those subject to litigation.
iii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
“Who gets what?” has traditionally been viewed as one o f the central questions in 
the study of politics. In the United States, the courts are recognized as key institutions for 
the legitimate settlement o f a wide spectrum of conflicts between individuals and groups 
that have important implications for the distribution o f material and symbolic goods. 
Therefore, understanding who wins in court is an essential component o f a full 
appreciation of the authoritative allocation o f values in society (Easton 1953). Marc 
Galanter’s Party Capability Theory (Galanter 1974) is exceptionally influential in the 
legal literature for investigating the judicial allocation o f values in society. It formulates 
the hypothesis that parties with greater resources, usually “repeat players,” fare better in 
courts and are better able to influence legal changes than “one shotters.” The theory also 
points out that “parties who have lawyers do better.” Strong evidence in support of Party 
Capability Theory is reported in several studies (Wheeler et al. 1987, Atkins 1991, 
Songer and Sheehan 1992). However, no empirical research in the accounting/tax arena 
has been attempted to date. Investigating the generalizability of Party Capability Theory 
to federal tax cases is important in understanding the judicial allocation in federal 
taxation.
1
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2The Judicial System in the US
Federal courts are located in every state o f the United States as are separate state 
court systems. Except for the U.S. Tax Court, all of the subsequently mentioned federal 
courts are established under Article III o f the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Tax Court is 
formed under Article I.
Article III. Article III, Section 1, o f the Constitution provides that the judicial 
power o f the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts 
as the Congress may establish over time. The judges, both o f the Supreme and lower 
courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for 
their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in 
office.
Thus, judges of federal courts established under Article III enjoy tenure and 
unreduced salary protection. The tenure and salary provisions were inserted as 
prophylactic measures to ensure the independence o f the judiciary from the executive and 
legislative branches.
Article I. Article I, Section 1 o f the Constitution provides that all legislative 
powers granted shall be vested in a Congress o f the United States which shall consist o f a 
Senate and House o f Representatives.
Article I does not provide tenure and unreduced salary protection to officers of the 
institutions established under it.
The Structure of Federal Courts. The federal judiciary is a totally separate, self- 
governing branch of the government. With certain exceptions, federal courts have 
jurisdiction to hear a broad variety o f cases. The same federal judges handle both civil
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3and criminal cases, public and private law disputes, cases involving individuals, and 
cases involving corporations and government entities.
Trial Courts. In the United States, U.S. District Courts are the principal trial 
courts in the federal court system. There are 94 federal judicial districts and U.S. District 
Courts that have jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories o f federal cases.
The United States Court of Federal Claims operates as a single court that resides 
in Washington, D.C. It has jurisdiction over disputes involving federal contracts, the 
taking of private property by the federal government, and a variety o f other monetary 
claims against the United States.
The United States Tax Court is another single court located in Washington, D.C. 
It is a special court with jurisdiction limited almost exclusively to litigation under the 
Internal Revenue Code. Its hearings are held in several cities throughout the nation, 
usually with only a single judge present who submits his/her opinion to the chief judge. It 
consists o f 19 judges appointed by the President for 15-year terms. Different from all 
other federal courts discussed in this paper, it is established under Article I instead of 
Article III. Correspondingly, Tax Court judges do not have tenure or unreduced salary 
protection. Tax Court judges may be removed by the President, after notice and 
opportunity for public hearing, on grounds that are very broad: inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance in office.
Appellate Courts. If either party of the litigants is not satisfied with a trial court 
decision, the unsatisfied party can appeal to the appellate court. Currently there are 13 
courts o f appeals. The 11 numbered regional circuits and the D.C. Circuit are 
geographically defined. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4geographically defined and has nationwide jurisdiction over certain appeals based on 
subject matter. Appeals from all the trial courts mentioned above, except the United 
States Court o f Federal Claims, may be taken to the United States regional circuit court of 
appeals. Jurisdiction is based upon the location of the litigant’s residence. In addition, the 
Court o f Appeals for the Federal Circuit has nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals from 
the United States Court of Federal Claims.
The United States Supreme Court. If  either party of the litigants is dissatisfied 
with the appellate court decision, the unsatisfied party can then appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court is the highest court in the 
country, and cases come before it via a discretionary review writ o f certiorari. It consists 
o f a Chief Justice and eight associate justices. In general, the United States Supreme 
Court only agrees to decide cases where there is a split of opinion among the courts of 
appeals or where there is an important constitutional issue of federal law that needs to be 
clarified. As a result, tax cases find a very limited audience before the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts. In general, federal courts may decide cases 
that involve the United States government or its officials, the United States Constitution 
or federal laws, or controversies between states or between the United States and foreign 
governments. A case can be filed in federal court even if no question arising under 
federal law is involved if  the litigants are citizens of different states or the dispute arises 
between citizens of the United States and those of another country or countries.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5The Structure of State Courts. The majority of legal disputes in America are 
addressed in separate state court systems established in each of the 50 states. Most state 
court systems have trial courts o f general jurisdiction, intermediate appellate courts, and a 
state supreme court.
The Jurisdiction of State Courts. State courts have jurisdiction over a wider 
variety o f disputes than the federal courts. State courts preside over virtually all divorce 
and child custody matters, probate and inheritance issues, real estate questions, and other 
issues.
Representation before Courts
The litigation process in United States Courts is referred to as an “adversary” 
system because it relies on the litigants to present their dispute before a neutral fact­
finder. The work o f collecting evidence and presenting it to the court is accomplished by 
the litigants and their attorneys, normally without assistance from the court. Traditionally, 
litigants will use professional representation (solo law practitioners or a law firm) to 
represent them before the court. The decision to self-represent is evidence that such 
litigants are pursuing an unsound legal strategy because it is assumed that legal 
representation is required in order that the issues in a dispute can be effectively presented 
to the court (Barclay 1996). Recently, pro se representation has become more frequent, 
and Swank (2005) calls it “the Pro Se Phenomenon.”
United States Courts have seen an exponential growth rate in pro se 
representation. For instance, in 1971, only one percent of litigants in divorce cases in 
California were pro se. By 1985, the rate had risen to 47% and in 2005 it was 
approaching 75%. Federal courts as well as state courts have seen an increase in pro se
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6litigants. Pro se litigants appeared in 37% of all federal cases. The number o f pro se 
litigants in Federal Appellate Courts increased by 49% in a two-year period (Swank 
2005).
“A national conference held in November o f 1999 signals the rising importance of 
the pro se litigants, as forty-nine states sent teams of judges, bar leaders and 
administrators to discuss ways o f making the court system more accessible to pro se 
litigants (Buxton 2002).”
There are numerous reasons for the so called pro se phenomenon. The high cost 
of attorneys and litigation is only one o f the reasons. Other popular reasons include 
increased literacy rates, increased sense o f consumerism, increased sense of 
individualism, and belief in one’s own abilities. Sometimes litigants are advised to appear 
pro se either because their case was uncontested or was simple enough to handle on their 
own. Whatever the reason is, pro se representation is growing fast and demanding 
attention.
Not having representation can negatively affect both the litigant and others. Pro 
se litigants are more likely to neglect time limits and miss court deadlines. They are 
believed to be unduly burdensome on judges, clerks, and court processes (Swank 2005). 
When a pro se case succeeds in reaching court, the pro se litigant’s lack of knowledge of 
legal terminologies and trial tactics typically results in the opposing attorney taking 
control of the process (Buxton 2002).
The Use of the Legal System
Individuals, organizations, and governments make demands on the civil courts to 
settle their disputes, enforce the performance o f obligations, and direct the redistribution
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7of resources. Only some individuals, some organizations, and some governments use the 
court systems. Furthermore, not all types o f legal actions are demanded. The most 
frequent plaintiffs are not necessarily the most frequent defendants. Some litigants 
predominate as plaintiffs, while others appear most often as defendants.
Party Capability Theory
In 1974, Galanter formulated the ground-breaking hypothesis that repeat players 
(RP) come out ahead in courts and are better able to influence legal change than one- 
shotters (OS) (Galanter 1974). RP is defined as “a unit which has had and anticipates 
repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome of any one case, and which has 
the resources to pursue its long-run interests.” OS is defined as “a unit whose claims are 
too large (relative to his size) or too small (relative to the cost o f remedies) to be 
managed routinely and rationally.” RPs enjoy considerably more advantages in litigation 
than do OSs. First of all, RPs have the advantage o f “having done it before.” They have 
the necessary experience and intelligence, have ready access to specialists, and enjoy the 
economy of scale, with lower start up costs for any case. Second, RPs have opportunities 
to develop informal relations with courts and other relevant institutions. Third, RPs can 
afford to play odds. They can adopt strategies to maximize gain over a long series of 
cases. Finally, RPs have the necessary resources to influence rules. It pays RPs to expend 
resources, such as lobbying, to influence the making of relevant rules. By choosing to 
settle cases where they expect unfavorable rule outcomes and to adjudicate those cases 
that they regard as most likely to produce favorable rules, RPs can establish favorable 
precedent in litigation. The study also refers to RPs as “haves.” The word “haves”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8nowadays is frequently used to refer to a stronger party who has relatively more 
resources.
Galanter (1974) further points out that “parties who have lawyers do better.” 
“ ...RPs who can buy legal services more steadily, in larger quantities, in bulk and at 
higher rates, would get services o f better quality.” How much the legal services factor 
accentuates the RP advantage relates to the way in which the profession is organized. 
That is, the more members o f the profession are identified with their clients, the closer 
and more enduring the lawyer-client relationship, then the more advantages become 
cumulative in nature.
Since Galanter’s (1974) hypothesis, numerous studies have tested the hypothesis. 
Some studies cite it as “Galanter hypothesis” or “Galanter’s analysis” (Songer and 
Sheehan 1992, Wheeler et al. 1987, Sheehan et al. 1992, etc) while others cite it as “Party 
Capability Theory” (Atkins 1991, McCormick 1993). Hereafter, this study will use the 
term “Party Capability Theory.”
The general approach to test Party Capability Theory is to classify litigants into 
groups and make general assumptions about the strength of the groups (Wheeler et al. 
1987, Songer and Sheehan 1992, Haynie 1994, Songer et al. 1999, etc). Wheeler et al. 
(1987) classify litigants into individual litigants, individual business proprietorships, 
business corporations, and government parties. The assumption is that individual litigants 
are the weakest litigants because they generally have less resources. When business and 
government parties contend, the assumption is that governmental parties will generally be 
stronger, for they are more likely to be repeat players in the system.
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9Most of the studies for testing the Party Capability Theory have ignored 
Galanter’s assumption that “parties who have lawyers do better” and that the legal 
services factor accentuates the RP advantage. To date, only Wheeler et al. (1987) 
consider the impact of lawyers on different groups o f litigants’ chances of winning. They 
identify three legal representation types: pro se, solo practitioner, and law firm. They do 
not compare pro se representation with the other two types of representation (due to the 
tiny amount of pro se cases). They conclude that “ ...the weaker appellant, when 
represented by a law firm against the stronger respondent’s solo practitioner, did far 
better than when the reverse occurred.”
Significance of the Problem
“Although Party Capability Theory has been ‘exceptionally influential’” (Epp 
1999) and is “the most visible, widely cited, and influential article ever published in the 
law and society field” (Grossman et al. 1999), Galanter’s (1974) work has not been 
utilized in the academic accounting arena. Since federal taxation has undeniable 
importance in the United States, understanding the judicial reallocation in the federal 
taxation area will offer guidelines for tax reform to improve both horizontal and vertical 
equity.
As mentioned earlier in this study, most prior Party Capability Theory studies 
have ignored legal representation, especially pro se representation and its influence. The 
omission of legal representation in testing Party Capability Theory makes the study 
incomplete. One of the reasons for its omission is the scarcity o f pro se representation in 
the past. Pro se representation is growing exponentially, making the complete 
investigation o f Party Capability Theory possible.
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The negative effect o f pro se representation on both litigant parties and judicial 
systems has increasingly attracted more attention. However, virtually no empirical 
research has been undertaken to investigate the negative effect o f pro se representation. 
Because o f the growing importance o f pro se representation in federal tax cases, 
empirical evidence is needed on this vital topic.
Objectives of the Study
The primary objective o f this study is to examine whether Party Capability 
Theory applies to federal tax cases. No empirical research of Party Capability Theory has 
been attempted in the accounting/tax arena, and this study addresses this void.
In the investigation o f Party Capability Theory, this inquiry tries to gauge the 
effect of pro se representation and professional legal representation. As mentioned 
earlier, only Wheeler et al. (1987) consider the effect o f representation when testing Party 
Capability Theory. Yet, they are unable to test the pro se representation effect due to the 
scarcity o f pro se representation. Furthermore, Wheeler et al. (1987) do not correct for 
self-selection bias when investigating solo vs. firm representation. Lack o f correction for 
self-selection bias makes the result o f Wheeler et al. (1987) questionable. By taking into 
consideration representation effect, including pro se representation effect, and by using 
Heckman’s correction to address self-selection bias, this study attempts to augment the 
extant literature.
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Research Focus 
Research Question One
The first research question for investigation is: Who litigates? Not everyone 
exercises his or her right in court. Wanner (1974) uses court records of 1965-1970 and 
categorizes plaintiffs o f civil trial courts into individuals, organizations (including all 
businesses and voluntary associations), and governments. Organizations make up almost 
half of the plaintiffs, individuals approximately 42%, and governments only constitute 
about 9% of the plaintiffs. To date, no other research has been attempted concerning who 
litigates. The current study categorizes the litigants for federal tax issues into five groups: 
individuals, businesses, the federal government, state and local governments, and other. 
Unions; nonprofit organizations; private, nonprofit schools; social, charitable and 
fraternal organizations; political parties; and litigants who could not be unambiguously 
categorized are classified as other. The focus o f this inquiry is on the first three groups. 
This study investigates the litigation activities o f the first three groups in trial courts, 
Federal Appellate Courts, and the United States Supreme Court for federal tax issues. 
State and local governments are rarely parties in federal tax cases. There is no generally 
agreed standard to code the litigation strength of the “other” group. Therefore, the fourth 
and fifth groups are excluded from the analysis.
Research Question Two
What do parties litigate? This study investigates the kinds of federal tax issues 
upon which legal actions are taken by the first three groups of litigants mentioned in 
research question one.
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Research Question Three
Who is being sued or appealed? Wanner (1974) study concludes that, for civil 
trial courts, the most often chosen defendants are individuals. Individuals make up about 
67% of the defendants, organizations about 26%, and governments less than 6%. For the 
three groups o f litigants mentioned in research question one (individuals, businesses, and 
the federal government), this study attempts to answer which group(s) is(are) being sued 
and/or appealed for federal tax issues.
Research Question Four
Why defendant/appellee is being sued/appealed? For the three groups of 
defendants/appellees (individuals, businesses, and the federal government), this study 
investigates the major reasons the three groups o f defendants/appellees are being brought 
to court.
Research Question Five
What are the success rates o f individuals, businesses, and the United States 
government in litigation for federal tax issues? Following prior research, this study 
investigates this issue by looking individually at federal trial courts, Federal Appellate 
Courts, and the United States Supreme Court.
Research Question Six
Do different types o f representation before the judiciary (pro se, solo, and group 
representation) affect success rates of the three groups of litigants (individuals, 
businesses, and the federal government) in litigation? Wheeler et al. (1987) classify legal 
representation into firm, solo, and pro se representation. They find that weaker parties, 
when represented by a law firm against the stronger respondent represented by a solo
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practitioner, did far better than when the reverse occurred. However, they do not analyze 
pro se representation’s influence on litigation successes of different parties due to the 
scarcity o f pro se representation. Due to difficulties in distinguishing between a solo 
practitioner and a law firm with the limited information provided in a case, this study 
uses a different classification o f representation types than Wheeler et al. (1987). This 
study classifies representation into pro se, solo, and group representation. If only one 
attorney is mentioned in the head note, this study supposes the representation type is solo. 
If two or more attorneys are mentioned in the head note, this study supposes the 
representation type is group representation. With the high growth rate o f pro se 
representation, this study is able to analyze solo and group representation’s influence as 
well as pro se representation’s influence on the judicial success o f different litigation 
parties.
Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter One serves as an 
introduction to the topic o f Party Capability Theory and includes a discussion of the 
importance o f the issue and associated problems. The purpose o f the study is also 
presented.
Chapter Two reviews the prior analytical and empirical research in the area o f 
Party Capability Theory and relevant topics. Chapter Three presents the research 
questions and hypotheses to be investigated and discusses the data analyzed and the 
research methodologies used in the study. Chapter Four reports the empirical findings of 
the experiment; results o f the tests of hypotheses are provided and descriptive statistics 
are reported.
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Chapter Five contains a discussion o f the research findings. Conclusions and ideas 
for future research are presented. In addition, limitations of the study are noted.
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CHAPTER 2
SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW
Party Capability Theory Research
Since the formation o f Party Capability Theory, several scholars have provided
empirical insights into the extent to which stronger parties enjoy advantages in litigation.
Empirical Research Using 
Trial Court Cases
Wanner (1974) analyzes the principal users o f the civil court system, and the 
issues they sought to adjudicate. The sample is civil trial courts cases (Baltimore, 
Cleveland, and Milwaukee) from 1965 to 1970 and are selected randomly without 
replacement. According to the results, the most frequent users o f civil trial courts are 
organizations (businesses, voluntary associations, and appearances o f individuals in their 
occupational roles). They account for about half o f all plaintiffs. The trial courts used in 
the sample resolve a relatively narrow range o f disputes. O f the vast number o f legal 
actions and remedies available, only ten types of action are litigated frequently by 
plaintiffs. The burden o f defense is shown to fall unevenly on the litigants. The most 
numerous defendants are individuals, composing about two-thirds o f  the defendants. 
Finally, all categories o f defendants most often appear in three types o f suits: liens, 
contract actions, and summary debt proceedings.
15
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Wanner (1975) analyzes who wins and loses at litigation using the same data as
Wanner (1974). T-test results show that success and failure at litigation are unequally
distributed among the litigants. Government plaintiffs are more successful at litigation
than business plaintiffs. Business plaintiffs are more successful at litigation than
individual plaintiffs. Business and government plaintiffs enjoy complete victory in 65%
of the cases they bring against individuals while individuals enjoy complete victory in
only 20% of the cases they bring against business or government defendants. About two-
thirds of the t-tests resulted in statistically significant differences among individual,
business, and government plaintiffs’ distribution of success. The results also show that
business and government plaintiffs spend significantly less time in court than individual
plaintiffs. Time spent is defined as the average number o f months a court case takes from
filing to the last recorded docket entry.
Empirical Research Using State 
Supreme Court Cases
Wheeler et al. Wheeler et al. (1987) is a classic study of Party Capability Theory. 
It uses cases from 16 state supreme courts over the period o f 1870-1970. Wheeler et al. 
(1987) suggest a number of reasons why Party Capability Theory’s prediction might not 
be sustained. Prominent in the discussion is the “rational actor hypothesis” that suggests 
litigants would consider carefully whatever biases and advantages existed in the system 
and choose to litigate only in cases in which both parties, as advised by counsel, feel that 
there is a substantial possibility o f winning. The litigating parties are divided into five 
categories: individuals, business proprietors, business organizations, small town 
governments, and city or state governments. This represents the first time that a study 
makes assumptions about the relative strength of different parties. With
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acknowledgement that there could be exceptions, the study postulates that organizations 
on average are stronger than individuals. When business and government parties contend, 
the study assumes that bigger is stronger—that larger business organizations are stronger 
than small town governments. Where business and government parties o f similar size 
contend, the study assumes that government parties will generally be stronger, for they 
are more likely to be repeat players in the system. Despite all the reasons listed in the 
paper regarding why there might be no difference between the success rates o f stronger 
and weaker parties, the result does imply that stronger parties enjoy statistically higher 
success rates in litigation.
The study defines four types o f business parties (railroads, banks, manufacturing 
companies, and insurance companies) that seem likely to be repeat players and have 
substantial financial and legal resources as big interests. The analysis o f the four types o f 
business parties’ litigation success shows that big interests did achieve a significant net 
advantage over other kinds of businesses, although it only holds a modest net advantage 
over individual opponents. The results o f big interest versus government are mixed.
A combined success rate calculated by aggregating each party’s litigation results 
as appellant and respondent is affected by the frequency with which a type o f party is 
appellant rather than respondent. To offset this bias, Wheeler et al. (1987) for the first 
time use net advantage. Net advantage is the difference between the success rate o f the 
party at issue when the party is plaintiff/appellant and the success rate o f the opponent 
party when the party at issue is defendant/respondent. The net disadvantage o f weaker 
parties is less than 5% to 6 % on many measures in Wheeler et al. (1987), causing the 
authors to conclude that the advantage of the stronger parties is “rather small.”
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The study also tested the time effect on different parties’ success rates in 
litigation. Three time periods are identified: 1870-1900, 1905-1935, and 1940-1970. 
Results indicate that the trend is different between the private law arena and the public 
law domain. In the private law arena, relatively stronger parties enjoy a slight advantage 
over relatively weaker parties, although this advantage has diminished over time. 
However, in the public law arena, government parties win far more often than their 
adversaries, with great gains in the early twentieth century and more modest gains in the 
latter period o f the study.
Wheeler et al. (1987) also address Galanter’s (1974) assumption about the role of 
legal counsel (“parties who have lawyers do better”). That is, the type o f legal counsel is 
classified into three categories: pro se, solo, and firm representation. Due to the scarcity 
o f pro se cases, the study is unable to investigate the pro se representation influence on 
the success rate at litigation o f the party at issue. The study does conclude that, with few 
exceptions, the weaker appellant, when represented by a law firm against the stronger 
respondent’s solo practitioner, does far better than when the reverse occurs.
Farole. Farole (1999) examines litigant success in five states’ supreme courts 
(Alabama, Kansas, New Jersey, South Dakota, and West Virginia) during the years 1975, 
1980, 1985, and 1990. Each litigant is identified as either a state government, local 
government, business group, or individual. Following Wheeler et al. (1987), a big 
business category is also created. Besides railroads, banks, manufacturing companies, and 
insurance companies, the study adds airlines and oil companies to this category. His 
findings lend support for the thesis that advantaged litigants are more successful in state 
supreme courts than other litigants.
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The success rates o f appellants show that individual appellants are less successful 
than businesses appellants, which are less successful than local government appellants, 
which in turn, are less successful than state government appellants. Farole ascribes the 
success o f government appellants to the greater selectivity in choosing which cases to 
appeal. According to his data, governments are appellants far less frequently than other 
litigants. Big businesses enjoy substantial advantages over small, locally based businesses 
or individual litigants. Comparison between big businesses and government litigants is 
not available due to the scarcity o f the cases.
Following Wheeler et al. (1987), this study uses net advantage as well as 
combined success rate as appellant and respondent. The two results are consistent with 
the success rates o f appellants.
To provide further systematic analysis, Farole (1999) uses the logistic regression 
model. After controlling for policy preferences o f the state supreme court, type o f legal 
issue involved in the case, and the year the case is decided, stronger litigants’ advantages 
remain.
Empirical Research Using Federal 
Appellate Court Cases
Songer and Sheehan. Songer and Sheehan (1992) focus on the success of 
appellants appearing before United States Courts o f Appeals. Their findings show 
stronger parties are substantially more successful in U.S. Courts of Appeals. The study 
uses only one year of data from three circuits. It uses all cases terminated by judicial 
action in calendar year 1986 in the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits. This study 
differs from most other studies in that the cases used in this study include both published 
and unpublished decisions. Songer (1988) demonstrates that restricting analyses to the
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published opinions of the courts can produce seriously distorted results. By using both 
published and unpublished decisions, conclusions are more generalizable.
Four types of litigants are identified in this study: individuals, businesses, state 
and local governments, and the United States government. Following Wheeler et al. 
(1987), a big business category is created. Besides the four types of business included in 
Wheeler et al. (1987), airlines and oil companies are also added to the big business 
category. The final types of businesses included in the big business category are, thus, the 
same as in Farole (1999). This study creates a category of “underdog individuals” that 
included the poor and racial minorities. These individuals are assumed to be weaker on 
average than other individuals.
Appellant success rates and net advantage analysis show that the United States 
government enjoys the highest success rate at litigation, followed by state and local 
governments. Business litigants have a lower success rate than government litigants, but 
have a higher success rate than individual litigants. Consistent with Wheeler et al. (1987), 
big businesses held a decided advantage over other businesses but only a very modest 
advantage over individuals. “Underdog individuals” appellant success rate is lower than 
the total category o f individuals against the other three categories. The net advantage of 
“underdog individuals” is -50.2, which is much lower than the total category of 
individuals’ net advantage o f -18.2.
Logistic regression is used for further analysis. After accounting for types o f legal 
issues, party effect (whether majority o f judges are appointed by Democratic presidents 
or Republican presidents), and region of the cases (South/Midwestern), stronger 
litigants’ advantages remain. While the strength of both the appellants and the
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respondents makes a contribution to the final case result, appellants’ strengths are more 
important.
Songer et al. In order to improve generalizability, Songer et al. (1999) again 
examine the success o f various types o f litigants appearing before U.S. Courts of 
Appeals. The data constitute a random sample o f published decisions from each circuit 
for each year from 1925 through 1988.
As in Songer and Sheehan (1992), four types o f litigants are identified in this 
study: individual litigants, businesses, state and local governments, and the United States 
government.
To analyze changes over time, the 64 years of data are divided into five periods. 
Instead o f simply dividing the 64 years into five equal periods as in Wheeler et al. (1987), 
Songer et al. (1999) divide the time period according to the legal and political history o f 
the twentieth century. During the first period, 1925-1936, the legal system is dominated 
by conservative, pro-business judges at all levels o f the judicial system. The second 
period, 1937-1945, is dominated by the Roosevelt Court and its aggressive pro-New Deal 
policies. It has a decidedly pro-underdog orientation. The third period, 1946-1960, is 
characterized by economic prosperity and the selection of lower court judges without 
much regard for their policy preferences. The fourth period, 1961-1969, is characterized 
by the leadership o f a liberal Supreme Court (Warren Court) which advocated the welfare 
o f poor people. During the final period, 1970-1988, the Supreme Court becomes steadily 
more conservative.
The overall success rate as appellants and respondents and the net advantage show 
that the “haves” win consistently throughout three o f the five periods examined. For these
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three periods, the U.S. government consistently has the highest success rate at litigation, 
followed by state and local governments. Business litigants have a lower success rate at 
litigation than governments but a higher success rate than individual litigants. For the 
second period, 1937-1945, which is dominated by the Roosevelt Court and has a 
decidedly pro-underdog orientation, individuals appear to fare about as well as 
businesses, though both fare substantially worse than either level o f government. State 
and local governments are more successful than the federal government at litigation. For 
the third period, 1946-1960, characterized by economic prosperity and the selection of 
lower court judges without much regard for their policy preferences, state and local 
governments again are more successful than the federal government at litigation.
Logistic regression is employed in this study. After controlling for types of legal
issues, and party effect (whether the majority of judges are appointed by Democratic or
Republican presidents), stronger litigants’ advantages remain. Consistent with Songer
and Sheehan (1992), the strength o f both the appellants and the respondents make a
contribution to the final case result. However, appellants’ strengths are more important.
Empirical Research Using United 
States Supreme Court Cases
Although support for Party Capability Theory is found in trial courts, state 
supreme courts, and Federal Appellate Courts, no support has been found in the United 
States Supreme Court.
Sheehan et al. (1992) examine the success rate o f  10 categories o f  parties in the 
United States Supreme Court over a 36-year period, from 1953 to 1988, and conclude 
there is little evidence litigant resources have a major impact on success in that forum. 
Instead, the success o f different classes o f litigants is closely related to the changing
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ideological composition o f the Court. Unions and poor individuals fare substantially 
better in liberal courts, and state governments are most successful in conservative courts.
To test if  court ideology affects litigation success rates o f different groups, the 36 
year period tested is divided into three time periods: Warren Court (1953-1970), the early 
Burger Court (1971-1980), and the later Burger and Rehnquist Courts (1981-1988). The 
overall success rates show that individual litigant’s success rates at litigation against all 
other parties decrease steadily throughout the three periods. The study ascribes the 
decreasing success rates o f individual litigants at litigation to the growing conservatism 
o f the court. However, the study does not provide the net advantages o f the litigating 
parties during these three periods. Instead of due to the increasing conservatism of the 
court, the decreasing overall success rates of individual litigants could be caused by 
increasing rates o f individual litigants being respondents rather than appellants. (The 
Supreme Court has a well-established tendency of reversing decisions from appellate 
courts. For this study period, the Supreme Court’s reversal rate is 67% .)
To test the relationship between ideology and the litigation success rate of 
different groups, the study also uses multivariate logit models. Four models are 
established, respectively, for individuals, businesses, state and local governments, and the 
federal government. Ideology is significant in three o f the four models. Ideology is not 
significant in the model for the business group. Litigant group (resources factor) is 
significant in the models for the business group and for the state and local government 
group. The resources factor is no longer significant in the business model and is reduced 
to borderline significance in the state and local government model after the cases 
involving the federal government are removed. This evidence proves that the resources
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factor is significant in the business model and, for the most part, the state and local 
government model because these two groups lose consistently to the federal government.
A series o f transfer function models are then used to further analyze the
ideological effects on the litigant’s success. The ideology of each justice is measured on a
scale of 1 (most liberal) to -1 (most conservative). The impact of ideology on the success
rate of individuals is especially dramatic; each unit increase in the conservatism of the
court has reduced the success rate o f individuals against state or local governments by
slightly less than four percentage points.
Empirical Research Using Data 
Outside of the United States
Several studies have been attempted using data outside o f the United States to 
generalize Party Capability Theory. The results are mixed. In general, Party Capability 
Theory does not get as much support from using data outside o f the United States as it 
does from using domestic data.
Atkins. Atkins (1991) uses data from English Court o f Appeals for 1983-1985. 
The data includes both published and unpublished cases. The analysis method of this 
study is different from other studies in that discriminant analysis instead o f logistic 
analysis is used. The dependent variable is the case result. This study is the first to use the 
lower forum as one of the independent variables. This inquiry also, for the first time, 
introduced panel size o f the Court o f Appeal as an indicator o f the importance of cases. 
The study concludes that although governments have higher success rates at litigation 
than individuals, the relationships o f governments vs. corporations and corporations vs. 
individuals are not clear.
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McCormick. The McCormick (1993) study uses data from the Supreme Court of 
Canada during the time period of 1949 to 1992 to generalize Party Capability Theory to 
Canada. The general conclusion from appellant success rate analysis, combined success 
rate analysis, and net advantage analysis strongly supports the theoretical prediction that 
governments are most successful at litigation, followed by businesses. Individuals are the 
most disadvantaged group at litigation. This finding is quite different from the Sheehan et 
al. (1992) finding using data o f the U.S. Supreme Court. Sheehan et al. (1992) do not find 
support for Party Capability Theory in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Haynie. The Haynie (1994) study uses data from the Philippine Supreme Court 
during the time period o f 1961 to 1986. Consistent with Sheehan et al. (1992) and in 
contrast to McCormick (1993), Haynie (1994) does not find support for Party Capability 
Theory. In fact, logistic regression, net advantage analysis, and combined success rate 
analysis all show that individuals have the greatest likelihood o f success at litigation in 
the Philippine Supreme Court. Haynie concludes that in developing societies there may 
be pressure for courts to support redistributive policies as a means of enhancing their 
legitimacy as a political institution. Such a concern for legitimacy may tend to outweigh 
the advantage that the stronger parties would normally receive from superior experiences 
and resources.
Summary of Party Capability Theory Research
Prior empirical research o f Party Capability Theory has two branches. One branch 
uses U.S. data. This branch has generalized Party Capability Theory to trial courts, 
United States Courts o f Appeals, and state supreme courts. No evidence in support o f 
Party Capability Theory has been found in the U.S. Supreme Court. Another branch of
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Party Capability Theory research uses data outside of the United States. Evidence in 
support of Party Capability Theory is found using data from developed countries, but no 
evidence has been found using data from developing countries that supports Party 
Capability Theory. No prior research has tried to specifically generalize the Party 
Capability Theory to cases involving federal tax issues. Thousands o f litigants seek legal 
recourse of federal tax disputes each year in the United States. 1 Whether or not Party 
Capability Theory applies to those cases has profound implications for analysis of 
judicial allocation. The study o f Party Capability Theory in the federal tax context is long 
overdue.
Pro Se Representation Research 
Swank
Swank’s (2005) “Pro Se Phenomenon” analysis examines the rise of pro se
litigation and the various reasons for this phenomenon.
The right to represent oneself in United States courts dates back to the founding of 
the country. The development o f pro se rights in the United States has been tied to 
the rights o f indigents to have access to the courts. The Judiciary Act o f 1789 was 
an early codification o f this belief. It granted parties the right to plead and conduct 
their own case personally in any court of the United States. Many states, either 
through their constitutions or statutorily, also provide individuals with the right to 
proceed pro se. It is unclear, however, if  there is a right to self-representation 
pursuant to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment guarantees 
criminal defendants the right to have assistance of counsel; by implication, the 
Amendment has served as a basis to hold that criminal defendants can waive that 
right and appear pro se. The right has been extended by the Supreme Court to 
civil cases.
1A  simple examination o f  the federal tax cases in the Lexis-Nexis database revealed that thousands o f  
cases were entered into verdict each year by the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court o f  
Appeals, or the U.S. Supreme Court during the time period o f  1940 to 2006.
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This study summarizes numerous research and survey results and cogently shows 
the exponential growth of pro se representation in the United States. Reasons for the “Pro 
Se Phenomenon” are summarized from various survey results. One o f the reasons is the 
high cost o f attorneys and litigation. Other popular reasons include increased literacy 
rates, sense of consumerism, and sense of individualism; and belief in one’s own abilities. 
Sometimes a litigant is advised to appear pro se either because his or her case was 
uncontested or was simple enough to handle on their own.
Buxton
Buxton (2002) investigates the traditional problems associated with the 
appearance o f pro se litigants and the countermeasures currently in place to assist them.
The pro se party’s unfamiliarity with evidentiary rules often leads to a failure to 
meet the burden of proof. The pro se party’s lack o f knowledge of legal terminology and 
trial tactics typically results in the opposing attorney taking control o f the process. There 
are currently a lot of programs aimed at making the pro se parties’ journey easier. While 
pro se programs take a variety o f forms, these programs consistently represent the desire 
of the judiciary to educate pro se litigants about the process of proceeding with a suit. 
The general forms o f the programs include provision of instructional brochures, 
videotaped programs, teaching sessions, and internet-based services.
Barclay
Barclay (1996) argues that self-representation could be part of a sound legal 
strategy that forces the court to focus on issues the litigant views as important. Through a 
phone interview with 95 civil appellants, the author identifies a salient disjuncture 
between the focus o f the legal system and the litigants’ own views o f the issues in their
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disputes. By choosing to self-represent, the courts are forced to deal with those issues that 
self-represented litigants choose to place on their dockets.
Ross
Ross (1970) finds that automobile injury claimants represented by attorneys 
recover claims more frequently than unrepresented claimants; among those who do 
recover, represented claimants recover significantly more than do unrepresented 
claimants with comparable cases. Claimants represented by firms recovered considerably 
more than claimants represented by solo practitioners.
Summary of Pro Se Representation Research
Although several analytical inquires have been made regarding pro se 
representation, there are very few empirical studies. This lack of research is partly due to 
the scarce amount o f pro se representation in the past. The unavailability o f data makes 
empirical research especially difficult. With the exponential growth rate of pro se 
representation, empirical research under the current environment is not only important 
but also possible.
Relevant Research in the Accounting Arena
As mentioned before, no Party Capability Theory study uses tax cases solely for 
sample selection. This section reviews some relevant studies in the accounting area.
Judge Bias Studies
Analytical studies have been completed to report the different chances o f success at 
litigation for taxpayers and the IRS. The purpose o f these studies is to evaluate judge bias 
instead of evaluating Party Capability.
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Maule. Maule (1999) analyzes judge bias by looking at two aspects: the 
opportunity for bias and the taxpayer prevalence scores o f judges. For issues clearly and 
unquestionably established by statute and case law, there is little opportunity for bias. For 
cases decided between 1976 and 1997, 60.2% of them do not provide opportunity for 
bias. Of these cases, the Service prevails in 95% of sampled memorandum decisions and 
75% of the sampled regular decisions. For the cases with bias opportunities, taxpayers 
prevailed in 29% of the sampled memorandum opinions and 48% of the sampled regular 
opinions. Maule ascribes the difference to the much higher percentage of pro se taxpayer 
litigants subject to memorandum opinions. The analysis o f taxpayer prevalence scores of 
judges strongly favors taxpayers and does not favor the IRS.
Maule concludes that the “Tax Court, like the umpires, does not make the 
rules...law requires the Court to reject, they ought to direct their criticism to the 
Congress.” Actually, this comment sharply points out one of the strengths o f the Service 
as a repeat player: the IRS as a repeat player can influence rules, either by lobbying or by 
choosing to settle cases where they expect unfavorable outcomes and to adjudicate those 
cases that they regard as most likely to produce favorable results and set precedent.
Geier. Geier (1991) compares U.S. Tax Court cases and U.S. District Courts cases 
o f the period from 1965 to 1986. The government won or partially won an average of 
70.5% of U.S. District Court cases in the years indicated. The percentage o f cases won or 
partially won by the government in the Tax Court averaged 90.4% for the same period. 
Geier ascribes the 24-point difference to a pro-government trend in the Tax Court. As 
mentioned earlier, the U.S. Tax Court is formed under Article I and U.S. District Courts 
are formed under Article III. Therefore, U.S. Tax Court judges do not have tenure and
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unreduced salary protection like U.S. District Courts judges. Geier believes that the lack 
o f protection o f Tax Court judges contributes to the pro-government trend o f the U.S. Tax 
Court.
Empirical Study about 
Pro Se Representation
According to Nichols and Price (2004), final tax assessment is significantly less for 
taxpayers with professional representation2 during an IRS office audit, both in dollars and 
as a percentage o f the potential deficiency. Here self-selection bias exists because non­
randomness arises from individual choices. In order to correct for self-selection bias, this 
study adopts Heckman’s correction technique (Heckman 1976,1979).
Summary of Relevant Research 
in the Accounting Arena
Research of judicial decisions in the accounting arena focuses on Tax Court 
decisions. Analytical studies about the decisions o f the Tax Court generally argue about 
whether Tax Court judges have pro-government bias. One side of the argument is that 
Congress is biased against taxpayers. The other side of the argument is that Tax Court 
judges are biased against taxpayers because of the lack of Article III protection. No 
research has looked at the Tax Court decisions from the point of view of Party Capability 
Theory. Some studies do notice the influence o f pro se representation, but there is no 
systematic research about pro se representation’s influence on court decisions. A study of 
court decisions from the Party Capability Theory point o f view will fill this void.
2Instead o f  using tax professionals, Nichols and Price (2004) treat students who were well prepared for the 
audit issues identified in the IRS audit notice and had a significantly greater level o f  knowledge than the 
taxpayers as professional representation.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY 
Research Questions
The following research questions are presented in Chapter One as worthy of 
investigation to gain insight into the strength of tax litigation groups in the United States:
1. Who litigates? This study investigates the litigation activities o f individuals, 
businesses, and the federal government in trial courts, Federal Appellate 
Courts, and the United States Supreme Court in federal tax issues.
2. What do litigants seek satisfaction in the courts? This study seeks to answer 
what kinds o f federal tax issues are litigated by individuals, businesses, and 
the federal government.
3. Who is being sued/appealed? This study seeks to answer which group(s) of 
the three groups (individuals, businesses, and the federal government) is(are) 
being sued and/or appealed for federal tax issues.
4. Why defendant/appellee is being sued/appealed? This inquiry investigates the 
three groups (individuals, businesses, and the federal government) of 
defendants/appellees are being brought to court for what kinds o f federal tax 
issues.
31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
5. What are the success rates o f individuals, businesses, and the United States 
government in litigation on federal tax issues?
6 . Do different types of representation before the court (pro se, solo, and group 
representation) have an effect on the judicial success rates of individuals, 
businesses, and the federal government?
Hypotheses
Corresponding to the research questions, the following hypotheses are presented for 
empirical investigation.
Hai : Individuals, businesses, and the federal government have unequal frequencies 
o f using legal recourse.
Ha2: Different categories o f tax issues have unequal frequencies o f being brought to 
court.
Ha3: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government have unequal frequencies 
o f being sued or appealed.
Ha4: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government are sued or appealed on 
different categories of tax issues.
Ha5: Different groups o f litigants have unequal success rates at litigation for federal 
tax issues, with the United States government being the most successful 
entity, businesses being the second, and individuals being the least successful.
Ha6: The three representation types before the courts (pro se, solo, and group 
representation) have significant influence on the success rates o f individuals, 
businesses, and the federal government in litigation.
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Research Sample
The research sample is obtained from the Lexis-Nexis database. This study divides 
cases collected into three categories: trial court cases, Federal Appellate Court cases, and 
United States Supreme Court cases. Trial court cases include the cases that are entered by 
the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. District Courts, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Federal 
Appellate Court cases include cases that are entered by U.S. Courts o f Appeals. The U.S. 
Courts of Appeals includes the eleven numbered circuits and additional unnumbered 
circuits for the District o f Columbia Circuit and the Federal Circuit. The United States 
Supreme Court cases include those entered by the United States Supreme Court.
The first internal revenue code o f the United States is the Internal Revenue Code of 
1939. It codifies various revenue acts that are legislated between 1913 and 1939. 
Subsequently, with the growing complexity o f the tax law, the Code was rewritten as the 
Internal Revenue Code o f 1954. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was so significant and the 
scope o f the changes so comprehensive that the tax law was renamed the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986. The research sample in this study includes only cases that are 
entered according to the current Internal Revenue Code (i.e., the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986).
This study investigates court decisions for the period 1992-2006. For the period 
under study, over 20,000 U.S. District Court decisions are entered each year. Among 
them, only a few hundred decisions are about federal tax issues. This research finds 5,112 
U.S. District Court federal tax issue decisions in total from 1992-2006. A total o f 8,613 
Tax Court judgments are found for the period under study. The U.S. Court o f Federal 
Claims decides around 500 cases each year. But only around 20 o f those cases are about
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federal tax issues. For years 1992 to 2006, 25 Tax Court cases and 25 U.S. District Court 
cases are randomly selected each year. All of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims federal tax 
cases from 1992 to 2006 are chosen. For the period under study, over 30,000 Federal 
Appellate Court cases are decided each year. This inquiry finds 2,590 appellate court 
federal tax cases from 1992 to 2006. A total o f 50 appellate court federal tax cases are 
obtained randomly for each year during the period under study. Around 7,500 cases each 
year are presented to the U.S. Supreme Court for writ of Certiorari but only 80-150 cases 
are granted certiorari each year for the period under study. Federal tax issues find very 
limited representation before the U.S. Supreme Court. A total o f 30 Supreme Court 
federal tax cases are found for period 1992-2006. All o f the 30 Supreme Court federal tax 
cases are chosen.
Cases involving litigants that cannot be classified into any of the four groups 
(individuals, businesses, state and local governments, the federal government) are 
eliminated. Those cases include litigation involving unions; nonprofit organizations; 
private, nonprofit schools; social, charitable, and fraternal organizations; political parties; 
and litigants who could not be unambiguously categorized. Cases in which the primary 
issue is not a federal tax issue are deleted. When a case is eliminated, another case is 
chosen randomly as a substitution.
Examination o f the sample reveals that state or local governments are seldom 
involved in federal tax cases. Out o f the 375 Tax Court cases, no state or local 
government litigants are involved. Only six o f the 375 U.S. District Court cases, and one 
of the 267 U.S. Court of Federal Claims cases involve state or local government litigants. 
For the 750 Federal Appellate Court cases, there are also six cases involving state or local
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governments. Only one out o f the 30 U.S. Supreme Court cases involves state or local 
governments. Due to the scarcity o f state or local government litigants in federal tax 
cases, these cases are deleted from further analysis.
The final sample includes 375 Tax Court cases, 369 U.S. District Court cases, 266 
U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases, 744 Federal Appellate Court cases, and 29 U.S. 
Supreme Court cases3.
Research Methods
For the analysis, each plaintiff/appellant and defendant/appellee is classified as 
belonging to one o f the four major classes: individuals, businesses, state and local 
governments, and the United States government. Sole proprietor is treated as an 
individual. If the party listed in the case citation is a specific, named individual, but the 
person’s involvement in the suit is due directly to his/her role as an official o f a 
government agency or as an officer, partner, or owner of a business, he/she is coded 
according to his/her organizational affiliation and not as an individual. When multiple 
parties are plaintiffs, defendants, appellants, or appellees, they are treated as one party, 
coded according to the strongest member on their side.
3
Independence captures the intuition o f  non-interaction and lack o f  information. In modeling it is 
often assumed rather than verified. This study assumes that the verdicts o f  trial court cases, Federal 
Appellate Court cases, and U.S. Supreme Court cases are independent from each other. There are 18 out o f  
the 744 Federal Appellate Court cases that are appealed from the trial court cases sample o f  this study. A 
total o f  seven out o f  the 29 U.S. Supreme Court cases are appealed from the Federal Appellate Court cases 
sample o f  this study. The assumption is that the results will not be distorted. So, this inquiry is looking at 
marginal association among variables instead o f  partial association among variables. The information 
conveyed by marginal association can be quite different from that conveyed by partial association. 
Whenever possible, variables should be controlled that may affect the association between the variables o f  
interest (Agresti 1984). However, this study believes that the cost o f  excluding higher forum cases which 
are appealed from lower forum cases sample outweigh its benefit, especially for Supreme Court cases 
(exclusion o f  the seven Supreme Court cases which are from the Federal Appellate Court cases sample cut 
Supreme Court cases sample to only 22 observations).
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For the period 1992-2006, this research finds 8,613 Tax Court cases, 5,112 U.S. 
District Court cases, and 267 U.S. Court of Federal Claims cases deal with federal tax 
issues. This study does not use proportional sampling to make the proportion of 
subsamples match the population. In order to adjust for the influence o f unproportional 
sampling, the cases from different judicial forums are weighted when performing analysis 
for trial court decisions.
Research Question One
This study investigates the frequency of different groups using litigation to settle 
federal tax issues for the three categories of cases (trial court decisions, Federal Appellate 
Court decisions, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
For trial court cases, chi-square test o f goodness of fit4 is used to test the equal 
frequency o f individual, business, and the federal government appearing as plaintiffs. As 
this study mentioned earlier, the U.S. Tax Court is an Article I Court while U.S. District 
Courts are Article III Courts. The U.S. Court o f Federal Claims deals with monetary 
claims against the United States. In order to detect any differences among these three 
judicial forums, the trial court cases are divided into cases from the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. 
District Courts, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Chi-square test of goodness of fit 
is run separately for the three different judicial forums. Chi-square test for independence5
4 Chi-square goodness o f  fit statistic is defined as: * _ * {n~'Ej )  . For equal frequency test, H0 is that the
x  ~h e ,
values o f  the multinomial probabilities P\=Pi= ... Pv (Bowerman and O ’Connell 1997).
5 Chi-square test for independence is defined as: % ^  ( n i j ~ E i j )  . H0 is that the two classifications are
X  ~  2j  *
A llC ells
statistically independent (Bowerman and O ’Connell 1997).
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is used to detect any relationship between the type of plaintiff and the judicial forum 
used.
For Federal Appellate Court cases and U.S. Supreme Court cases, Chi-square test 
o f goodness o f fit is used to test the equal frequency of individuals, businesses, and the 
federal government appearing as appellants.
Research Question Two
To address the tax issues involved in each case, this study codes all the IRC 
Sections mentioned in each case. They are then classified into ten categories o f tax issues 
according to the classification o f the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. The ten categories 
o f tax issues are income taxes; estate and gift taxes; employment taxes; miscellaneous 
excise taxes; alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise taxes; procedure and 
administration; financing o f presidential election campaigns; trust fund code; coal 
industry health benefits; and group health plan requirements. If one case involves more 
than one tax issue, only the major tax issue is coded.
This study separately investigates the subject o f litigants’ adjudication in the three 
different categories of cases. For the trial court decisions, chi-square test of goodness of 
fit is used to test the equal frequency o f different tax issues being brought to court. Chi- 
square test for independence is used to further test if  there exists any relationship between 
the type o f the plaintiff(s) and the tax issue(s) being brought to court. The trial court 
decisions are then divided into cases from the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. District Courts, and 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Chi-square test o f goodness o f fit is separately run for 
the three judicial forums. Chi-square for independence is used to test if  there is any
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relationship between the type of tax issues being brought to court and the judicial forum 
used.
For Federal Appellate Court cases, chi-square test o f goodness of fit is used to test 
the equal frequency of different tax issues being brought to court. Chi-square test for 
independence is used to further test if  there exists a relationship between the type o f the 
appellant(s) and the tax issue(s) being appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court cases sample is 
not big enough for a valid chi-square test. No formal test o f Ha2 is done for U.S. 
Supreme Court cases. Sample description is provided.
Research Question Three
This inquiry investigates the frequency o f different groups being sued or appealed 
in the three categories o f cases. For trial court decisions, chi-square test of goodness o f fit 
is used to test the equal frequency of individuals, businesses, and the federal government 
appearing as defendant. Chi-square test for independence is used to test if  there is any 
relationship between the type of defendant and the legal forum chosen.
For Federal Appellate Court and U.S. Supreme Court cases, chi-square test of 
goodness of fit is used to test the equal frequency o f individuals, businesses, and the 
federal government appearing as appellee.
Research Question Four
This study investigates what defendant (appellee) is being sued (appealed) in 
three different categories of tax cases. For trial court decisions, chi-square test for 
independence is used to test if  there exists any relationship between the type o f defendant 
and the tax issue being brought to court. Only the major tax issue in each case is 
considered. For Federal Appellate Court cases, chi-square test for independence is used to
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test if  there exists any relationship between the type of appellee and the tax issue being 
appealed. The size o f the U.S. Supreme Court cases sample is not sufficient for a valid 
chi-square test and only data description is presented. No statistical method is attempted 
to formally test Ha4 for U.S. Supreme Court cases.
Research Question Five
The available data does not permit this research endeavor to code the strength of 
the litigants according to their size o f financial resources and frequency o f dealing with 
courts. This study follows Wheeler et al. (1987) to make general assumptions o f the 
strength o f the different groups o f litigants. As a result, this study assumes that 
individuals usually have fewer resources than either businesses or the federal 
government. When business and federal government parties confront each other, the 
assumption is that the federal government is usually stronger because even when the 
financial resources of the federal government is no greater than those of the businesses, 
the government agencies are more likely to be repeat players. These assumptions are 
consistent with Songer and Sheehan (1992), and Songer et al. (1999).
Prior researches have analyzed the relative strength of different groups using trial 
courts, Federal Appellate Courts, or the United States Supreme Court data. In order to 
make comparisons with prior studies, this inquiry analyzes case results separately for trial 
courts, Federal Appellate Courts, and the United States Supreme court.
For trial court, the case result is coded as “1” if  the plaintiff wins, “0” if the 
defendant wins. For other courts, the case result is coded as “1” if the appellant wins, “0” 
if  the appellee wins.
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For trial court, the plaintiff is coded as a win when the plaintiff wins a judgment 
or verdict; the defendant is coded in the same manner. In the event o f a partial judgment 
for the plaintiff and a partial judgment for the defendant, the party who prevails is coded 
as a win. Following Maule (1999), the prevailing party is determined by comparing the 
dollar difference between the parties with the dollar difference between the court’s 
determination and the amount allowed by the IRS.
For Federal Appellate Courts and the United States Supreme Court, following the 
approach o f Wheeler et al. (1987), this study defines winners and losers by looking at 
“who won the appeal in its most immediate sense, without attempting to view the appeal 
in some larger context.” If the decision o f the trial court is “reversed,” “reversed and 
remanded,” “vacated,” or “vacated and remanded,” the appellant is coded as a win. This 
study ignores “the possibility that an appellant who sought primarily to postpone the day 
o f judgment might have ‘won’ in terms o f successfully obtaining a profitable delay, 
although the legal grounds for its appeal are rejected.”
For the comparison of the success rates of the three groups in trial courts, this 
study first looks at the success rates o f the three groups in litigation when they are 
plaintiffs. Second, this study examines the combined success rates o f the three groups in 
litigation as plaintiffs and as defendants. Third, in order to eliminate the influences of the 
different frequencies of the three groups that appear as plaintiffs vs. defendants, this 
study calculates the net advantages o f the three groups. The calculation o f the net 
advantage is as defined by Wheeler et al. (1987). That is, net advantage is the difference 
between the success rate of the party at issue when the party is plaintiff/appellant and the 
success rate of the opponent party when the party at issue is defendant/appellee. Fourth,
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to further explore the advantage that the stronger party appears to have, this study follows 
the lead o f Wheeler et al. and selects only those cases in which parties in different 
categories directly confronted each other. The net advantages o f the three groups using 
only direct comparison cases are calculated. Fifth, this study divides the trial court cases 
into three groups according to the judicial forum: Cases from the U.S. Tax Court, cases 
from U.S. District Courts, and cases from the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. Steps one 
through four are repeated separately for the three groups o f trial court cases. Finally, this 
study uses logistic regression to formally test hypothesis five. The dependant variable is 
dichotomous. It is coded as “1” if  the plaintiff wins and “0” if  the defendant wins. Three 
types o f independent variables are developed. The first type includes litigant party 
strength variables. The strengths o f plaintiffs and defendants are coded. Litigant strength 
variable is coded as “ 1” for individuals, “2” for businesses, and “3” for the federal 
government. The second type o f independent variables includes dummy variables for 
different types o f tax issues. The types o f tax issues are defined in research question two. 
Dummy variables are used for each type o f tax issues. For example, if  the case’s major 
issue is an income tax issue, the dummy variable for income tax issues is coded “ 1 ”, the 
dummy variables for other tax issues are coded zero. The third type of independent 
variables includes dummy variables for different judicial forums.
For the comparison of success rates in litigation for the three groups in Federal 
Appellate Courts, this study first looks at the success rates of the three groups in litigation 
when they are appellants. Second, this investigation examines the combined success rates 
of the three groups at litigation as appellants and as appellees. Third, in order to 
eliminate the influences of the different frequencies the three groups appear as appellants
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vs. appellees, this inquiry calculates the net advantages of the three groups. Fourth, to 
further explore the advantage that the stronger party appears to have, this study selects 
only those cases in which parties in different categories directly confronted each other. 
The net advantage o f the three groups using only direct comparison cases is calculated. 
Finally, logistic regression is used to formally test hypothesis five. The dependant 
variable is dichotomous (it is coded as “ 1” if  the appellant wins and “0 ” if  the appellee 
wins). Three types of independent variables are developed. The first type includes litigant 
party strength variables. The strengths o f the appellant and appellee are separately coded. 
The second type of independent variables includes dummy variables for different types of 
tax issues. Pursuant to Atkins (1991), this investigation defines the third type of 
independent variables which includes dummy variables for different types o f lower 
forums.
For comparison of the success rates o f the three groups at the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the first four steps o f analysis are the same as the first four steps used for the 
Federal Appellate Court cases. Then, this study uses logistic regression to formally test 
hypothesis five. The dependant variable is dichotomous. It is coded as “1” if  the appellant 
wins and “0” if the appellee wins. Two types of independent variables are developed. The 
first type includes litigant party strength variables. The strengths of the appellant and 
appellee are separately coded. The second type o f independent variables includes dummy 
variables for different types o f tax issues.
Research Question Six
Representation Type. To test whether representation type affects the success of 
the three groups at litigation, this inquiry categorizes the representation type into pro se,
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solo, and group representation. It is not always clear whether an attorney mentioned in 
the head note is representing the client on his own or whether that attorney is the member 
o f a firm. In order to maintain the consistence o f the coding, if  only one attorney is 
mentioned in the head note, this study assumes the representation type is solo. If two or 
more attorneys are mentioned in the head note, this study assumes the representation type 
is group representation.
Heckman’s Correction. Selection bias arises whenever there is non-random 
sampling. Self-selection bias arises when the non-randomness arises from individual 
choices. In this investigation, litigants self-select the kind o f representation type. OLS 
procedures that ignore the non-randomness o f the sample may be biased. To correct for 
self-selection bias, this study uses the methodology developed by Heckman (1976, 1979).
Consider an observation equation (Equation 1) and a selection equation (Equation 
2 ) o f the form:
Yu = 0iXu + Uu (1)
Y2i* = 6 2X2, + U 2l (2)
Heckman’s correction is comprised o f two stages. The first stage is the estimation 
of a selection equation.
Y 2i* =  /32X 2i +  U 2j U ~ N ( 0 ,1 )
Y 2j =1 if Y 2j* > 0 
Y 2i = 0 i f Y 2i* <=0
The selection equation is estimated by maximum likelihood as an independent 
probit model. A vector o f the inverse of Mills ratios (X) is then generated from the 
parameter estimates.
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The second stage is the estimation of the observation equation. Instead o f using 
Equation 1, Heckman’s two-stage estimation introduced X into Equation 1 as another 
independent variable, thus get Equation 3:
Y li = /31X l i+ - £ k = A / + V , i (3)
V ^ 22
Pro Se Choice Model. The pro se choice model is developed to control for self­
selection bias, which is shown as Equation 4:
Lawyer = Ob + aiTaxIssue + (^Amount + (^Individual + (^Company + et (4)
Where:
“Lawyer”= j 1 if  lawyer(s) represented.
1 0  if  pro se.
“Taxlssue” is a group of dummy variables that represent the type of tax issues 
involved in the case. Tax issue type is as defined in research question two.
“Amount” is the total of the dollar amount in dispute.
“Individual” and “Company” are dummy variables for the type of litigant 
involved.
Solo Choice Model. Solo choice model is developed as shown in Equation 5:
Group=/3o + /31 Taxlssue + & Amount + + $ 3  Individual + ^Com pany + e, (5)
“Group” is a dummy variable coded as “1” if  a group represents the litigant and 
“0” otherwise.
Application of Heckman’s Correction. This study uses logistic regression to 
formally test hypothesis six. Because estimation o f Equation 4 and Equation 5 needs
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
specified potential tax deficiency amount and potential penalty amount, cases that do not 
provide such information are deleted from the analysis.
For trial court cases, the dependant variable is dichotomous. It is coded as “1” if 
the plaintiff wins and “0” if the defendant wins. Four types o f independent variables are 
developed. The first type includes dummy variables for different tax issues. The second 
type includes litigant party strength variables. The coding of party strength is as described 
in research question five. The third type of independent variables includes dummy 
variables for different types o f judicial forums. The fourth type o f independent variables 
is dummy variables for the representation type o f the plaintiff and the representation type 
o f the defendant. Representation dummy variable is coded as “1” if  lawyer(s) 
representation and “0” otherwise. Heckman’s correction is applied to minimize self­
selection bias. Equation 4 is estimated. To further test representation influence on 
litigants’ successes at trial, this study then uses only the cases that do not involve pro se 
representation and recalculates the above described logistic regression. The definition of 
the fourth type o f independent variables is different from above. Representation dummy 
variable is coded as “1” if  group representation and “0” if  solo representation. Heckman’s 
correction is applied to minimize self-selection bias and Equation 5 is estimated.
For Federal Appellate Court cases, the dependant variable is coded as “1” if 
appellant wins and “0” if appellee wins. Four types of independent variables are 
developed. The first type includes dummy variables for different tax issues. The second 
type o f independent variables includes litigant party strength variables. The third type 
includes dummy variables for different lower forums. The fourth type o f independent 
variables includes dummy variables for the representation type of the appellant and the
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representation type o f the appellee. Representation type is coded “1” if  lawyer(s) 
representation and “0” otherwise. Equation 4 is estimated for Heckman’s correction. 
Furthermore, this study uses only the cases that do not involve pro se representation and 
rerun pursuant to the described procedure. The definition o f the fifth type o f independent 
variables is different from above. Representation type is coded “ 1” if  group 
representation and “0” if  solo representation. Equation 5 is estimated for Heckman’s 
correction.
For U.S. Supreme Court cases, the method of testing hypothesis six is the same as 
the method used for federal appellate cases except for the following two changes. First, 
no lower forum dummy variable is developed. Second, the sample size prohibits the 
application o f Heckman’s correction.
Summary
Affluent Party Capability Theory inquires have been performed in the legal and 
sociological fields. However, no research on Party Capability Theory has been attempted 
in the accounting/tax arena. This study fills the void by providing such research. Six 
questions are presented in Chapter One. This chapter discusses the approaches by which 
these questions are investigated. Specifically, the research sample is stipulated, variables 
identified, the coding scheme for the variables is presented, and appropriate statistical 
tools are discussed. Results of the analysis are presented in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Introduction
Previous chapters contain: (1) a discussion o f Party Capability Theory and the need 
for further research, (2) a review of prior researches o f Party Capability Theory in the 
legal area and a review of relevant researches in the accounting area, and (3) 
development o f the methodology used in this study. This chapter presents the results of 
the data analysis and tests o f hypotheses. Summary statistics are presented first, followed 
by a discussion o f the results pertaining to each of the hypothesis presented in Chapter 
Three.
Summary of Input Data
A total of 1,010 trial court cases, 744 Federal Appellate Court cases, and 29 U.S. 
Supreme Court cases are used in this study. A summary of the cases are listed in 
Appendix A. The 1,010 trial court cases are comprised of 375 Tax Court cases, 369 U.S. 
District Court cases, and 266 U.S. Court of Federal Claims cases. This study randomly 
chose 100 o f the 1783 selected cases for validation o f coding precision. One doctoral 
student coded half of the 100 chosen cases and another doctoral student coded the other 
half. The coding of the two doctoral students is compared with the coding o f the author.
47
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Pearson correlation analysis shows that the two independent coding sets are highly 
correlated (p<0.0001).
There are 178 Tax Court cases, 117 U.S. District Court cases, and 53 U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims cases that involve pro se representation. Hence, 348 (34.5%) out o f the 
1,010 trial court cases involve pro se litigants, with 122 (16.4%) of the 744 appellate 
court cases that involve pro se litigants. Pro se litigants do not reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court level.
Test Results for Research Question One
Individuals, businesses, and various governments entities make demands in the 
civil courts to settle their disputes, enforce the performance of obligations, and direct the 
redistribution of resources. However, only some individuals, businesses, and 
governments use court systems to settle their issues, others choose not to use legal 
recourse. Research question one attempts to answer who utilizes legal recourse.
Test Results for Trial Court Cases
Out o f the 375 U.S. Tax Court cases, 319 cases are initiated by individuals, which 
is about 85% of all the Tax Court cases under study. The remaining 56 Tax Court cases 
are initiated by businesses. No Tax Court cases are initiated by the U.S. government. Out 
of the 369 U.S. District Court cases, 220 cases are initiated by individuals, which is about 
60% of all the U.S. District Court cases under study. Businesses and the U.S. government 
each initiates about 20% o f the U.S. District Court cases under study. Unlike the U.S. Tax 
Court and U.S. District Courts, in which most cases are brought by individuals, more than 
half of the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases are initiated by businesses. Businesses 
initiate 142, which is about 53% of all the U.S. Court of Federal Claims cases under
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study. The remaining 124 U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases under study are brought to 
court by individuals. In sum, 663 out of the 1,010 trial court cases under study are 
initiated by individual litigants, which constitute about 66% of all trial court cases under 
study; 273 (27%) cases are initiated by business litigants; only 74 (7%) cases are initiated 
by the U.S. government. As mentioned earlier, this study uses unproportional sampling. 
To correct for the influence o f unproportional sampling, the percentage o f each group 
appearing in trial court as plaintiff is recalculated after proper weighting. After weighting, 
individuals still are the most frequent litigants. They start about 75% o f all the trial court 
cases involving only the three groups under study; businesses initiate about 17% of those 
cases; the U.S. government initiates only around 7% of those cases. The only trial court
forum the U.S. government uses to start litigation 
summarizes who litigates in trial courts.
is U.S. District Courts. Table 4.1
Table 4.1 
Summary of Plaintiffs in U.S. Trial Courts
Forum Group Frequency o f Occurrence
Tax Court Individual 319
Tax Court Business 56
Tax Court U.S. Government 0
District Court Individual 220
District Court Business 75
District Court U.S. Government 74
Claims Court Individual 124
Claims Court Business 142
Claims Court U.S. Government 0
For U.S. Tax Court cases, the chi-square test o f goodness o f fit reveals that 
individual and business litigants have a significantly different frequency o f using the U.S.
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Tax Court (p< 0.0001). Chi-square test of goodness of fit shows that the three groups of 
litigants under investigation have significantly different frequencies when using the U.S. 
District Court (p< 0.0001). No significant difference o f using the U.S. Court o f Federal 
Claims is found between individuals and businesses (p=0.2697).
For all the 1,010 trial court cases under investigation, with adjustment of 
unproportional sampling, chi-square test of goodness of fit shows that the three groups of 
litigants under investigation have significantly different frequencies o f suing in trial court 
(p<0.0001). Furthermore, chi-square test for independence shows a significant 
relationship between litigation groups and trial court forums chosen (p< 0.0001).
The Tax Court's jurisdiction is generally limited to redetermining deficiencies in 
income taxes, estate and gift taxes, and certain specified excise taxes that are subject to 
deficiency procedures (26 U.S.C. §§6212, 6213, 6214). It has exclusive jurisdiction over 
petitions for the redetermination o f tax deficiencies (26 U.S.C. §6213) and over appeals 
o f levy determinations as long as it has jurisdiction over the underlying tax liability that 
the IRS has alleged (26 U.S.C. §6330(d)(l)(A)). Section 6330(d) presumes that judicial 
review of an assessed tax liability should be sought in the Tax Court and that the taxpayer 
could seek review in a U.S. District Court only where the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction 
(Voelker v. Nolen, 365 F.3d 580). United States Code §1346(a)(2) establishes that U.S. 
District Courts' jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Federal Claims over claims 
against the United States that do not exceed $10,000. Whether different jurisdictions of 
the three judicial forums contribute to the significant relationship between litigant groups 
and judicial forums chosen is outside the scope o f this study.
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Test Results for Federal 
Appellate Court Cases
O f the 744 Federal Appellate Court cases, 465 cases are initiated by individuals,
which is about 63% o f all the Federal Appellate Court cases under study; business
litigants initiate 188 (25%) cases; the U.S. government initiates the remaining 91 (12%)
cases.
Chi-square test o f goodness o f fit shows that the three groups of litigants under 
investigation have significantly different frequencies o f using Federal Appellate Courts 
(pO.OOOl).
Test Results for U.S. Supreme 
Court Cases
O f the 29 U.S. Supreme Court cases under study, 19 cases are initiated by the 
U.S. government, which constitute about 66% of all the U.S. Supreme Court cases under 
study; individual and business litigants each start five (17%) cases. Observation o f the 
data indicates that the composition of initiators in trial courts, Federal Appellate Courts, 
and the U.S. Supreme court is different.
Chi-square test o f goodness o f fit reveals that the three groups of litigants under 
investigation have significantly different frequencies o f using the U.S. Supreme Court
(p-0.0012).
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Comparison of Trial Court. Federal 
Appellate Court and U.S.
Supreme Court Cases
As mentioned earlier, observation o f the data indicates that the composition of
initiators in trial courts, Federal Appellate Courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court is
different. Table 4.2 illustrates the composition of initiators in the three levels of forums.
Businesses have a relatively even usage o f the three forums. Individuals are the majority
users o f trial courts and Federal Appellate Courts, but are minor users o f the U.S.
Supreme Court. The U.S. government shows a reverse pattern compared with individuals.
The different abilities of the three groups in securing a writ o f certiorari might contribute
to the increase o f the federal government appellant in the U.S. Supreme Court6.
Table 4.2
Summary o f Initiators in Courts
Court Individual Business U.S. 
Trial Court 75.29 17.42 
Federal Appellate Court 62.50 25.27 
The U.S. Supreme Court 17.24 17.24
Government
7.29
12.23
65.52
In order to further investigate the composition o f initiators in different levels of 
court, chi-square test of goodness of fit is used for the test o f multinomial distribution. 
The compositions o f initiators in different levels o f court are significantly different from 
each other (p< 0.0001).
6 Four o f  the nine justices must vote to grant a writ o f  certiorari. The great majority o f  cases brought to the 
Supreme Court are denied certiorari (approximately 7,500 petitions are presented each year; between 80 
and 150 are granted and only a small proportion o f  them are tax cases).
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Conclusion-Research Question One
The first alternative hypothesis presented for investigation in this study is:
Hai: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government have unequal frequencies 
of using legal recourse.
The alternative hypothesis should not be rejected if  chi-square test shows that the 
three groups of litigants under investigation do have significantly different chances of 
starting litigations. Test results for trial court, Federal Appellate Court, and U.S. Supreme 
Court cases show that the three groups of litigants have significantly different frequencies 
o f using legal recourse. Individuals initiate the majority o f trial court and Federal 
Appellate Court cases under study. The U.S. government starts most o f the U.S. 
Supreme Court cases under study. The alternative hypothesis is therefore not rejected.
Test Results for Research Question Two
In order to investigate what tax issues the opposing parties litigate over, the IRC 
Sections mentioned in each case are classified into ten categories o f tax issues according 
to their classification within the Internal Revenue Code o f 1986. The ten categories of tax 
issues are income taxes; estate and gift taxes; employment taxes; miscellaneous excise 
taxes; alcohol, tobacco, and certain other excise taxes; procedure and administration; 
financing of presidential election campaigns; trust fund code; coal industry health 
benefits; and group health plan requirements.
Test Results for T rial Court Cases
In the 375 Tax Court cases, 226 are income tax cases, 124 are procedure and 
administration cases, 18 are estate and gift tax cases, five are employment tax cases, and 
two are miscellaneous excise tax cases. The major issues brought to the U.S. Tax Court
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are income tax as well as procedure and administration issues. Income tax cases comprise 
about 60% of all Tax Court cases under study; procedure and administration disputes 
comprise about 33% of the cases. For the 369 U.S. District Court cases, 301 are 
procedure and administration cases; 47 are income tax cases; 10 are employment tax 
cases; five are estate and gift tax cases; five are miscellaneous excise tax cases; and one is 
alcohol, tobacco, and other excise tax cases. The major issue brought to U.S. District 
Courts is the procedure and administration issue. It constitutes about 82% of all U.S. 
District Court cases under study. Procedure and administration issue is brought to the 
U.S. Court o f Federal Claims 131 times (49%) out o f the 266 cases under study. The 
remainder consists o f 99 (37%) cases concerning income tax disagreements; 19 cases 
concerning employment taxes; 10 cases concerning miscellaneous excise taxes; six cases 
about estate and gift taxes; and one case about alcohol, tobacco, and other excise taxes. 
For all the 1,010 trial court cases under study, 556 are procedure and administration 
cases, 372 are income tax cases, 29 are estate and gift tax cases, 34 are employment tax 
cases, 17 are miscellaneous excise tax cases, and two are alcohol, tobacco, and other 
excise tax cases. After adjusting for unproportional sampling, the major issues brought to 
trial court are procedure and administration, and income tax disputes. Procedure and 
administration disputes comprise about 51% of all the trial court cases under study and 
income tax cases around 43%. Table 4.3 summarizes what litigants sue for in trial courts.
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Table 4.3
Summary of Federal Tax Issues in Trial Courts
Court Group Tax Issue Frequency
Tax Court Individual Income Taxes 182
Tax Court Individual Estate and Gift Taxes 17
Tax Court Individual Employment Taxes 5
Tax Court Individual Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 1
Tax Court Individual Procedure and Administration 114
Tax Court Business Income Taxes 44
Tax Court Business Estate and Gift Taxes 1
Tax Court Business Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 1
Tax Court Business Procedure and Administration 10
Dis. Court Individual Income Taxes 30
Dis. Court Individual Estate and Gift Taxes 4
Dis. Court Individual Employment Taxes 5
Dis. Court Individual Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 1
Dis. Court Individual Procedure and Administration 180
Dis. Court Business Income Taxes 15
Dis. Court Business Employment Taxes 3
Dis. Court Business Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 2
Dis. Court Business Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes 1
Dis. Court Business Procedure and Administration 54
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Income Taxes 2
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Estate and Gift Taxes 1
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Employment Taxes 2
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 2
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Procedure and Administration 67
Claims Court Individual Income Taxes 39
Claims Court Individual Estate and Gift Taxes 6
Claims Court Individual Employment Taxes 1
Claims Court Individual Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 1
Claims Court Individual Procedure and Administration 77
Claims Court Business Income Taxes 60
Claims Court Business Employment Taxes 18
Claims Court Business Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 9
Claims Court Business Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes 1
Claims Court Business Procedure and Administration 54
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Further, analysis of the data shows that some IRC Sections tend to be more 
frequently contended.7 §§61, 162, 3121, 6330, 6511, 6672, 7421, 7422, 7430, 7433, 
7602, and 7609 are the most often disputed sections in trial courts. Section 61 defines 
gross income. Section 162 is about deduction of trade or business expenses. Section 3121 
gives definition of wages, employment, employee, employer and other related concepts 
for employment tax. Section 6330 requires notice and opportunity for hearing before 
levy. Section 6511 sets time limitations on credit or refund. Section 6672 holds the 
responsible person personally liable for failing to collect taxes. Section 7421 prohibits 
suits to restrain assessment or collection. Section 7422 stipulates that no suit is allowed 
prior to filing claim for refund and sets limits on right o f action for refund. Section 7430 
awards costs and certain fees for prevailing parties. Section 7433 is civil damages for 
certain unauthorized collection actions. Section 7602 gives the Secretary rights to 
examine books and witnesses. Section 7609 stipulates special procedures for third-party 
summons. Generally, sections about procedure and administration are most often under 
dispute in trial court, especially sections dealing with levies, summons, and damages.
For the 375 Tax Court cases under study, the most often disputed IRC Sections are 
§162 (29 times under dispute) and §6330 (21 times). Other frequently argued sections 
include §61 (14 times), §7430 (14 times), §152 (12 times), §165 (12 times), §183 (12 
times), §6015 (11 times). Section 3121 (five times) is the center o f controversy for all the 
employment tax cases of the Tax Court decisions under study. For the 369 U.S. District 
Court cases under study, the most often disputed IRC Sections are §7433 (38 times), 
§7609 (28 times), §7421 (26 times), and §7602 (21 times). Section 6330 (19 times), 
§6672 (18 times), §7422 (17 times), §6321 (16 times), §6323 (14 times), §7402 (13
7 Appendix B provides a summary o f  IRC Sections analyzed in this study.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
times), and §6103 (10 times) are also very often under disputes. U.S. Court o f Federal 
Claims cases have more diverse focuses. That is, of the 266 U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
cases under investigation, §7422 (23 times), §6511 (20 times), §6672 (13 times), §3121 
(12 times), and §6532 (10 times) are the sections contended most often. Taking all the 
trial court cases together, the most frequently disputed IRC Sections are §6330 (40 
times), §7422 (40 times), §7433 (40 times), §162 (38 times), §6672 (32 times), §7421 (30 
times), §6511 (29 times), §7609 (28 times), §7430 (26 times), §3121 (22 times), §61 (21 
times), and §7602 (21 times). Other often disputed sections include §6103 (19 times), 
§6321 (18 times), §165 (17 times), §7402 (17 times), §104 (16 times), §6532 (16 times), 
§183 (15 times), §6501 (15 times), §152 (14 times), §6323 (14 times), §6015 (13 times), 
§72 (12 times), §170 (12 times), §6320 (12 times), §446 (11 times), §6229 (11 times), 
§6402 (11 times), §6653 (11 times), §166 (10 times), §6331 (10 times), and §6651 (10 
times). For the 1,010 trial court cases, 34 are employment tax cases, and 22 times the 
issue involves §3121. Table 4.4 summarizes the IRC Sections that are brought to trial 
courts.
As this study illustrated earlier, around 94% of the trial court cases are income tax 
cases or procedure and administration cases. This inquiry combines all the remaining tax 
issues as other tax issues to proceed chi-square test of goodness o f fit for hypothesis two. 
Data are further adjusted to take into consideration unproportional sampling. The chi- 
square test o f goodness o f fit shows that the frequencies o f different issues being brought 
to the trial courts are significantly different (p< 0.0001).
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Table 4.4
Summary of IRC Sections Brought to Trial Courts
IRC Section Frequency IRC Section Frequency
Ta
x 
C
ou
rt
§162 29
Tr
ial
 C
ou
rt
§6330 40
§6330 21 §7422 40
§61 14 §7433 40
§7430 14 §162 38
§152 12 §6672 32
§165 12 §7421 30
§183 12 §6511 29
§6015 11 §7609 28
D
ist
ric
t 
C
ou
rt
§7433 38 §7430 26
§7609 28 §3121 22
§7421 26 §61 21
§7602 21 §7602 21
§6330 19 §6103 19
§6672 18 §6321 18
§7422 17 §165 17
§6321 16 §7402 17
§6323 14 §104 16
§7402 13 §6532 16
§6103 10 §183 15
§7422 23 §6501 15
§6511 20 §152 14
§6672 13 §6323 14
§3121 12 §6015 13
§6532 10 §72 12
§170 12o
u §6320 12
a §446 11
0 §6229 11
§6402 11
§6653 11
§166 10
§6331 10
§6651 10
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There exists a significant relationship between the type of plaintiff and the type of 
tax issue being brought to the trial courts (p< 0.0001). As shown in Table 4.5, after 
proper weighting, the major tax issues brought to court by individuals and businesses are 
procedure and administration disagreements and income tax issues. In contrast, the U.S. 
government goes to court over 90% of the time to settle procedure and administration 
issues.
Table 4.5
Summary o f Issues Brought by Different Groups to Trial Courts
Group Tax Issue Percentage
Individual Income Taxes 44.33
Individual Procedure and Administration 49.23
Individual Other 6.44
Business Income Taxes 52.20
Business Procedure and Administration 41.67
Business Other 6.13
U.S. Government Income Taxes 2.7
U.S. Government Procedure and Administration 90.54
U.S. Government Other 6.76
Judicial forum is also significantly related to the type o f tax issues being brought to 
court (p< 0.0001). As noted previously, the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. District Courts and the 
U.S. Court o f Federal Claims have different jurisdiction over federal tax issues. This 
might contribute to the types of tax issues being brought in these different judicial 
forums. The Tax Court's jurisdiction is generally limited to redetermining deficiencies in 
income taxes, estate and gift taxes, and certain specified excise taxes that are subject to 
deficiency procedures (26 U.S.C. §§ 6212, 6213, 6214). Section 6330(d) presumed that 
the taxpayer could seek review in a U.S. District Court only where the Tax Court lacks
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jurisdiction ( Voelker v. Nolen, 365 F.3d 580). Consequently, around 60% of cases being
brought to the Tax Court are income tax disputes while about 82% are procedure and
administration disagreements in U.S. District Courts. United States Code § 1346(a)(2)
establishes that U.S. District Courts'jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court o f Federal
Claims over claims against the United States that do not exceed $10,000. Around half of
the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases under study are about procedure and
administration.
Test Results for Federal 
Appellate Court Cases
Table 4.6 illustrates what issues are litigated in Federal Appellate Courts. For the
total of 744 Federal Appellate Court cases, 379 are procedure and administration cases;
293 are income tax cases; 35 are estate and gift tax cases; 16 are miscellaneous excise tax
cases; 14 are employment tax cases; five are coal industry health benefits cases; and two
are alcohol, tobacco, and other excise tax cases. In sum, over 50% of the appellants go to
Federal Appellate Courts to settle procedure and administration issues and around 39%
for income tax disputes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
Table 4.6
Summary o f Federal Tax Issues in Federal Appellate Courts
Group Tax Issue Frequency
Individual Income Taxes 166
Individual Estate and Gift Taxes 27
Individual Employment Taxes 2
Individual Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 4
Individual Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Excise Taxes 2
Individual Procedure and Administration 263
Individual Coal Industry Health Benefits 1
Business Income Taxes 94
Business Estate and Gift Taxes 2
Business Employment Taxes 6
Business Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 8
Business Procedure and Administration 75
Business Coal Industry Health Benefits 3
U.S. Government Income Taxes 33
U.S. Government Estate and Gift Taxes 6
U.S. Government Employment Taxes 6
U.S. Government Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 4
U.S. Government Procedure and Administration 41
U.S. Government Coal Industry Health Benefits 1
Closer examination o f the data shows that §162 (24 times), §6672 (24 times), and 
§104 (22 times) are most often under dispute. Other contended sections include §7201 
(19 times), §7433 (19 times), §7206 (17 times), §7602 (15 times), §7430 (14 times), 
§7609 (14 times), §6331 (12 times), §6511 (12 times), §163 (11 times), §6321 (11 times), 
§6330 (11 times), §7212 (11 times), and §61 (10 times). There are only 35 estate and gift 
tax disputes for all the Federal Appellate Court cases under study. Seven times they 
concern retained life estate (§2036) and five times the marital deduction (§2056). For the 
14 Federal Appellate Court employment tax cases under study, §3121 (eight times) and 
§3401 (four times) are the center o f the disputes.
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Federal Appellate Court cases cover more diverse issues than trial court cases. 
Furthermore, the most often disputed sections for Federal Appellate Court and trial court 
cases are not quite the same. Section 104 is one of the three most often disputed sections 
in Federal Appellate Courts, but it is not the most often disputed sections in trial courts. 
Specifically, §104 offers exemptions from taxes for damages due to personal physical 
injuries or physical sickness.
The major arguments in Federal Appellate Courts are procedure and administration 
issues (51%) and income tax disputes (39%). After combining all the remaining issues as 
other disputes, the chi-square test o f goodness o f fit shows that the frequencies of 
different issues being brought to Federal Appellate Courts are significantly different (p< 
0 .0001).
Chi-square also rejects the independence of the type of litigant and the issue being
brought to court (p< 0.0001). While the major issues being brought by all three groups of
litigants under study are income tax and procedure and administration disputes,
businesses bring more income tax cases than procedure and administration cases to court,
while individuals and the U.S. government bring more procedure and administration
cases than income tax cases to court.
Test Results for U.S. Supreme 
Court Cases
Table 4.7 summarizes the types o f issues that litigants bring to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Individuals litigate for income taxes and procedure and administration issues. All 
the cases brought by businesses are income tax cases. The federal government brings to 
the U.S. Supreme Court diverse issues. Due to the limited number of observations, no 
chi-square test is used to formally test Ha2.
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Table 4.7
Summary of Federal Tax Issues in the U.S. Supreme Court
Group Tax Issue Frequency
Individual Income Taxes 2
Individual Procedure and Administration 3
Business Income Taxes 5
U.S. Government Income Taxes 4
U.S. Government Estate and Gift Taxes 3
U.S. Government Employment Taxes 2
U.S. Government Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 4
U.S. Government Procedure and Administration 6
Appellants bring to the U.S. Supreme Court a very broad range of issues. Even so, 
this study detects that §6511 occurs four times, and §104 occurs three times out of the 29 
Supreme Court cases under examination.
Conclusion-Research Question Two
The second alternative hypothesis presented for investigation in this study is:
Ha2: Different categories of tax issues have unequal frequencies o f being brought to 
court.
The alternative hypothesis should not be rejected if the chi-square test shows that 
different categories o f tax issues under investigation do have significantly unequal 
chances of being brought to court. Test results for trial court and Federal Appellate Court 
cases reveal significantly unequal frequencies o f different categories o f tax issues being 
contended. The sample size o f U.S. Supreme Court cases does not permit a valid chi- 
square analysis. Consequently, the alternative hypothesis is not rejected for trial court and 
Federal Appellate Court cases. No conclusion is made for U.S. Supreme Court cases.
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Test Results for Research Question Three
Who is being sued or appealed? For the three groups of litigants (individuals, 
businesses, and the federal government), this study attempts to answer which group(s) 
is(are) being sued and/or appealed for federal tax issues.
Test Results for Trial Court Cases
Table 4.8 reveals that the federal government is the predominant defendant in trial 
courts. It is the only defendant in the U.S. Tax Court and the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims and it is the defendant in about 75% o f the U.S. District Court cases under 
examination. This result is the opposite o f Wanner’s (1974) finding. For trial court cases, 
in general, Wanner (1974) concludes that individuals make up about 67% of the 
defendants, organizations around 26%, and governments less than 6%. Chi-square test o f 
goodness o f fit affirms that the three groups under study have significantly different 
frequencies o f appearing as defendant in trial courts (p<0.0001). Also, the chi-square test 
for independence shows that there is a significant relationship between the type o f 
defendant and the judicial forum chosen (p<0.0001). As shown in Table 4.7, for federal 
tax disputes, individuals or businesses are possible defendants only in U.S. District 
Courts.
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Table 4.8
Summary of Defendants in U.S. Trial Courts
Forum Group Frequency of Occurrence
Tax Court Individual 0
Tax Court Business 0
Tax Court U.S. Government 375
District Court Individual 42
District Court Business 49
District Court U.S. Government 278
Claims Court Individual 0
Claims Court Business 0
Claims Court U.S. Government 266
Test Results for Federal Appellate Court Cases
The U.S. government is the appellee in 622 out of the 744 Federal Appellate 
Court cases under study. Businesses and individuals are appellees for 68 and 54 times, 
respectively. Chi-square test of goodness o f fit shows that the three groups under 
examinaion have significantly different frequencies o f being appellees in Federal 
Appellate Courts (pO.OOOl).
Test Results for U.S. Supreme Court Cases
U.S. Supreme Court appellees show a diverse pattern. That is, individuals, 
businesses, and the U.S. government are appellees for 11, eight, and 10 times, 
respectively, for the Supreme Court cases under study. The frequencies of the three 
groups appearing as appellee in the U.S. Supreme Court are not significantly different 
(p> 0.7855).
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Conclusion-Research Question Three
The third alternative hypothesis presented for investigation is:
Ha3: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government have unequal frequencies 
o f being sued or appealed.
The alternative hypothesis should not be rejected if chi-square test shows that 
individuals, businesses, and the federal government have significantly different 
frequencies o f being sued or appealed. Test results for trial court cases and Federal 
Appellate Court cases show that the three groups under study have significantly different 
frequencies o f being sued. The federal government is the major defendant/appellee for 
the trial court and Federal Appellate Court cases under study. The alternative hypothesis 
is not rejected. However, the alternative hypothesis is rejected for the Supreme Court 
cases.
Test Results for Research Question Four
Why is the defendant/appellee being sued/appealed? This study investigates what 
defendant (appellee) is being sued (appealed) for in three different categories o f tax cases. 
Test Results for Trial Court Cases
The U.S. government is sued in the Tax Court over 60% of the time for income tax 
issues and over 33% of the time for procedure and administration disputes. Other issues 
comprise less than 7% of the total cases. The U.S. government is sued in the U.S. Court 
o f Federal Claims about 49% of the time for procedure and administration disputes and 
around 37% for income tax issues. The remaining 14% is for other controversies. The 
major issue brought to U.S. District Courts is procedure and administration (82%). 
Individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government are sued in U.S. District Courts over
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88%, 71%, and 82% of the times, respectively, over procedure and administration issues. 
Taking all the trial court cases together, and after proper adjustment for unproportional 
sampling, the U.S. government is brought to trial courts about 46% of the time over 
income tax issues, and around 48% of the time for procedure and administration disputes. 
Individuals and businesses are sued in U.S. District Courts only and for procedure and 
administration disagreements over 88% and 71% of the time respectively. Chi-square test 
for independence reveals that there exists a significant relationship between the type of 
defendant and the federal tax issue being brought to court (p<0.0001). Table 4.9 displays 
issues that defendants are being sued for in the trial courts.
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Table 4.9
Summary of Issues that Defendants Are Being Sued for in Trial Courts
Court Group Tax Issue Frequency
Tax Court U.S. Gov. Income Taxes 226
Tax Court U.S. Gov. Estate and Gift Taxes 18
Tax Court U.S. Gov. Employment Taxes 5
Tax Court U.S. Gov. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 2
Tax Court U.S. Gov. Procedure and Administration 124
Dis. Court Individual Income Taxes 3
Dis. Court Individual Estate and Gift Taxes 1
Dis. Court Individual Employment Taxes 1
Dis. Court Individual Procedure and Administration 37
Dis. Court Business Income Taxes 7
Dis. Court Business Employment Taxes 4
Dis. Court Business Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 3
Dis. Court Business Procedure and Administration 35
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Income Taxes 37
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Estate and Gift Taxes 4
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Employment Taxes 5
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 0
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes 1
Dis. Court U.S. Gov. Procedure and Administration 229
Claims Court U.S. Gov. Income Taxes 99
Claims Court U.S. Gov. Estate and Gift Taxes 6
Claims Court U.S. Gov. Employment Taxes 19
Claims Court U.S. Gov. Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 10
Claims Court U.S. Gov. Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes 1
Claims Court U.S. Gov. Procedure and Administration 131
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Test Results for Federal 
Appellate Court Cases
Table 4.10 illustrates what appellees are being sued for in Federal Appellate 
Courts. Individuals are being brought to Federal Appellate Courts over 48% of the time 
for procedure and administration issues, and about 41% for income tax disputes. 
Businesses are sued in Federal Appellate Courts over 41% o f the time for income tax 
issues, and around 37% for procedure and administration disagreements. The U.S. 
government is sued in Federal Appellate Courts over half o f the time (53%) for procedure 
and administration disputes, and about 39% for income tax issues. In summary, appellees 
are sued in Federal Appellate Courts mostly for procedure and administration and income 
tax issues. Chi-square tests for independence show a significant relationship between the 
type of appellee and the federal tax issue being brought to appellate courts (p<0.0001).
Table 4.10
Summary o f Issues that Appellees Are Being Sued for in Federal Appellate Courts
Group Tax Issue Frequency
Individual Income Taxes 22
Individual Estate and Gift Taxes 6
Individual Procedure and Administration 26
Business Income Taxes 28
Business Employment Taxes 6
Business Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 5
Business Procedure and Administration 25
Business Coal Industry Health Benefits 4
U.S. Government Income Taxes 243
U.S. Government Estate and Gift Taxes 29
U.S. Government Employment Taxes 8
U.S. Government Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 11
U.S. Government Alcohol, Tobacco, and other Excise Taxes 2
U.S. Government Procedure and Administration 328
U.S. Government Coal Industry Health Benefits 1
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Test Results for U.S. Supreme 
Court Cases
Table 4.11 summarizes issues that appellees are being sued for in the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Appellees are litigated over a wide range of issues. Individuals are sued 
five out o f the 11 times on procedure and administration issues and four times on income 
tax disputes. Business appellees are in the U.S. Supreme Court four out of the eight times 
for miscellaneous excise tax disputes. The U.S. government is sued seven out o f the 10 
times on income tax issues. Due to the limitation o f the sample size, no formal statistical
test is applied to test Ha4 for Supreme Court cases.
Table 4.11
Summary o f Issues that Appellees Are Being Sued for in the U.S. Supreme Court
Group Tax Issue Frequency
Individual Income Taxes 4
Individual Estate and Gift Taxes 2
Individual Procedure and Administration 5
Business Estate and Gift Taxes 1
Business Employment Taxes 2
Business Miscellaneous Excise Taxes 4
Business Procedure and Administration 1
U.S. Government Income Taxes 7
U.S. Government Procedure and Administration 3
Conclusion-Research Question Four
The fourth alternative hypothesis presented for investigation in this study is:
Ha4: Individuals, businesses, and the federal government are sued or appealed on 
different categories o f tax issues.
The alternative hypothesis should not be rejected if  chi-square test o f independence 
shows that there exists a significant relationship between the type o f defendant/appellee
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and the issue under dispute. Test results for trial court and Federal Appellate Court cases 
show a significant relationship between the type of defendant/appellee and the issue 
involved. Consequently, the alternative hypothesis is not rejected. Due to limitations on 
sample size, this inquiry does not perform a formal test o f Ha4 for Supreme Court cases.
Test Results for Research Question 
Five and Research Question Six
This study investigates the success rates o f individuals, businesses, and the U.S. 
government in litigation by looking individually at federal trial courts, Federal Appellate 
Courts, and the United States Supreme Court. The available data do not permit this 
inquiry to code the strength o f the litigants according to their size o f financial resources 
and frequency of dealing with courts. As a result, this inquiry assumes that individuals 
usually have fewer resources than either businesses or the government and, thus, are 
weaker. When business and government parties confront each other, the assumption is 
that the federal government is usually stronger.
Test Results for Trial Court Cases
Success Rates Analysis. This inquiry first looks at the success rates of the three 
groups in litigation when they are plaintiffs. The results for trial court cases are 
summarized in Table 4.12. As plaintiffs, individuals win 16.3% of cases in the U.S. Tax 
Court, 10.5% in U.S. District Courts, and 13.7% in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 
Businesses win 33.9% of cases in the U.S. Tax Court, 25.3% in U.S. District Courts, and 
31.7% in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. The U.S. government only appears as 
plaintiff in U.S. District Courts and it wins 73% of the cases. Individual and business 
plaintiffs have the lowest (highest) chance o f winning a case in U.S. District Courts (the
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U.S. Tax Court). Taking trial court cases together, individuals, businesses, and the U.S. 
government win 13.9%, 30.4%, and 73% respectively as plaintiffs. The weighted results 
are 14.6%, 30.2%, and 73%.
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Table 4.12
Winning and Losing by Nature of Party (Trial Courts)
Plaintiff
Respondent
Tax Court
Ind. Bus. U.S. Gov. Total
% N % N %a Nb % N
Individual NA NA NA NA 16.3 319 16.3 319
Business NA NA NA NA 33.9 56 33.9 56
U.S. Gov. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total NA NA NA NA 18.9 375 18.9 375
Plaintiff
District Court
Ind. Bus. U.S. Gov. Total
% N % N % N % N
Individual 0 1 28.6 14 9.3 205 10.5 220
Business 50.0 2 NA NA 24.7 73 25.3 75
U.S. Gov. 76.9 39 68.6 35 NA NA 73.0 74
Total 73.8 42 57.1 49 13.3 278 26.0 369
Plaintiff
Claims Court
Individual Business U.S. Gov. Total
% N % N % N % N
Individual NA NA NA NA 13.7 124 13.7 124
Business NA NA NA NA 31.7 142 31.7 142
U.S. Gov. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total NA NA NA NA 23.3 266 23.3 266
Plaintiff
Tria Court
Individual Business U.S. Gov. Total
% N % N % N % N
Individual 0 1 28.6 14 13.6 648 13.9 663
Business 50.0 2 NA NA 30.3 271 30.4 273
U.S. Gov. 76.9 39 68.6 35 NA NA 73 74
Total 73.8 42 57.1 49 18.5 919 22.7 1010
Plaintiff
Trial Court (Weighted)
Individual Business U.S. Gov. Total
% N % N % N ‘ % N
Individual 0 1.0 28.6 13.9 14.4 745.5 14.6 760.4
Business 50.0 2.0 NA NA 30.0 174.0 30.2 175.9
U.S. Gov. 76.9 38.8 68.6 34.8 NA NA 73.0 73.7
Total 73.8 41.8 57.2 48.8 17.4 919.4 21.6 1010
a Percentage o f  cases in which plaintiff won. 
b Total cases on which percentage is based.
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As summarized in Table 4.13, the combined success rates of individuals as 
plaintiffs and as defendants are 16.3%, 13%, and 13.7% in the U.S. Tax Court, U.S. 
District Courts, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, respectively. The combined 
success rates o f businesses are 33.9%, 32.3%, and 31.7% and the combined success rates 
o f the U.S. government are 81.1%, 83.8%, and 76.7%, respectively, in the U.S. Tax 
Court, U.S. District Courts, and the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. Taking all the trial 
court cases together, the combined success rates for individuals, businesses, and the U.S. 
government are 14.6%, 32.3%, and 80.9%, respectively. The weighted combined success 
rates are 15.2%, 32.9%, and 81.9%.
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Table 4.13
Success Rates by Nature o f Party (Trial Courts)
Type o f Party
Tax Court
Success Rate 
as
Appellant
When Respondent, 
Opponents 
Success Rate
Net
Advantage
Combined Success Rate 
as Appellant 
and Respondent
Individual 16.3 NA = NA 16.3
Business 33.9 NA = NA 33.9
U.S. Gov. NA 18.9 = NA 81.1
District Court
Individual 10.5 73.8 = -63.3 13.0
Business 25.3 57.1 = -31.8 32.3
U.S. Gov. 73.0 13.3 = 59.7 83.8
Claims Court
Individual 13.7 NA = NA 13.7
Business 31.7 NA = NA 31.7
U.S. Gov. NA 23.3 = NA 76.7
Trial Court
Individual 13.9 73.8 = -59.9 14.6
Business 30.4 57.1 = -26.7 32.3
U.S. Gov. 73.0 18.5 = 54.5 80.9
Trial Court (Weighted)
Individual 14.6 73.8 = -59.0 15.2
Business 30.2 57.2 = -27.0 32.9
U.S. Gov. 73.0 17.4 = 55.6 81.9
The plaintiff success rates and the combined success rates o f different parties in the 
U.S. Tax Court and U.S. District Courts do not support the conclusion of Geier (1991). 
Geier (1991) compares U.S. Tax Court and U.S. District Court cases from 1965-1986. 
The cases won or partially won by the U.S. government is 24% higher in the U.S. Tax 
Court than in U.S. District Courts. Geier ascribes the 24-point difference to the pro- 
government trend o f the U.S. Tax Court. The U.S. Tax Court is formed under Article I
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and therefore U.S. Tax Court judges do not have tenure and unreduced salary protection 
like U.S. District Court judges. This study reaches an opposite conclusion. Individuals 
and businesses have both a higher plaintiff success rate and a higher combined successes 
rate in the U.S. Tax Court than in U.S. District Courts. The different time frames o f the 
two studies might contribute to the conflicting conclusions. The fact that Geier(1991) 
ignores the different frequencies o f the U.S. government appearing as plaintiffs and as 
defendants in the U.S. Tax Court vs. U.S. District Courts might also contribute to the 
opposite results. By combining the cases in which the U.S. government is plaintiff and 
the cases in which it is defendant, Geier’s (1991) results ignore that the success rate o f a 
litigant as a plaintiff is different from the success rate o f a litigant as a defendant. The 
combined success rate o f the U.S. government is 2.7 points higher in U.S. District Courts 
(83.8%) than in the U.S. Tax Court (81.1%) for this study. This is misleading because, as 
mentioned earlier, individuals and businesses have both higher plaintiff success rates and 
higher combined successes rates in the U.S. Tax Court than in U.S. District Courts.
The net advantages for different parties in litigation are shown in Table 4.13. The 
net advantages o f individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government in trial courts are 
-59.9%, -26.7%, and 54.5% respectively. The weighted net advantages are -59%, -27%, 
and 55.6%, respectively. The U.S. government does far better than businesses. 
Businesses do considerably better than individuals. Individuals occupy the bottom of the 
order. To further investigate the interactions between specific categories o f parties, cases 
in which two parties confront each other directly are selected. Table 4.14 summarizes the 
results. The U.S. government not only wins far more often overall, it also has an 
advantage vis-a-vis each other type of litigant. Its net advantage over businesses is
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38.6%, and 62.5% over individuals. Individuals lose against all other types o f parties. The 
margin o f disadvantage of individuals over businesses is 21.4%.
Table 4.14
Net Advantage for Different Combination o f Parties (Trial Courts)
Combination o f Parties Net Advantage Net Advantage( Weighted)
Individual vs. Business Business by 21.4% Business by 21.4%
Individual vs. U.S. Gov. U.S. Gov. by 63.3% U.S. Gov. by 62.5%
Business vs. U.S. Gov. U.S. Gov. by 38.3% U.S. Gov. by 38.6%
Logistic Regression Results for H .^  without Considering Representation Types.
At this point, the investigation results for trial court cases suggest that “haves” do tend to 
have certain advantages. Although the analysis presented above produces results that are 
consistent with Party Capability Theory, the thesis can be only provisionally supported 
until the effects of potential intervening variables are examined. This inquiry further 
clarifies the results by using logistic regression to formally test Has. As mentioned earlier, 
the major tax issues brought to court by individuals and businesses are procedure and 
administration disagreements and income tax issues. In contrast, the U.S. government 
goes to court over 90% of the time to settle procedure and administration issues. The U.S. 
government is brought to trial courts about 46% of the time for income tax issues, and 
around 48% of the time for procedure and administration disputes. Individuals and 
businesses are sued in U.S. District Courts over 88% and 71% of the time, respectively, 
for procedure and administration disagreements. Thus, tax issue type is included in the 
regression and dummy variables are also created for the different legal forums.
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Table 4.15 illustrates the influence of litigant strength on case outcomes. Overall, 
the model performs moderately well. That is, the full model is significant at the 0.001 
level and it has explanation power of 19.1%.9 However, the signs o f the variables are 
opposite of the predicted direction. Contrary to Songer et al. (1999) and Farole (1999), 
which report a positive coefficient for plaintiff strength variable and a negative 
coefficient for defendant strength variable, this study reports a negative coefficient for 
plaintiff strength variable and a positive coefficient for defendant strength variable. The 
variable measuring the status o f the defendant’s strength is positively related to the 
likelihood o f plaintiff success, and the relationship is significant (p=0.0021). It indicates 
that plaintiffs have significantly higher success probabilities when confronting 
presumably stronger parties. Although the magnitude is less, the variable measuring the 
status o f the plaintiffs strength is negatively related to the likelihood o f plaintiff success, 
and the relationship also reaches a significant level (p<0.0001), indicating that, holding 
all other variables constant, the presumed stronger plaintiffs have significantly lower 
success probabilities. The unexpected results could be due to the conventional 
assumption of party strength. Prior literature generally assumes that the strengths o f the 
litigating parties have measurable values. This study follows the norm and assumes that
8 The plaintiff and defendant type interaction is not significant and is deleted from the model. For all the 
subsequent models mentioned in this study, plaintiff and defendant type/appellant and appellee type 
interaction is checked and then deleted because the result is not significant.
Year o f  decision is also not significant and is deleted from the model. The Pearson residuals vs. 
year and deviance residuals vs. year plots indicate no obvious split point o f  time. For all the subsequent 
models in this research, year o f  decision is first included as independent variable and then deleted due to 
insignificance; the Pearson residuals vs. year and deviance residuals vs. year plots indicate no obvious 
division o f  time. Thus, this study does not divide the data into multiple time periods.
9 The deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit statistics indicate that the model does not fit well (p<0.05). The 
model does fit well after inclusion o f  representation types as independent variables.
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the strength of individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government are 1, 2, and 3 
respectively. The assumption is not necessarily an approximation of reality.
Table 4.15
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood of Success in Trial Courts
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept 0.4865 0.8898 0.5845
Plaintiff Strength -1.0439 0.1647 <0.0001 0.352
Defendant Strength 0.7202 0.2347 0.0021 2.055
Income Tax Issue -0.0214 0.2996 0.9431 0.979
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.2094 0.2946 0.4772 1.233
District Court 0.4224 0.2417 0.0805 1.526
Claims Court 0.1329 0.2187 0.5434 1.142
Note: Dependent Variable = Verdict. Model pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square10=0.1910.
To take into consideration that the party strength assumption might not follow 
reality, this inquiry uses dummy variables for different litigation parties to reexamine the 
data. The results are illustrated in Tables 4.16 and 4.17.11 Holding all other variables 
constant, individual plaintiffs have significantly higher chances o f winning a case than 
the U.S. government plaintiff (p=0.0012) and business plaintiffs (pO.OOOl). Business 
and the U.S. government plaintiffs’ chances o f winning a case do not differ significantly. 
The plaintiff has a marginally significantly lower chance o f winning a case if  the
10 Pseudo-R-Square is an Aldrich and Nelson's coefficient which serves as an analog to the squared 
contingency coefficient, with an interpretation like R-square. Its maximum is less than 1. It may be used in 
either dichotomous or multinomial logistic regression. The Max-rescaled R-square adjusts the pseudo R- 
square to the full range o f  0.0 to 1.0. Both values are a rough approximation o f  the explanatory power o f  
the model (Hosmer & Lemeshow 2000).
11 The deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit statistics indicate that the models are not good fits (p<0.05). 
However, the models do fit well after inclusion o f  representation types as independent variables.
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defendant is an individual or a business than when the defendant is the U.S. government 
(0.05<p<0.10); a plaintiffs chance of winning does not differ significantly when the 
defendant is an individual than when the defendant is a business.
Table 4.16
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood of Success in Trial Courts 
(Individual vs. Government and Business vs. Government)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -0.4362 0.7111 0.5396
Individual Plaintiff 2.0468 0.6336 0.0012 7.743
Business Plaintiff 1.0303 0.6581 0.1175 2.802
Individual Defendant -1.3358 0.7020 0.0571 0.263
Business Defendant -1.0308 0.5973 0.0844 0.357
Income Tax Issue -0.0354 0.3002 0.9060 0.965
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.1936 0.2991 0.5174 1.214
District Court 0.4588 0.2491 0.0655 1.582
Claims Court 0.1196 0.2241 0.5936 1.127
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1922.
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Table 4.17
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood of Success in Trial Courts
(Individual vs. Business)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept 0.3245 0.7469 0.6639
Business Plaintiff -1.0113 0.1922 <0.0001 0.364
The U.S. government Plaintiff -1.9196 0.6295 0.0023 0.147
Business Defendant 0.2557 0.4767 0.5917 1.291
The U.S. government Defendant 1.2848 0.6955 0.0647 3.614
Income Tax Issue -0.0363 0.2995 0.9035 0.964
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.1912 0.2980 0.5212 1.211
District Court 0.4478 0.2484 0.0714 1.565
Claims Court 0.1169 0.2239 0.6017 1.124
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1918.
Logistic Regression Results for H„s (after Inclusion of Representation Types) 
and Ha<;. The above logistic analysis for trial court cases is contrary to Party Capability 
Theory. The results tend to support that individuals have comparative advantages in 
litigation over businesses and the U.S. government. Businesses and the U.S. government 
have about the same strength in litigation. The results could be due to the omission of 
representation type in the logistic models. This study further introduces representation 
type into the logistic models. By applying Heckman’s correction to take care o f self­
selection bias, this inquiry also indirectly considers the influence of amounts in disputes 
on case results.
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Table 4.18 reports the comparison o f lawyer vs. pro se representation.12 After 
control for the representation type and indirectly control of the amount in dispute, the 
signs o f plaintiff and defendant strength variables are still contrary to the expected 
direction but are no longer significant. Opposite to the general belief that lawyer 
representation holds an advantage compared to pro se representation, the signs o f plaintiff 
and defendant representation variables indicate that lawyer representation reduces 
litigants’ winning possibilities in comparison with pro se representation. In other words, a 
lawyer represented plaintiff has a significantly lower chance of winning a case than pro 
se plaintiff (p>0.0009). Although to an insignificant level, the sign o f defendant 
representation type indicates that a defendant is better off pro se than with lawyer 
representation. In addition, plaintiffs using the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims have 
significantly higher chances o f winning than plaintiffs using the U.S. Tax Court 
(p>0.0375).
12 The Pearson residuals vs. representation types and deviance residuals vs. representation types plots do 
not show obvious evidence o f  deviation from homogeneity between different representation types. The 
above procedure is also run for Federal Appellate Court and U.S. Supreme Court cases with the plots 
showing no obvious deviation from homogeneity.
The opponent parties’ representation type interaction, litigant parties’ type and representation type 
interactions are all insignificant and therefore are deleted from the model. The above procedure is also run 
for Federal Appellate Court and U.S. Supreme Court cases with no significant results.
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Table 4.18
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Trial Courts: Lawyer vs. Pro Se)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -3.3250 5.1298 0.5159
Plaintiff Strength -0.5102 0.6777 0.4515 0.600
Defendant Strength 0.5902 0.6321 0.3504 1.804
Income Tax Issue -0.0242 0.5204 0.9629 0.976
Procedure and Administration Issue -0.0727 0.4853 0.8810 0.930
District Court 0.6302 0.3428 0.0660 1.878
Claims Court 0.5942 0.2856 0.0375 1.812
Plaintiff (Lawyer Representation) -0.9557 0.2882 0.0009 0.385
Defendant (Lawyer Representation) 3.5993 4.2923 0.4017 36.571
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1820.
Because party strength assumption does not necessarily resemble reality, plaintiff 
and defendant strength variables are substituted by dummy variables for litigant parties 
and the model for comparison of lawyer vs. pro se representation is recalculated. The 
results are reported in Tables 4.19 and 4.20. After control for representation types and 
indirect control o f amounts in dispute, the plaintiff chance o f winning does not differ 
significantly across plaintiff and defendant types. Furthermore, three out o f the four 
defendant dummy variables have the expected sign. Again, contrary to general belief, the 
lawyer represented plaintiff has a significantly lower chance of winning than pro se 
plaintiff (p<0.01). Although insignificant, a defendant is better off pro se than with 
attorney representation.
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Table 4.19
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success 
(Lawyer vs. Pro Se, Individual vs. Government, and Business vs. Government)
(Trial Courts)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -3.4302 4.4248 0.4382
Individual Plaintiff 1.462 1.7640 0.4156 4.205
Business Plaintiff 1.3116 1.6479 0.4261 3.712
Individual Defendant 1.1723 2.0167 0.5610 3.229
Business Defendant -1.4110 1.3057 0.2799 0.244
Income Tax Issue -0.1980 0.5470 0.7174 0.820
Procedure and Administration Issue -0.1567 0.4991 0.7535 0.855
District Court 0.6762 0.3508 0.0539 1.966
Claims Court 0.5491 0.2865 0.0553 1.732
Plaintiff (Lawyer Representation) -0.9710 0.2893 0.0008 0.379
Defendant (Lawyer Representation) 3.3150 4.0639 0.4147 27.523
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1970.
Table 4.20
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Trial Courts: Lawyer vs. Pro Se, Individual vs. Business)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept 0.9251 3.3831 0.7845
Business Plaintiff -0.0626 0.7597 0.9343 0.939
Government Plaintiff -1.9657 1.9074 0.3028 0.140
Business Defendant -2.8517 1.6969 0.0928 0.058
Government Defendant -1.6221 2.1305 0.4464 0.197
Income Tax Issue -0.2934 0.5386 0.5859 0.746
Procedure and Administration Issue -0.2372 0.4898 0.6281 0.789
District Court 0.5732 0.3376 0.0896 1.774
Claims Court 0.4762 0.2776 0.0863 1.610
Plaintiff (Lawyer Representation) -0.7261 0.2706 0.0073 0.484
Defendant (Lawyer Representation) 1.7397 2.6197 0.5066 5.696
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1901.
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To further investigate the influence o f representation type on case results, 
decisions involving only solo or firm representations are selected for additional analysis. 
Logistic regression results are depicted in Table 4.21. Plaintiff and defendant strength 
variables still have opposite signs than expected but are at insignificant levels. 
Surprisingly, group represented plaintiff has a significantly lower chance o f winning than 
solo represented plaintiff (p>0.0005). A plaintiffs chance of winning is also higher when 
confronting a group represented defendant as contrasted to a solo represented defendant. 
However, this result is at an insignificant level.
Table 4.21
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Trial Courts: Solo vs. Group)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept 0.4736 8.4519 0.9553
Plaintiff Strength -0.6366 2.1030 0.7621 0.529
Defendant Strength 0.2214 0.8715 0.7995 1.248
Income Tax Issue 0.5207 1.1817 0.6595 1.683
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.0410 0.4042 0.9192 1.042
District Court 0.6598 0.3844 0.0861 1.934
Claims Court 0.5087 0.3569 0.1541 1.663
Plaintiff (Group Representation) -0.8892 0.2568 0.0005 0.411
Defendant (Group Representation) 0.2291 0.2996 0.4446 1.257
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model p<0 .0001, Max--rescaled R-Square=0. 1447.
Tables 4.22 and 4.23 report solo vs. firm representation results using dummy 
variables for various litigant types instead of litigant strength variables. The results are 
consistent with the conclusions using litigant strength variables. Although the plaintiff 
type variables still have unexpected signs, they are at insignificant levels. All the
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defendant type variables have expected signs. A plaintiff has a lower chance of winning 
when confronting a stronger defendant than a weaker defendant, but it is at an 
insignificant level o f significance. Again, group represented plaintiff does significantly 
worse than solo represented plaintiff (p<0.001). A defendant seems to be better off using 
solo representation instead o f group representation, although the effect is insignificant.
Table 4.22
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success 
(Trial Courts: Solo vs. Group, Individual vs. Government, and Business vs. Government)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -5.0841 5.7990 0.3790
Individual Plaintiff 11.8371 7.8009 0.1292 >999.999
Business Plaintiff 7.9873 6.2539 0.2015 >999.999
Individual Defendant 6.7065 6.1086 0.2723 817.690
Business Defendant 2.4692 5.6469 0.6619 11.813
Income Tax Issue -1.3557 1.5754 0.3895 0.258
Procedure and Administration Issue -0.0920 0.4120 0.8233 0.912
District Court 0.7296 0.3888 0.0606 2.074
Claims Court 0.5319 0.3586 0.1380 1.702
Plaintiff (Group Representation) -0.9252 0.2597 0.0004 0.396
Defendant (Group Representation) 0.1551 0.3046 0.6106 1.168
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1682.
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Table 4.23
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success 
(Trial Courts: Solo vs. Group, Individual vs. Business)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept 12.1512 8.1171 0.1344
Business Plaintiff -3.7876 2.8003 0.1762 0.023
Government Plaintiff -10.5990 6.3522 0.0952 <0.001
Business Defendant -3.9430 2.1735 0.0697 0.019
Government Defendant -5.4415 4.1659 0.1915 0.004
Income Tax Issue -1.4326 1.5600 0.3584 0.239
Procedure and Administration Issue -0.0949 0.4066 0.8154 0.909
District Court 0.6365 0.3792 0.0932 1.890
Claims Court 0.4832 0.3523 0.1701 1.621
Plaintiff (Group) -0.8687 0.2547 0.0006 0.420
Defendant (Group) 0.1179 0.2987 0.6931 1.125
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1654.
Further Analysis of Pro Se Plaintiffs in Trial Courts. Pro se plaintiffs are 
predominantly individuals. Out o f the 318 Tax Court cases with available disputed 
amounts, 159 are initiated by pro se litigants. For the 159 cases with pro se plaintiffs, 156 
of the pro se plaintiffs are coded as individuals. For the remaining three cases with pro se
1 Tplaintiffs coded as businesses, one case involved a trustee representing a trust , and the 
other two cases had individual plaintiffs whose involvement in the suit was directly 
related to their roles as an officer or owner o f the business. Thus, the above three cases’
13 It is well established that a corporation (including a trust) must a p p e a r  th ro u g h  a n  a tto rn ey . E x c e p t  in  
extraordinary circumstances, corporations cannot be represented by lay persons (783 F.2d 771, 773; 65 
App. D.C. 255; 82 F.2d 861,863).
In all the courts o f  the United States the parties may plead and manage their own causes 
personally, or by the assistance o f  such counsel or attorneys at law. The words "the parties," as used in the 
statute, mean the parties in interest -  the real, beneficial owners o f  the claims asserted in the suit. By  
implication, it excludes agents in fact and confines the representation, where the party whose rights are 
actually involved does not appear in person, to attorneys and counselors at law (65 App. D.C. 255).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
plaintiffs are coded according to their organizational affiliation and not as individuals. 
This study has collected 153 U.S. District Court cases with available disputed amounts. 
Among these decisions, 27 are initiated by pro se individual plaintiffs. For the 166 U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims cases with amounts in dispute, 37 have pro se plaintiffs. A total 
o f 35 pro se plaintiffs are coded as individuals. The remaining two are coded as 
businesses according to the individual plaintiffs’ organizational affiliation. The above 
results are summarized in Table 4.24,
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Table 4.24 
Comparison of Trial Court Cases 
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
Court
No. of 
Cases with 
Pro Se 
Plaintiffs
Issues Involved No. o f Cases with 
Lawyer or 
Undisclosed 
Representation 
Plaintiffs
Issues Involved
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
---
--
Ta
x 
C
ou
rt
OnIT)
Income Taxes 107
159
Income Taxes 99
Procedure and 
Administration 49
Procedure and 
Administration 42
Employment
Taxes 3
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 15
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 2
Employment
Taxes 1
D
ist
ric
t 
C
ou
rt
27
Procedure and 
Administration 25
126
Procedure and 
Administration 98
Income Taxes 18
Employment
Taxes 2
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 4
Employment
Taxes 4
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 2
Procedure and Procedure and
Administration 27 Administration j O
3 Income Taxes 49o
u Income Taxes Employment 12
cn CJ 37 129 Taxes
■«3 10 Estate and Gift f
U Taxes
Miscellaneous CL
Excise Taxes 0
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For the 159 Tax Court cases with pro se plaintiffs, 107 involve income tax issues, 
three are about employment tax issues, and 49 about procedure and administration 
concerns. O f the 159 Tax Court cases with lawyer represented plaintiffs or with 
plaintiffs’ representation type undisclosed, 99 are about income tax issues, 42 are about 
procedure and administration concerns, 15 are about estate and gift taxes, two are about 
miscellaneous excise taxes, and one is about employment tax. For the 27 U.S. District 
Court cases with pro se plaintiffs, 25 involve procedure and administration concerns and 
the remaining two are about employment taxes. Out of the 126 U.S. District Court cases 
with lawyer represented plaintiffs or with plaintiffs’ representation type undisclosed, 98 
involve procedure and administration concerns, 18 involve income tax issues, four are 
estate and gift tax cases, four are employment tax cases, and two are miscellaneous excise 
tax cases. O f the 37 U.S. Court o f Federal Claims cases with pro se plaintiffs, 27 are 
procedure and administration disputes and 10 are income tax cases. For the 129 U.S. 
Court o f Federal Claims cases with attorney represented plaintiffs or with plaintiffs’ 
representation unavailable, 56 are procedure and administration cases, 49 are income tax 
cases, 12 are employment tax cases, six are about estate and gift taxes, and six about 
miscellaneous excise taxes. In sum, pro se plaintiffs appear in trial courts about 98% of 
the time for income tax or procedure and administration issues for the sample under 
study.
Pro se plaintiffs in the Tax Court most often sue over §§61, 72, 104, 151, 152, 
162, 274, 6330, and 7491; while plaintiffs with lawyer or undisclosed representation in 
the Tax Court most often contest §§162, 165, 170, 183, 6653, and 7430. Pro se plaintiffs 
in U.S. District Courts most often disagree on §§6330, 7421, and 7422; while plaintiffs
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with attorney or undisclosed representation in U.S. District Courts most often clash on 
§§6321, 6322, 6323, 6331, 6672, and 7433. The two most often disputed Sections by pro 
se plaintiffs in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims are §§6511 and 7422. Also, these 
sections are the most disputed Sections by plaintiffs with lawyer or undisclosed 
representation. Therefore, except in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims, the most often 
disputed Sections by pro se plaintiffs are usually different from the most often contested 
Sections by plaintiffs with attorney or undisclosed representation. Table 4.25 displays the 
most often disputed IRC Sections for trial court cases with available disputed amounts.
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Table 4.25
Most Often Disputed IRC Sections for Trial Court Cases 
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed
Court Representation PlaintiffsIRC Section Times Appearing 
as Major Issue
IRC Section Times Appearing 
as Major Issue
§104 5 §170 5
§274 6 §6653 7
§7491 6 §7430 7
£o §151 6
u §72 9 §165 8
3f—t §6330 11
§61 11 §183 11
§152 12
§162 15 §162 12
§6330 4 §6331 6
t53 §6322 7o
U §7421 4 §7433 8
-4-»o
•c
to
Q
§6672 10
§7422 5 §6323 11
§6321 11
§7422 5 §6532 5
§6402 5
o
U §6511 8
COg §h511 9 §3121 8
3 §7422 8
u §6672 10
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Table 4.26 displays the amount in dispute for trial court cases. Plaintiffs who 
choose pro se usually have a lower amount in dispute compared with plaintiffs who 
choose to hire attomey(s) or whose representation information is unavailable. The median 
amount in dispute for pro se plaintiffs in the Tax Court is $11,462.56 while it is $100,000 
for plaintiffs with lawyer or undisclosed representation. The median amounts in dispute 
for plaintiffs with pro se and lawyer or undisclosed representation in U.S. District Courts 
are $5,142.10 and $96,123.84, respectively. The medians are $10,182.03 and 
$427,640.67, respectively, in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims.
Table 4.26
Amount in Dispute for Trial Court Cases 
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
Court
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed 
Representation Plaintiffs
High Low Median High Low Median
Tax
Court $17,732,639 $398 $11,462.56 $551,510,819 $298 $100,000
District
Court 230,000 500 5,142.10 61,649,000 500 96,123.84
Claims
Court 2,900,000 571.34 10,182.03 140, 314.41 569.93 427,640.67
In summary, choosing pro se representation is quite common for plaintiffs in the 
U.S. Tax Court. For the 318 Tax Court cases with amounts in dispute available, half are 
initiated by pro se plaintiffs. Pro se representation is much less popular in U.S. District 
Courts and the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims. 18% plaintiffs in U.S. District Courts and 
22% in the U.S. Court o f Federal Claims choose to represent themselves. Pro se plaintiffs 
try to settle income tax or procedure and administration issues in trial courts 98% of the
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time. Trial court cases with pro se plaintiffs have a much lower median amount in dispute 
than cases with attorney or undisclosed representation.
Further Analysis of Solo Represented Plaintiffs in Trial Courts. For Tax Court 
cases where the amount in dispute is available, 103 are initiated by solo represented 
plaintiffs and 53 are initiated by group represented plaintiffs. Individual plaintiffs use 
solo representation three times as often as group representation. On the other hand, 
business plaintiffs use group representation more often than solo representation. A total 
o f 54 U.S. District Court cases are initiated by solo represented plaintiffs and 46 are 
initiated by group represented plaintiffs. Individual plaintiffs use solo representation 
twice as often as group representation while business and the federal government 
plaintiffs use group representation more often than solo representation. A total o f 70 U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims cases are initiated by solo represented plaintiffs and 49 by group 
represented plaintiffs. Individual plaintiffs use solo representation twice as often as group 
representation. Business plaintiffs use group representation almost as often as solo 
representation. Specifically, in trial courts, individual plaintiffs tend to choose solo over 
group representation while business and the federal government plaintiffs tend to choose 
group over solo representation.
This research does not find a distinct difference between solo and group 
represented plaintiffs in regard to what kind of issue they brought into the trial courts. In 
the Tax Court, solo represented plaintiffs most often sue over §§162, 165, 183, 6653, and 
7430 while group represented plaintiffs most often sue over §§162 and 183. In U.S. 
District Courts, the most often disputed Sections by solo represented plaintiffs are 
§§6321 and 7433 while they are §§6321, 6322, 6323, and 6672 for group represented
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plaintiffs. Solo represented plaintiffs in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims most often 
disagree on §§6511, 6672, and 7422. Group represented plaintiffs bring to the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims a wide range o f issues and they do not focus on any specific IRC 
Section. The above results are summarized in Table 4.27 and 4.28.
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Table 4.27
Comparison of Trial Court Cases (Solo vs. Group Representation)
Court
No. o f Cases 
with Solo 
Represented 
Plaintiffs
Issues Involved No. of Cases 
with Group 
Represented 
Plaintiffs
Issues Involved
Tax
Court
103 in Total.
90 by 
Individuals;
13 by 
Businesses.
Income Taxes 61
53 in Total.
31 by 
Individuals;
22 by 
Businesses.
Income Taxes 35
Procedure and 
Administration 29
Procedure and 
Administration 13
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 11
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 4
Employment
Taxes 1
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 1
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 1
District
Court
54 in Total.
29 by 
Individuals;
15 by 
Businesses;
10 by 
Government.
Procedure and 
Administration 42 46 in Total;
13 by 
Individuals;
19 by 
Businesses;
14 by 
Government.
Procedure and 
Administration 35
Income Taxes 6 Income Taxes 8
Employment
Taxes 4
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 2
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 1
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 1
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 1
Claims
Court
70 in Total, 
31 by 
Individuals;
39 by 
Businesses.
Procedure and 
Administration 35 49 in Total;
15 by 
Individuals;
34 by 
Businesses.
Income Taxes 25
Income Taxes 22 Procedure and Administration 15
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 5
Employment
Taxes 5
Employment
Taxes 5
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 3
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 3
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 1
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Table 4.28
Most Often Disputed IRC Sections for Trial Court Cases 
(Solo vs. Group Representation)
Court
Cases with Solo Represented 
Plaintiffs
Cases with Group Represented Plaintiffs
IRC
Section
No. o f Times 
Appearing 
as Major Issue
IRC Section No. o f Times Appearing 
as Major Issue
Ta
x 
C
ou
rt §7430 5 §162 4
§6653 6 4
§183 7
§1(.2 8
§165 8
D
is
tri
ct
C
ou
rt
§6321 5 §6672 5§6321 5
§7433 5
§6322 5
§6323 7
C
la
im
s
C
ou
rt
§6511 4
No IRC Section Is Mentioned More Than 3 
Times
§7422 5
§6672 6
Table 4.29 displays the high, low, and median amount in disputes for solo and 
group represented plaintiffs. Group represented plaintiffs have a median amount in 
dispute about two times larger than solo represented plaintiffs.
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Table 4.29
Amount in Dispute for Trial Court Cases 
(Solo vs. Group Representation)
Court
Cases with Solo Represented 
Plaintiffs
Cases with Group Represented 
Plaintiffs
High Low Median High Low Median
Tax
Court $23,213,702 $644 $70,097.35 $551,510,819 $1,545 $301,425.17
District
Court 25,478,773 1,000 78,036.36 61,649,000 2,000 218,015.50
Claims
Court 63,792,209 2,352.32 463,010.27 200,328,350 569.93 1,446,176
Whenever the choices are o f solo or group representation, individuals tend to
choose solo representation while businesses and the federal government tend to choose
group representation. Even though there are no distinct differences between solo and
group represented plaintiffs in regard to what kind o f issue they bring to trial courts, these
two groups o f plaintiffs focus on different IRC Sections. Solo represented plaintiffs have
a much lower median amount in dispute compared with group represented plaintiffs.
Conclusion for Trial Court Cases-Research 
Questions Five and Six
The fifth and sixth alternative hypotheses presented for investigation in this study
are:
Ha5: Different groups of litigants have unequal success rates at litigation for federal 
tax issues, with the United States government being the most successful 
entity, businesses being the second, and individuals being the least successful.
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Ha6: The three representation types before the courts (pro se, solo, and group 
representation) have significant influence on the success rates of individuals, 
businesses, and the federal government in litigation.
Logistic regression results do not support HU. Without control for representation 
types, the results indicate that the individual plaintiff has a significant higher chance of 
winning than business or the U.S. government as plaintiff. Business and the U.S. 
government plaintiffs do not differ significantly in chances of winning. Defendant types 
do not have significant influence on case results. After control for representation types, 
plaintiff and defendant types both are not significantly correlated with case results.
Contrary to general belief, holding all other conditions constant, pro se plaintiffs
perform significantly better than lawyer represented plaintiffs; solo represented plaintiffs
significantly outperform firm represented plaintiffs. Defendant representation types do
not significantly contribute to case results. Overall, HU is not rejected.
Test Results for Federal 
Appellate Court Cases
Success Rates Analysis. The beginning point o f the analysis is to examine the 
appellant success rate and overall success rate for each of the three categories o f litigants. 
The results are displayed in Tables 4.30 and 4.31. There are wide disparities in the 
relative success of the different classes o f appellants in the courts o f appeals, and those 
differences are quite consistent with the expectations of Party Capabilities Theory. The 
federal government is successful in 60.4% of its appeals and has an overall rate of 
success (combined success rate as appellant and as appellee) o f 79.7%. Individuals and 
businesses are successful in their appeals for 16.1%, and 23.4%, respectively. The overall 
success rates for individuals and businesses are 17.9%, and 32.4%, respectively. In total,
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the United States government is more than twice as successful as individuals and 
businesses.
Table 4.30
Winning and Losing by Nature o f Party (Appellate Courts)
Respondent
Individual Business U.S. Gov. Total
Appellant % N % N % N % N
Individual 0 1 28.6 14 15.8 450 16.1 465
Business 71.4 7 11.1 9 22.1 172 23.4 188
U.S. Gov. 67.4 46 53.3 45 NA NA 60.4 91
Total 66.7 54 42.6 68 17.5 622 23.4 744
Table 4.31
Success Rates by Nature o f Party (Appellate Courts)
When Respondent, Combined Success Rate
Success Rate Opponents' as Appellant
Type o f Party as Appellant Success Rate = Net Advantage and Respondent 
Individual 16.1 66.7 = -50.6 17.9
Business 23.4 42.6 = -19.2 32.4
U.S. Gov. 60.4 17.5 = 42.9 79.7
As mentioned earlier, the net advantage index may be a better indicator of 
litigation success than the plaintiff success rate or overall success rate. It is unaffected by 
the relative frequency that a given class o f litigant appears as an appellant rather than as 
an appellee. Net advantage for each class of litigant is displayed in Table 4.31. The 
results reinforce the picture suggested by the plaintiff success rate and overall success 
rate. Only the federal government enjoys a positive net advantage of 42.9%. Businesses 
follow the federal government and have a negative net advantage o f 19.2%. Individuals
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
suffer a steep negative net advantage of 50.6%. Direct comparisons of litigation parties 
using only cases in which the two parties under comparison directly confront each other 
affirm the above results. The direct comparison results are displayed in Table 4.32. 
Individuals suffer tremendous negative net advantages in comparison with either 
businesses (-42.8%) or the federal government (-51.6%). The U.S. government enjoys a 
strong positive net advantage compared with individuals (51.6%) and businesses 
(31.2%).
Table 4.32
Net Advantage for Different Combination of Parties (Appellate Courts)
Combination o f Parties Net Advantage
Individual vs. Business Business by 42.8%
Individual vs. U.S. Gov. U.S. Gov. by 51.6%
Business vs. U.S. Gov. U.S. Gov. by 31.2%
Logistic Regression Results for Has without Considering Representation Types.
To provide more systematic analysis, this study uses the logistic regression model. The 
results are reported in Table 4.33. The dependant variable is appellant success, coded as 1 
if  the appellant wins and 0 if  the appellee wins. Overall, the model performs well. The 
full model is significant at the 0.0001 level. Most of the independent variables have a 
statistically significant relationship with appellant success. However, the signs o f the 
party strength variables are not in the predicted direction. Appellant strength is 
significantly negatively related with appellant success (p>0.0135), and appellee strength 
is significantly positively related with appellant success (PO.OOOl). The logistic model 
actually suggests that the presumed weaker party significantly outperforms the presumed
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stronger party. Income tax and procedure and administrative issues have a strong positive 
association with plaintiff successes compared with other issues. Different types o f lower 
forums do not influence case results significantly.
Table 4.33
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood of Success in Appellate Courts
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -1.2615 0.8536 0.1394
Appellant Strength -0.4346 0.1759 0.0135 0.648
Appellee Strength 0.8241 0.2092 <0.0001 2.280
Income Tax Issue 0.8101 0.2971 0.0064 2.248
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.7877 0.2955 0.0077 2.198
District Court 0.4225 0.2175 0.0521 1.526
Claims Court 0.0668 0.4266 0.8755 1.069
N ote- Dependent Variable = Verdict. Model p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1740.
As this study previously mentioned, party strength assumption is arbitrary and 
might mislead test results. Test results, after using party dummy variables to substitute 
party strength variables, are displayed in Tables 4.34 and 4.35. Individual appellants 
significantly outperform the federal government appellants (p>0.0304) and individual 
appellees significantly outperform the federal government appellees (p>0.0026). Business 
and individual appellants’ success probabilities do not differ significantly. However, 
business appellees significantly underperform individual appellees (p>0.0288). Business 
and the federal government litigants comparison does not show significant results, either 
as an appellant or as an appellee. Compared with other disputes, income tax or procedure
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and administration issues give the appellant a significantly better opportunity o f winning 
(p<0.01). Lower forum type is not a significant factor in the appellant’s success pattern.
Table 4.34
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood o f Success in Appellate Courts 
(Individual vs. Government and Business vs. Government)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -0.2854 0.5316 0.5914
Individual Appellant 1.0453 0.4829 0.0304 2.844
Business Appellant 0.6555 0.4787 0.1709 1.926
Individual Appellee -1.5590 0.5177 0.0026 0.210
Business Appellee -0.6328 0.4548 0.1642 0.531
Income Tax Issue 0.8096 0.2993 0.0068 2.247
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.8114 0.2995 0.0067 2.251
District Court 0.3977 0.2252 0.0774 1.488
Claims Court 0.0485 0.4287 0.9100 1.050
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1746.
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Table 4.35
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood of Success in Appellate Courts
(Individual vs. Business)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -0.7486 0.6049 0.2159
Business Appellant -0.3891 0.2246 0.0832 0.678
The U.S. government Appellant -1.0149 0.4817 0.0351 0.362
Business Appellee 0.8647 0.3957 0.0288 2.374
The U.S. government Appellee 1.5127 0.5162 0.0034 4.539
Income Tax Issue 0.8031 0.2988 0.0072 2.233
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.8054 0.2989 0.0071 2.238
District Court 0.3947 0.2247 0.0790 1.484
Claims Court 0.0479 0.4284 0.9109 1.049
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.1745.
Logistic Regression Results for il-,s (after Inclusion of Representation Types)
and Hafi.The above analysis does not account for representation influence on appellant 
success. As displayed in Table 4.36, further clarification of the results by adding 
representation type into the model shows a different conclusion. The party strength 
variables still have the unexpected sign. However, only the appellee strength variable is 
significant (p>0.0039). The presumed weaker appellees significantly outperform the 
presumed stronger appellees. Compared with other issues, except procedure and 
administration disputes, income tax issues are associated with significantly higher 
appellants’ success probabilities (p>0.0277). Despite o f the unexpected signs, appellant 
and appellee representation types (pro se vs. lawyer) do not significantly correlate with 
case results.
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Table 4.36
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Appellate Courts: Lawyer vs. Pro Se)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -5.9914 7.4327 0.4202
Appellant Strength -0.1510 0.4650 0.7453 0.860
Appellee Strength 1.1060 0.3833 0.0039 3.022
Income Tax Issue 1.2432 0.5648 0.0277 3.467
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.8034 0.5900 0.1732 2.233
District Court 0.5448 0.3625 0.1328 1.724
Claims Court 0.5144 0.8406 0.5406 1.673
Appellant (Lawyer Representation) -0.2616 0.5894 0.6571 0.770
Appellee (Lawyer Representation) 3.3231 7.1988 0.6444 27.745
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.2482.
Tables 4.37 and 4.38 display logistic regression results after substituting party 
strength variables with party dummy variables. First, the three parties under investigation 
do not have significantly different success probabilities as appellants. However, 
individual appellees significantly outperform business and the federal government 
appellees (p<0.05). But no significant difference is found between business and the 
federal government appellees. Overall, two out of the eight party dummy variables have 
the expected signs. Appellant and appellee representation types (pro se vs. lawyer) are 
not significantly correlated with appellants’ success probabilities, even though they have 
unexpected signs.
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Table 4.37
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success 
( Lawyer vs. Pro Se, Individual vs. Government, and Business vs. Government)
(Appellate Courts)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -3.9524 7.3014 0.5883
Individual Appellant 0.9787 1.1059 0.3762 2.661
Business Appellant 1.0378 0.8987 0.2482 2.823
Individual Appellee -1.8820 0.9066 0.0379 0.152
Business Appellee 0.0757 0.9184 0.9343 1.079
Income Tax Issue 1.1294 0.6705 0.0921 3.094
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.7155 0.6757 0.2896 2.045
District Court 0.4128 0.3817 0.2795 1.511
Claims Court 0.4490 0.8564 0.6001 1.567
Appellant (Lawyer Representation) -0.2527 0.5882 0.6674 0.777
Appellee (Lawyer Representation) 3.4207 7.1988 0.6347 30.592
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model p<0 .0001, Max--rescaled R-Square=0..2592.
Table 4.38
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success 
(Appellate Courts: Lawyer vs. Pro Se, Individual vs. Business)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -5.8486 11.8617 0.6220
Business Appellant 0.0528 0.8066 0.9478 1.054
Government Appellant -0.9996 1.1104 0.3680 0.368
Business Appellee 1.9907 0.7661 0.0094 7.321
Government Appellee 1.9025 0.9096 0.0365 6.703
Income Tax Issue 1.1370 0.6719 0.0906 3.117
Procedure and Administration Issue 0.7157 0.6767 0.2903 2.046
District Court 0.4194 0.3829 0.2734 1.521
Claims Court 0.4554 0.8581 0.5956 1.577
Appellant (Lawyer Representation) -0.2633 0.5916 0.6563 0.769
Appellee (Lawyer Representation) 4.4036 11.7935 0.7089 81.748
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.2594.
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Cases involve only solo or group representations are selected for comparison of 
solo vs. firm representation influence on case results. According to Table 4.39, party 
strength variables have signs that are opposite of their expected signs. Appellee strength 
is positively associated with appellants success possibilities (p>0.0411). The stronger the 
appellee is, then, the higher chance that the appellant wins the case. Even though the 
effect is not statistically significant, group represented appellants have higher chances of 
winning than solo represented appellants. On the other hand, group represented appellees 
underperform solo represented appellees (p>0.0891). Issues involved and forums used do 
not contribute significantly to case results.
Table 4.39
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Appellate Courts: Solo vs. Group)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -3.7891 3.3656 0.2602
Appellant Strength -0.8323 0.9072 0.3589 0.435
Appellee Strength 1.4905 0.7297 0.0411 4.439
Income Tax Issue 1.5615 0.9861 0.1133 4.766
Procedure and Administration Issue 1.7406 1.4526 0.2308 5.700
District Court 0.6410 0.3836 0.0947 1.898
Claims Court 0.3802 0.8585 0.6579 1.463
Appellant (Group Representation) 0.2208 0.3900 0.5714 1.247
Appellee (Group Representation) 0.6919 0.4069 0.0891 1.998
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel pO.OOOl, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.2695.
Tables 4.40 and 4.41 report test results after substituting party strength variables 
with party dummy variables. Three out o f the eight party dummy variables have expected
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signs. None o f the party dummy variables is significantly associated with case results. 
For appellants, group representation is positively associated with appellants possibilities 
o f success, but on an insignificant level. On the other hand, appellees are better off with 
solo rather than group representation, but it is only marginally significant (0.05<p<0.10). 
Consistent with the test results using party strength variables, issues involved and forums 
used do not significantly influence case results.
Table 4.40
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success 
(Solo vs. Group, Individual vs. Government, and Business vs. Government)
(Appellate Courts)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept -0.3401 1.4908 0.8196
Individual Appellant 2.3965 2.1343 0.2615 10.985
Business Appellant 1.4120 1.2310 0.2514 4.104
Individual Appellee 4.8413 5.4232 0.3720 126.637
Business Appellee 5.9055 5.0180 0.2393 367.039
Income Tax Issue 3.5994 1.9600 0.0663 36.575
Procedure and Administration Issue 3.3517 2.1638 0.1214 28.550
District Court 0.6380 0.4127 0.1221 1.893
Claims Court 0.3990 0.8896 0.6537 1.490
Appellant (Group Representation) 0.2165 0.3964 0.5850 1.242
Appellee (Group Representation) 0.7367 0.4117 0.0735 2.089
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. M odel p<0 .0001, Max--rescaled R-Square=0,.2813.
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Table 4.41
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence o f Representation Type on Party Success
(Appellate Courts: Solo vs. Group, Individual vs., Business)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept 3.7595 6.7546 0.5778
Business Appellant -0.5472 1.0728 0.6100 0.579
Government Appellant -1.7716 1.9255 0.3575 0.170
Business Appellee 1.4101 0.7737 0.0684 4.096
Government Appellee -2.7178 5.1048 0.5944 0.066
Income Tax Issue 2.6750 1.6958 0.1147 14.512
Procedure and Administration Issue 2.4523 1.8805 0.1922 11.615
District Court 0.4344 0.3926 0.2685 1.544
Claims Court 0.2775 0.8556 0.7457 1.320
Appellant (Group) 0.1768 0.3817 0.6432 1.193
Appellee (Group) 0.6757 0.4072 0.0971 1.965
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model p<0.0001, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.2745.
Further Analysis of Pro Se Appellants in Federal Appellate Courts. Although 
pro se plaintiffs significantly outperform lawyer represented plaintiffs in trial courts, pro 
se appellants do not enjoy the same advantage in Federal Appellate Courts. This inquiry 
further analyzes pro se appellants in Federal Appellate Courts and compares it with trial 
courts results.
Table 4.42 includes Federal Appellate Court cases that disclose the amount in 
dispute. This study collected a total of 286 Federal Appellate Court cases with amount in 
dispute. Only 13% (38 cases) of them are initiated by pro se appellants. As mentioned 
earlier, 223 (35%) o f the 637 trial court cases with available amounts in dispute are 
started by pro se plaintiffs. Thus, pro se is not as popular a choice for appellants in 
Federal Appellate Courts as it is for plaintiffs in trial courts.
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In trial courts, pro se plaintiffs try to settle income tax or procedure and 
administration issues 98% of the time and pro se plaintiffs have a much lower median 
amount in dispute than cases with attorney or undisclosed representation plaintiffs. 
According to Tables 4.42 and 4.43, pro se appellants appeal in Federal Appellate Courts 
100% of the time for income tax or procedure and administration issues. The median 
amount in dispute for pro se appellants is only 9% of the amount for other appellants.
As shows in Table 4.44, the most often disputed Section for pro se appellants is 
§6213, while other appellants most often disagree upon §§104, 6323, 6653, and 6672. 
Recall that, except in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, pro se plaintiffs focus on 
different IRC Sections compared with other plaintiffs in trial courts.
Even though pro se is not as popular among appellants in Federal Appellate 
Courts as it is among plaintiffs in trial courts, the characteristics o f pro se appellants are 
consistent with those o f pro se plaintiffs. However, pro se appellants do not enjoy the 
same success in Federal Appellate Courts as pro se plaintiffs in trial courts.
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Table 4.42
Comparison of Federal Appellate Court Cases 
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
No. of Cases 
with Pro Se 
Plaintiffs
Issues Involved No. of Cases with 
Lawyer or 
Undisclosed 
Representation 
Plaintiffs
Issues Involved
38 in Total.
All by 
Individuals.
Procedure and 
Administration 21
248 in Total.
142 by Individuals; 
62 by Businesses; 44 
by the Government.
Income Taxes 97
Procedure and 
Administration 122
Income Taxes 17
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 16
Employment
Taxes 7
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 6
Table 4.43
Amount in Dispute for Federal Appellate Court Cases 
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation 
Plaintiffs
High Low Median High Low Median
4,676,578 1,548 13,357.45 85,000,000 772 148,313.63
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Table 4.44
Most Often Disputed IRC Sections for Federal Appellate Court Cases 
(Pro Se vs. Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation 
Plaintiffs
IRC
Section
No. o f Times 
Appearing 
as Major Issue
IRC Section No. o f Times Appearing 
as Major Issue
§6213 3
§6653 7
§6323 8
§6672 14
§104 16
Further Analysis of Solo Represented Appellants in Federal Appellate 
Courts. Solo represented plaintiffs significantly outperform group represented plaintiffs 
in trial courts. However, the same result is not found for solo represented appellants in 
Federal Appellate Courts. This research further analyzes solo represented appellants and 
compares the results with solo represented plaintiffs in trial courts.
Individual appellants use solo representation more often than group representation 
while business and the federal government appellants use group representation more 
often than solo representation. Group represented appellants bring many more estate and 
gift tax cases to court than solo represented appellants. Solo and group represented 
appellants all focus on §§104 and 6672. Solo represented appellants also focus on 
§§6015, 6321, and 6653 while group represented appellants focus on §§2036 and 6323. 
The median amount in dispute for solo represented appellants is only 30% of that amount 
compared to group represented appellants.
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As mentioned before, in trial courts, individuals plaintiffs tend to choose solo 
representation while businesses and the federal government tend to choose group 
representation. Solo and group represented plaintiffs focus on different IRC Sections. 
Solo represented plaintiffs have a much lower median amount in dispute compared with 
group represented plaintiffs. In Federal Appellate Courts, individual appellants tend to 
choose solo representation while businesses and the federal government tend to choose 
group representation. Solo and group represented appellants generally have different tax 
issues. The median amount in dispute for solo represented appellants is 70% lower than 
that of group represented appellants. Thus, the general characteristics of solo represented 
plaintiffs in trial courts are consistent with the general characteristics o f solo represented 
appellants in Federal Appellate Courts. Consequently, it is the judicial forum, not the 
different characteristics o f solo represented plaintiffs, that makes them significantly 
outperform group represented plaintiffs in trial courts. The above results are summarized 
in Tables 4.45, 4.46, and 4.47.
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Table 4.45
Comparison of Federal Appellate Court Cases (Solo vs. Group Representation)
No. of Cases 
with Pro Se 
Plaintiffs
Issues Involved No. o f Cases with 
Lawyer or 
Undisclosed 
Representation 
Plaintiffs
Issues Involved
113 in Total.
84 by 
Individuals;
22 by 
Businesses;
7 by the 
Government.
Procedure and 
Administration 67
135 in Total.
58 by Individuals; 
40 by Businesses; 
37 by the 
Government.
Income Taxes 56
Income Taxes 41 Procedure and Administration 55
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 2
Estate and Gift 
Taxes 14
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 2
Employment
Taxes 6
Employment
Taxes 1
Miscellaneous 
Excise Taxes 4
Table 4.46
Most Often Disputed IRC Sections for Federal Appellate Court Cases 
(Solo vs. Group Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation 
Plaintiffs
IRC
Section
No. of Times 
Appearing 
as Major Issue
IRC Section No. o f Times Appearing 
as Major Issue
§6015 4 §6323 5
§6321 4 §2036 6
§6653 4 §6672 10
fcO(»72 4
§104 11§104 5
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Table 4.47
Amount in Dispute for Federal Appellate Court Cases 
(Solo vs. Group Representation)
Cases with Pro Se Plaintiffs Cases with Lawyer or Undisclosed Representation 
Plaintiffs
High Low Median High Low Median
85,000,000 1,791 88,768.7 80,000,000 772 300,000
Conclusion for Appellate Court Cases-Research 
Questions Five and Six
Without accounting for representation types, individual appellants significantly 
outperform the federal government appellants, and individual appellees significantly 
outperform the federal government appellees. Business and individual appellants’ success 
probabilities do not differ significantly. However, individual appellees significantly 
outperform business appellees. A comparison of business and the federal government 
litigants does not show significant results, either as an appellant or as an appellee. After 
taking into consideration representation types (pro se vs. lawyer), the three parties under 
investigation do not show significantly different success probabilities as appellant. 
Individual appellees significantly outperform both business and the federal government 
appellees. Logistic analysis using cases that involve only solo or group representations 
shows that the three litigant parties do not differ significantly either as an appellant or as 
an appellee. However, individuals seem to have a limited advantage over businesses and 
the federal government in appellate courts; businesses and the federal government have 
about the same power. The results do not support Ha5-
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Representation type does not contribute significantly to case results in appellate 
courts. Litigants seem to be better off via pro se than lawyer representation, but the effect 
is not significant. For lawyer represented litigants, group represented appellants 
outperform solo represented appellants and group represented appellees underperform 
solo represented appellees, but at an insignificant level. Ha6 is rejected for appellate court 
cases.
Test Results for U.S. Supreme 
Court Cases
Table 4.48 presents appellant success rates for the three categories o f litigants in 
the U.S. Supreme Court. Individual appellants are less successful than businesses, which 
are less successful than the U.S. government (appellant success rate is 20%, 40%, and 
78.9% for individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government, respectively). The combined 
success rates in Table 4.49 resemble the picture (combined success rate is 18.8%, 30.8%, 
75.9% for individuals, businesses, and the U.S. government, respectively). Overall, the 
federal government is twice as successful as businesses in the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
are in turn twice as successful as individuals.
Table 4.48
Winning and Losing by Nature o f Party (the U.S. Supreme Court)
Respondent
Individual Business U.S. Gov. Total
Appellant % N % N % N % N
Individual NA NA NA NA 20 5 20 5
Business NA NA NA NA 40 5 40 5
U.S. Gov. 81.8 11 75 8 NA NA 78.9 19
Total 81.8 11 75 8 30 10 62.1 29
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Table 4.49 shows the net advantage for each category o f litigant. The net 
advantage measure might be a better indicator of litigation success than the raw rates 
because it is unaffected by the relative frequency with which various classes o f litigants 
appear as an appellant rather than an appellee. If there is a propensity to affirm (or 
reverse) in the U.S. Supreme Court, this propensity does not affect the net advantage 
index. The net advantage confirms that the presumed stronger party, most notably the 
federal government, has greater success compared to individual or business litigants. 
Only the federal government has a positive net advantage (48.9%), followed by 
businesses (-35%), whereas the score for individuals is -61.8%.
Table 4.49
Success Rates by Nature o f Party (the U.S. Supreme Court)
Type o f Party 
Individual 
Business 
U.S. Gov.
Success Rate 
as Appellant 
20.0
40.0 
78.9
When Respondent, 
Opponents' 
Success Rate
81.8
75.0
30.0
Net Advantage 
-61.8 
-35.0
48.9
Combined Success Rate 
as Appellant 
and Respondent 
18.8
30.8
75.9
Cases in which different categories o f litigants directly face one another are then 
chosen. Table 4.50 shows the net advantages o f various pairings o f litigants. In every 
matchup, the presumed stronger party enjoys a net advantage. The federal government 
enjoys a net advantage o f 62.8% over individuals and 35% over businesses. Individuals 
versus businesses net advantage is not calculated due to lack of data.
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Table 4.50
Net Advantage for Different Combination o f Parties (the U.S. Supreme Court)
Combination of Parties Net Advantage
Individual vs. Business NA
Individual vs. U.S. Gov. U.S. Gov. by 61.8%
Business vs. U.S. Gov. U.S. Gov. by 35%
Although the analysis of bivariate relationships presented above produced results 
that are consistent with the thesis that litigant status and strength are significantly related 
to rates o f appellants successes, nevertheless, this thesis can only be provisionally 
supported until the effects o f potential influential variables are examined. Table 4.51 
reports the logistic regression results after accounting for tax issues. The full model is 
only marginally significant (p>0.0555). Although insignificant, appellant and appellee 
strength variables have signs that are different than those expected. That is, the presumed 
stronger litigant parties have lower chances o f winning a case than the presumed weaker 
litigant parties, but the effect is below the conventional significance level. The federal 
tax issues involved do not significantly influence case results. Due to data limitations, 
further analysis using party dummy variables instead o f party strength variables is not 
attempted for Supreme Court cases.
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Table 4.51
Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood of Success in the U.S. Supreme Court
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept 2.9483 5.5819 0.5974
Appellant Strength -1.4981 1.3102 0.2529 0.224
Appellee Strength 0.4766 1.0830 0.6599 1.611
Income Tax Issue -1.5909 1.3846 0.2506 0.204
Procedure and Administration Issue -0.4088 1.3746 0.7662 0.664
Note: Dependent Variable = Verdict. Model p>0.0555, Max-rescaled R-Square=0.3711.
Table 4.52 displays logistic regression results by adding representation type (solo 
vs. group) into the model. The full model is not significant. Party strength variables still 
have unexpected signs and are not significant at a conventional level. Issues involved are 
not significantly correlated with case results either. Group represented litigants seem to 
underperform solo represented litigants, either as an appellant or as an appellee, although 
at an insignificant level.
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Table 4.52
Logistic Regression Estimates for Influence of Representation Type on Party Success 
(the U.S. Supreme Court: Solo vs. Group)
Independent Variable Estimate SE Pr > ChiSq Odds Ratio
Intercept 3.4792 5.6257 0.5363
Appellant Strength -1.5525 1.3098 0.2359 0.212
Appellee Strength 0.3075 1.1063 0.7810 1.360
Income Tax Issue -2.0608 1.4833 0.1647 0.127
Procedure and Administration Issue -0.4820 1.4043 0.7314 0.618
Appellant (Group Representation) -0.6089 2.0243 0.7636 0.544
Appellee (Group Representation) 0.8619 2.0124 0.6684 2.368
Note: Dependant Variable=Verdict. Model p> 0.1762, Max--rescaled R-Square=0 .3958.
Although the Sixth Amendment offers litigants the right to self-represent, the
Supreme Court cases collected for this study do not involve pro se representation. This
study observes a decreased rate o f pro se representation when the judicial level ascends
from the trial court. As mentioned earlier, for trial court cases, around 34.5% of cases
involve pro se litigants. The number decreases to 16.4% for the appellate court cases, and
to 0% for the Supreme Court cases.
Conclusion for Supreme Court Cases-Research 
Questions Five and Six
Notwithstanding that the appellant success rate, combined success rate, and net 
advantage all show that the federal government is the most successful party in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, followed by businesses, and individuals are the weakest in litigation, 
which are in support o f Party Capability Theory, logistic regression shows opposite 
results. Without considering representation types, the presumed stronger litigant parties 
have a lower chance of winning a case than the presumed weaker litigant parties, but the
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effect is below the conventional significance level. The same results are found after 
taking into consideration representation types (solo vs. group). Ha5 is not supported for 
Supreme Court cases.
Representation type does not contribute significantly to case results in the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Litigants seem to be better off solo than having group representation, 
either as an appellant or as an appellee, but the effect is not significant. Ha6 is rejected for 
Supreme Court cases.
Comparison with Prior Studies
Prior to the current study, the work that analyzes research questions one through 
four is Wanner (1974). As discussed in Chapter Two, Wanner (1974) uses trial court 
records o f 1965-1970. Wanner concludes that, for trial court cases in general, 
organizations make up almost half of the plaintiffs, individuals approximately 42%, and 
government only constitutes about 9% of the plaintiffs; individuals make up the majority 
of defendants (67%), organizations follow (26%), and the government is only the 
defendant less than 6% of the time. In contrast, the current study concludes that for 
federal tax cases in trial courts, individuals are the majority plaintiff (75.29%), businesses 
and the federal government only constitute 17.42%, and 7.29% of the plaintiffs, 
respectively; the federal government is the only defendant in the U.S. Tax Court and the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims and it is the defendant in about 75% of the U.S. District 
Court cases under study. Thus, the most frequent plaintiffs for trial court cases in general 
are organizations and in trial court federal tax disputes are individuals. The majority 
defendants for trial court cases in general are individuals and for trial court federal tax 
disagreement is the federal government. Wanner (1974) finds individuals bring different
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kinds o f disputes to the judicial system than do organizations and governments. This is 
consistent with the current study’s result that there is a significant relationship between 
the type of plaintiff and the type of tax issue being brought to trial courts. Wanner (1974) 
finds that all categories o f defendants most often appear in three types of suits while the 
current study concludes a significant relationship between the type o f defendant and the 
issue involved.
For the three types o f success rate analysis (appellate success rate, combined 
success rate, and net advantage), the current study reaches more dramatic conclusions 
than previous researches. According to Table 4.53, the government has the highest 
appellate success rate, combined success rate and net advantage in the current study. Its 
net advantage in previous studies ranges from 11.8% to 32.3%, while it is 42.9% in the 
current study. Businesses and individuals are far less successful in the current study than 
in previous studies. Businesses’ (Individuals’) net advantage ranges from -2.8% to 3.1% 
(-12.6% to -1.5%) in prior studies and it is -19.2% (-50.6%) in the current study. The 
results seem to indicate that the federal government enjoys a bigger advantage in federal 
tax cases than cases in general in appellate courts.
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Table 4.53
Comparison o f Various Studies: Success Rates
Wheeler et al. (1987), 
State Supreme Court Cases
Songer et al. (1999),
U.S. Courts o f Appeals Cases
City &
State
Gov.
Businesses Individuals U.S.
Gov.
Businesses Individuals
Success Rate 
as Appellant
48.2% 41.6% 38.5% 51.3% 30.8% 26.1%
Combined 
Success Rate
60.2% 50.2% 48.1% 70% 48.2% 35.1%
Net
Advantage
11.8% 3.1% -1.5% 25.6% -2.8% -12.6%
Farole (1999),
State Supreme Court Cases
Current Study,
U.S. Courts o f Appeals Cases
Success Rate 
as Appellant
68.7% 45.2% 41.1% 60.4 23.4 16.1
Combined 
Success Rate
65.2% 49.1% 43.1% 79.7 32.4 17.9
Net
Advantage
32.3% -2.4% -12.5% 42.9 -19.2 -50.6
Comparison of logistic regression results with prior studies shows opposite 
conclusions. As displayed in Table 4.54, prior studies find positive evidence in support of 
Party Capability Theory. The current study finds evidence that is contrary to Party 
Capability Theory.
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Table 4.54
Comparison o f Various Studies: Logistic Regression
Independent
Variable
Songer et al. 
(1999), Cases of 
U.S. Courts of 
Appeals
Farole (1999), 
State Supreme 
Court Cases
Current Study (Before Control 
of Representation Effects), 
Cases of U.S. Courts of Appeals
Estimate Estimate Estimate
Appellant 0.33** 0.248*** -0.4346*
Respondent -0.10** -0.033 0.8241***
* Significant at 0.05 ** Significant at 0.01 ***Significant at 0.001
Although the success rate analysis does not contradict Party Capability Theory and 
is consistent with previous studies, logistic analysis in the current study finds opposite 
results compared to prior studies. That is, Patty Capability Theory does not appear to 
apply to federal tax cases. The presumed stronger party does win more often than the 
presumed weaker party, but it is for reasons other than party strength. One possible 
explanation might be: The presumed stronger party can absorb moderate losses and is 
less likely to file a frivolous law suit. On the other hand, the presumed weaker party has 
too much at stake on one case to play odds. Consequently, the presumed weaker party 
files many more frivolous suits than the presumed stronger party. This makes the success 
rate of the weaker party much lower than the stronger party. But once the weaker party 
does file a reasonable case, it actually outperforms the presumed stronger parties in 
federal tax disputes.
Only Wheeler et al. (1987) considers representation effects on case results. Due to 
the scarcity o f pro se cases, that study was unable to investigate the pro se representation 
influence on the success rate at litigation o f the party at issue. The study does conclude
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that, with few exceptions, the weaker appellant, when represented by a law firm against 
the stronger respondent’s solo practitioner, does far better than when the reverse occurs. 
The current study does find that appellants are better off using group representation 
instead o f solo representation, although at an insignificant level. However, the current 
study also concludes that appellees with solo representation outperform appellees with 
group representation, and it reaches a marginal significance level.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the data analysis and tests of 
hypotheses. For trial courts and Federal Appellate Courts, individuals initiate the majority 
of the cases under study. The federal government is the major defendant/appellee. For 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. government initiates most o f the cases under study. No 
significantly different frequencies are found for the three groups under study appearing as 
appellee before the U.S. Supreme Court. Procedure and administration disputes and 
income tax issues are the two major reasons litigants go to trial and appellate courts. On 
the other hand, appellants bring to the U.S. Supreme Court a very broad range o f issues.
Even though success rate analysis shows that the presumed stronger party does win 
more often in court, logistic regression results do not support Party Capability Theory. 
After controlling for representation types, plaintiff/appellant category is not significantly 
correlated with case results. However, individual appellees significantly outperform both 
business and the federal government appellees in Federal Appellate Courts. In trial 
courts, pro se plaintiffs perform significantly better than attorney represented plaintiffs; 
solo represented plaintiffs significantly outperform group represented plaintiffs. Group
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represented appellees underperform solo represented appellees in Federal Appellate 
Courts at a marginally significant level.
Chapter Five includes a summary and discussion of the results o f this research 
effort. Implications and limitations o f the study are disclosed and recommendations for 
further research are presented.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the findings o f this research inquiry on 
Party Capability Theory. The primary research objective is to investigate different 
litigants’ strength in court on federal tax issues. Each step toward meeting this objective 
is outlined in the chapter summaries that follow. Next, conclusions relative to the tests of 
hypotheses are discussed. Implications and limitations of the study are disclosed and 
recommendations for further research are presented.
Summary of Previous Chapters
As discussed in Chapter One, understanding who wins in court is an essential 
component o f a full appreciation of the authoritative allocation o f values in society. Party 
Capability Theory hypothesizes that “repeat players” fare better in courts and are better 
able to influence legal change than “one shotters.” It also points out that legal services 
accentuate the RP advantage. The theory becomes most visible and is widely cited in the 
law and society field. However, it has not been utilized in accounting academic research, 
and understanding judicial reallocation in federal taxation area has considerable 
importance. Most prior Party Capability Theory studies have ignored legal representation, 
especially pro se representation and its influence. The growing importance o f pro se 
representation in federal tax cases mandates evidence to address this research gap.
127
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Chapter Two includes a review of relevant prior studies. While the approaches in 
Party Capability Theory studies vary significantly, classification o f litigants into groups 
and making general assumptions o f the strength of each group has been widely used. 
Since Wheeler et al. (1987), net advantage analysis has become an essential component 
o f Party Capability Theory study. Logistic regression is commonly used to control for 
other influential factors in litigation. Prior empirical analysis of Party Capability Theory 
provides evidence that: (1) The presumed stronger parties do enjoy certain advantages in 
U.S. trial courts, U.S. Court of Appeals, and state supreme courts in the United States; 
and (2) Party Capability Theory does not apply to the U.S. Supreme Court. Party 
Capability Theory has not been generalized to federal tax cases. Prior research on pro se 
representation has been merely analytical. The general conclusion is that the pro se 
party’s unfamiliarity with rules often leads to his/her failure in court. However, no 
empirical research on pro se representation has been attempted, and further consideration 
o f the topic is warranted.
The methodology used in this study is developed and outlined in Chapter Three. 
This study is the first empirical analysis o f Party Capability Theory for federal tax cases, 
and is the first to consider pro se representation influence on case results. The research 
sample for the study consists o f 1,010 trial court cases, 744 appellate court cases, and 29 
U.S. Supreme Court cases rendered from 1992 through 2006. Appellate success rate, 
combined success rate, and net advantage analysis are used. To further control for other 
influential variables, logistic regression is selected as the most appropriate statistical tool.
Chapter Four presents the analysis of research results. Success rate analysis 
indicates that the presumed stronger party does win more often in court. However,
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logistic regression yields different results. The following section presents conclusions for 
each of the study’s six research questions.
Summary of Conclusions
The following six research questions are presented in this study for investigation:
1. Who litigates?
2. What do litigants seek satisfaction in the courts?
3. Who is being sued/appealed?
4. Why is the defendant/appellee being sued/appealed?
5. What are the success rates o f individuals, businesses, and the United States 
government in litigation on federal tax issues?
6. Do different types o f representation before the court (pro se, solo, and group 
representation) have an effect on the judicial success rates of individuals, 
businesses, and the federal government?
Chi-square tests o f goodness o f fit indicate the three groups o f litigants have 
significantly different frequencies o f being plaintiff/appellant or defendant/appellee. 
Individuals initiate the majority o f trial court and Federal Appellate Court cases under 
study. The U.S. government initiates most o f the U.S. Supreme court cases under study. 
The federal government is the major defendant/appellee for the trial court and Federal 
Appellate Court cases. No significantly different frequencies are found for the three 
groups under study appearing as appellee in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Procedure and administration disputes and income tax issues are the two major 
reasons that litigants go to trial and the appellate process. Appellants bring to the U.S. 
Supreme Court a very broad range o f issues. Test results for trial court and Federal
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Appellate Court cases show a significant relationship between the type of 
defendant/appellee and the issue involved.
While success rate analysis shows that the presumed stronger party does win more 
often in court, logistic regression results do not support Party Capability Theory. For trial 
court cases, after control for representation types, litigant category is not significantly 
correlated with case results; contrary to expectation, pro se plaintiffs perform 
significantly better than lawyer represented plaintiffs; solo represented plaintiffs 
significantly outperform group represented plaintiffs; defendant representation type does 
not significantly contribute to judicial results.
For appellate court cases, after accounting for representation types, the three parties 
under investigation do not show significantly different success probabilities as plaintiff; 
however, individual appellees significantly outperform both business and federal 
government appellees; litigants seem to be better off as pro se than with attorney 
representation, but the effect is not significant; group represented appellants outperform 
solo represented appellants to an insignificant level; on the other hand, group represented 
appellees underperform solo represented appellees at a marginally significant level.
For U.S. Supreme Court cases, after accounting for representation effect, the 
presumed stronger litigant parties have a lower chance of winning a case than the 
presumed weaker litigant parties, but the effect is below the conventional significance 
level; litigants seem to do better solo than with group representation, either as appellant 
or as appellee, but the effect is not significant.
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Chapter Five includes a summary and discussion of the results o f this research 
effort. Implications and limitations of the study are disclosed and recommendations for 
further research are presented.
Although success rate analysis in this study produces consistent results with prior 
studies, logistic regression results of the current study are in contrast to prior inquires. 
Therefore, Party Capability Theory cannot be generalized to federal tax cases.
Implications
Notwithstanding that a number of studies have shown advantages for stronger 
parties in litigation, there is some question as to whether it applies specifically to federal 
tax cases. Based on an examination of litigant success in recent years at different levels of 
tax jurisprudence, this study does not find support for Party Capability Theory in federal 
tax cases. In fact, the judicial system seems to tilt to the weaker parties. Stability is 
assured when society at large agrees on the rules. When a large proportion of the 
population is discontent with the federal tax system, security is threatened. To limit 
opposition, the judicial system has to sufficiently ensure the acceptance of the social 
order. By favoring the “have nots” in decisions, courts can in fact boost the public belief 
in the federal tax system.
The findings o f this study have practical implications for those who are considering 
going to court or are in the middle of federal tax litigation disputes. The results provide a 
useful foundation for addressing the issue of when a litigant should represent 
himself/herself or hire a lawyer or group o f lawyers. Since hiring professionals can be 
costly, a rational litigant would do a cost benefit analysis and make the decision to hire a 
lawyer or lawyers only if the expected savings from professional representation would be
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greater than the cost of representation. This paper provides empirical evidence that 
professional representation does not result in a higher success possibility in federal tax 
cases. For plaintiffs using trial courts, pro se performs significantly better than lawyer 
representation; solo representation significantly outperforms group representation. For 
appellees in Federal Appellate Courts, solo representation performs marginally 
significantly better than group representation.
Limitations
This research is based on court decisions between 1992 and 2006. Logistic 
regression functions are developed to test the strength o f various litigants. The potential 
effect o f factors not included in the sample on the model is unknown. Specifically, three 
categories o f factors are not reflected in the model: (1) How soundly justified is a 
particular law suit? Litigants filing frivolous lawsuits do not have a chance to win 
whether they are lawyer represented or pro se. Coding cases into strong or weak should 
improve the results. However, subjectivity o f the coder will negatively influence the 
results. This inquiry chooses not to code case strength. (2) Judges ideologies are 
interwoven with case results. Previous studies note that judges appointed by Democratic 
presidents are more likely to support liberal decisions than judges appointed by 
Republicans (Goldman 1975; Gottschall 1986). Unfortunately, the current study does not 
have the necessary information to gauge judges ideologies. (3) Only the major federal tax 
issue involved in a case is coded. How issues other than the major issue influence a case 
result is not shown. However, including minor issues into the logistic model will distort 
the effect of the major issues on case results. This study chooses not to include minor 
issues into the model.
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This study is also limited to the extent that representation type is not fully 
disclosed in court records. Ideal classification o f representation types would be: pro se, 
solo, and firm representation. Sole practitioners should be classified as solo 
representation and law firm should be classified as firm representation. The limited 
information from the case heading does not allow clear classification o f representation 
type into solo or firm representation. This study thus adopts an alternative coding 
strategy. Instead o f classifying as solo or firm representation, this study classifies as solo 
or group representation. This coding strategy eliminates subjective factors in coding 
representation types, but it also potentially decreases the explanatory power of 
representation types.
Application of the logistic regression model may be limited due to the subjective 
nature o f the dependent variable. This study codes a case result as plaintiff/appellant wins 
if  the plaintiff/appellant only partially wins the verdict, as long as the winning amount 
exceeds 50 percent o f the amount under dispute. How this coding strategy influences the 
results is unknown.
The results o f this investigation are based on data from the United States. Other 
countries have different tax systems, further study is needed to generalize the results to an 
international level.
Suggestions for Future Research
The limitations noted above suggest possible extensions for other studies. An easy 
to use, and relatively objective case strength coding system can be developed. The 
introduction of case strength variable into the model will decrease noise caused by 
frivolous law suits, and a judge’s ideology factor could be controlled by utilizing a
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stratified sample selection. By sorting out cases decided by different judges, then 
randomly selecting a certain amount o f cases decided by each judge, direct testing of 
judge effects is possible. The limitation of this method is that the sample is not 
representative of the population because the cases included in the sample have to be 
decided by only one judge.
The dependent variable coding becomes subjective in a partial verdict. Future 
research could consider only cases won completely by one litigating party should solve 
this problem. Comparison o f party distribution and issues involved in the biased sample 
with the population could provide interesting insight as to who completely wins more 
often in court and on what type of issue.
The tax system varies significantly across countries. The maturity level, 
complexity, and economic background o f a tax system can all contribute to a tax case 
results. The United States has a very mature and complex tax system. This system is 
based on a highly developed economy. Data from a developing country with a young, 
simple tax system, like China, might produce totally different results.
Summary
This study provides evidence that Party Capability Theory does not apply to 
federal tax cases. The presumed weaker party seems to have a higher success probability 
in court. The general belief that pro se litigants often are in a disadvantaged position in 
court does not apply to federal tax cases. On the contrary, in trial courts, plaintiffs are 
significantly better in representing themselves rather than seeking professional 
representation.
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The study is limited in that it is only based on domestic data. Further, the 
dependent variable in the model is subject to a degree of subjectivity. Nevertheless, 
findings of this study should be of value to those who are litigants in federal tax 
controversies.
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APPENDIX B
I.R.C. SECTIONS USED IN THE ANALYSIS
Sec. 61. Gross income defined.
(a) General definition. Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 1 et 
seq.], gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not 
limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe benefits, and similar 
items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge o f indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share o f partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect o f a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
* * *
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Sec. 72. Annuities; certain proceeds o f endowment and life insurance contracts.
(a) General rule for annuities. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter [26 USCS §§
1 et seq.], gross income includes any amount received as an annuity (whether for a period 
certain or during one or more lives) under an annuity, endowment, or life insurance 
contract.
(b) Exclusion ratio.
(1) In general. Gross income does not include that part o f any amount received as an 
annuity under an annuity, endowment, or life insurance contract which bears the same 
ratio to such amount as the investment in the contract (as of the annuity starting date) 
bears to the expected return under the contract (as o f such date).
(2) Exclusion limited to investment. The portion o f any amount received as an annuity 
which is excluded from gross income under paragraph (1) shall not exceed the 
unrecovered investment in the contract immediately before the receipt o f such amount.
* * *
(c) Definitions.
(1) Investment in the contract. For purposes of subsection (b), the investment in the 
contract as o f the annuity starting date is—
(A) the aggregate amount o f premiums or other consideration paid for the contract, 
minus
(B) the aggregate amount received under the contract before such date, to the extent 
that such amount was excludable from gross income under this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 1 et 
seq.] or prior income tax laws.
* * *
(d) Special rules for qualified employer retirement plans.
(1) Simplified method of taxing annuity payments.
(A) In general. In the case of any amount received as an annuity under a qualified 
employer retirement plan—
(i) subsection (b) shall not apply, and
(ii) the investment in the contract shall be recovered as provided in this paragraph.
* * *
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Sec. 104. Compensation for injuries or sickness.
(a) In general. Except in the case o f amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) 
deductions allowed under section 213 [26 USCS § 213] (relating to medical, etc., 
expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include—
(1) amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal 
injuries or sickness;
(2) the amount o f any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit 
or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account o f personal 
physical injuries or physical sickness;
(3) amounts received through accident or health insurance (or through an arrangement 
having the effect o f accident or health insurance) for personal injuries or sickness (other 
than amounts received by an employee, to the extent such amounts (A) are attributable to 
contributions by the employer which were not includible in the gross income o f the 
employee, or (B) are paid by the employer);
(4) amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for personal injuries or 
sickness resulting from active service in the armed forces of any country or in the Coast 
and Geodetic Survey or the Public Health Service, or as a disability annuity payable 
under the provisions of section 808 o f the Foreign Service Act o f 1980 [22 USCS §
4048]; and
(5) amounts received by an individual as disability income attributable to injuries 
incurred as a direct result o f a terroristic or military action (as defined in section 
692(c)(2) [26 USCS § 692(c)(2)]).
*  *  *
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
183
Sec. 151. Allowance of deductions for personal exemptions [Caution: See prospective
amendment note below.].
(a) Allowance o f deductions. In the case o f an individual, the exemptions provided by 
this section shall be allowed as deductions in computing taxable income.
(b) Taxpayer and spouse. An exemption of the exemption amount for the taxpayer; and 
an additional exemption of the exemption amount for the spouse o f the taxpayer if  a joint 
return is not made by the taxpayer and his spouse, and if  the spouse, for the calendar year 
in which the taxable year o f the taxpayer begins, has no gross income and is not the 
dependent of another taxpayer.
(c) Additional exemption for dependents. An exemption o f the exemption amount for 
each individual who is a dependent (as defined in section 152 [26 USCS § 152]) o f the 
taxpayer for the taxable year.
(d) Exemption amount * * *
(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the term 'exemption 
amount' means $ 2,000.
(2) Exemption amount disallowed in case o f certain dependents. In the case o f an 
individual with respect to whom a deduction under this section is allowable to another 
taxpayer for a taxable year beginning in the calendar year in which the individual's 
taxable year begins, the exemption amount applicable to such individual for such 
individual's taxable year shall be zero.
(3) Phaseout.
(A) In general. In the case o f any taxpayer whose adjusted gross income for the 
taxable year exceeds the threshold amount, the exemption amount shall be reduced by the 
applicable percentage.
(B) Applicable percentage. For purposes o f subparagraph (A), the term 'applicable 
percentage' means 2 percentage points for each $ 2,500 (or fraction thereof) by which the 
taxpayer's adjusted gross income for the taxable year exceeds the threshold amount. In 
the case o f a married individual filing a separate return, the preceding sentence shall be 
applied by substituting '$ 1,250' for '$ 2,500'. In no event shall the applicable percentage 
exceed 100 percent.
* * *
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Sec. 152. Dependent defined.
(a) In general. For purposes o f this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], the term "dependent" 
means—
(1) a qualifying child, or
(2) a qualifying relative.
(b) Exceptions. For purposes of this section­
al) Dependents ineligible. If an individual is a dependent of a taxpayer for any taxable
year of such taxpayer beginning in a calendar year, such individual shall be treated as 
having no dependents for any taxable year o f such individual beginning in such calendar 
year.
(2) Married dependents. An individual shall not be treated as a dependent o f a taxpayer 
under subsection (a) if  such individual has made a joint return with the individual's 
spouse under section 6013 [26 USCS § 6013] for the taxable year beginning in the 
calendar year in which the taxable year o f the taxpayer begins.
(3) Citizens or nationals o f other countries.
(A) In general. The term "dependent" does not include an individual who is not a 
citizen or national o f the United States unless such individual is a resident of the United 
States or a country contiguous to the United States.
* * *
(c) Qualifying child. For purposes o f this section—
(1) In general. The term "qualifying child" means, with respect to any taxpayer for any 
taxable year, an individual—
(A) who bears a relationship to the taxpayer described in paragraph (2),
(B) who has the same principal place o f abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half 
o f such taxable year,
(C) who meets the age requirements o f paragraph (3), and
(D) who has not provided over one-half of such individual's own support for the 
calendar year in which the taxable year o f the taxpayer begins.
(2) Relationship. For purposes o f paragraph (1)(A), an individual bears a relationship to 
the taxpayer described in this paragraph if such individual is—
(A) a child of the taxpayer or a descendant of such a child, or
(B) a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister o f the taxpayer or a descendant o f any 
such relative.
(3) Age requirements.
(A) In general. For purposes of paragraph (1)(C), an individual meets the 
requirements o f this paragraph if such individual—
(i) has not attained the age o f 19 as o f the close of the calendar year in which the 
taxable year o f the taxpayer begins, or
(ii) is a student who has not attained the age of 24 as of the close o f such calendar
year.
* * *
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Sec. 162. Trade or business expenses.
(a) In general. There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary 
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, 
including—
(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services 
actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other than 
amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away from home 
in the pursuit of a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or 
possession, for purposes o f the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has 
not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the place o f residence o f a Member o f Congress 
(including any Delegate and Resident Commissioner) within the State, congressional 
district, or possession which he represents in Congress shall be considered his home, but 
amounts expended by such Members within each taxable year for living expenses shall 
not be deductible for income tax purposes in excess of $ 3,000. For purposes of 
paragraph (2), the taxpayer shall not be treated as being temporarily away from home 
during any period o f employment if  such period exceeds 1 year. The preceding sentence 
shall not apply to any Federal employee during any period for which such employee is 
certified by the Attorney General (or the designee thereof) as traveling on behalf o f the 
United States in temporary duty status to investigate or prosecute, or provide support 
services for the investigation or prosecution of, a Federal crime.
* % *
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Sec. 163. Interest [Caution: See prospective amendment note below.].
(a) General rule. There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within 
the taxable year on indebtedness.
(b) Installment purchases where interest charge is not separately stated.
(1) General rule. If  personal property or educational services are purchased under a 
contract—
(A) which provides that payment of part or all o f the purchase price is to be made in 
installments, and
(B) in which carrying charges are separately stated but the interest charge cannot be 
ascertained,
then the payments made during the taxable year under the contract shall be treated for 
purposes of this section as if  they included interest equal to 6 percent o f the average 
unpaid balance under the contract during the taxable year. For purposes o f the preceding 
sentence, the average unpaid balance is the sum of the unpaid balance outstanding on the 
first day of each month beginning during the taxable year, divided by 12. For purposes of 
this paragraph, the term "educational services" means any service (including lodging) 
which is purchased from an educational organization described in section 
170(b)(l)(A)(ii) [26 USCS § 170(b)(l)(A)(ii)] and which is provided for a student o f 
such organization.
(2) Limitation. In the case of any contract to which paragraph (1) applies, the amount 
treated as interest for any taxable year shall not exceed the aggregate carrying charges 
which are properly attributable to such taxable year.
(c) Redeemable ground rents. For purposes of this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], any 
annual or periodic rental under a redeemable ground rent (excluding amounts in 
redemption thereof) shall be treated as interest on an indebtedness secured by a mortgage.
(d) Limitation on investment interest.
(1) In general. In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, the amount allowed as 
a deduction under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for investment interest for any 
taxable year shall not exceed the net investment income o f the taxpayer for the taxable 
year.
(2) Carryforward o f disallowed interest. The amount not allowed as a deduction for any 
taxable year by reason of paragraph (1) shall be treated as investment interest paid or 
accrued by the taxpayer in the succeeding taxable year.
(3) Investment interest. For purposes of this subsection—
(A) In general. The term "investment interest" means any interest allowable as a 
deduction under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] (determined without regard to 
paragraph (1)) which is paid or accrued on indebtedness properly allocable to property 
held for investment.
* * *
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Sec. 165. Losses.
(a) General rule. There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained during the 
taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(b) Amount o f deduction. For purposes o f subsection (a), the basis for determining the 
amount o f the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 
[26 USCS § 1011] for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition o f property.
(c) Limitation on losses o f individuals. In the case o f an individual, the deduction under 
subsection (a) shall be limited to
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with 
a trade or business; and
(3) except as provided in subsection (h), losses o f property not connected with a trade 
or business or a transaction entered into for profit, if  such losses arise from fire, storm, 
shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.
(d) Wagering losses. Losses from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the 
extent o f the gains from such transactions.
(e) Theft losses. For purposes of subsection (a), any loss arising from theft shall be 
treated as sustained during the taxable year in which the taxpayer discovers such loss.
(f) Capital losses. Losses from sales or exchanges o f capital assets shall be allowed only 
to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212 [26 USCS §§ 1211 and 1212].
(g) Worthless securities.
(1) General rule. If  any security which is a capital asset becomes worthless during the 
taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall, for purposes o f this subtitle [26 USCS §§ 
1 et seq.], be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange, on the last day o f the taxable 
year, o f a capital asset.
* * *
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Sec. 166. Bad debts.
(a) General rule.
(1) Wholly worthless debts. There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which 
becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(2) Partially worthless debts. When satisfied that a debt is recoverable only in part, the 
Secretary may allow such debt, in an amount not in excess of the part charged off within 
the taxable year, as a deduction.
(b) Amount o f deduction. For purposes o f subsection (a), the basis for determining the 
amount o f the deduction for any bad debt shall be the adjusted basis provided in section 
1011 [26 USCS § 1011] for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of 
property.
(c) Repealed.
(d) Nonbusiness debts.
(1) General rule. In the case o f a taxpayer other than a coiporation—
(A) subsection (a) shall not apply to any nonbusiness debt; and
(B) where any nonbusiness debt becomes worthless within the taxable year, the loss 
resulting therefrom shall be considered a loss from the sale or exchange, during the 
taxable year, o f a capital asset held for not more than 1 year.
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined. For purposes o f paragraph (1), the term "nonbusiness 
debt" means a debt other than—
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a trade or 
business o f the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade 
or business.
(e) Worthless securities. This section shall not apply to a debt which is evidenced by a 
security as defined in section 165(g)(2)(C) [26 USCS § 165(g)(2)(c)].
* * *
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Sec. 170. Charitable, etc., contributions and gifts [Caution: See prospective amendment
notes below.].
(a) Allowance of deduction.
(1) General rule. There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as 
defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year. A charitable 
contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if  verified under regulations 
prescribed by the Secretary.
* * *
(c) Charitable contribution defined. For purposes o f this section, the term "charitable 
contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of—
(1) A State, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision o f any of the 
foregoing, or the United States or the District o f Columbia, but only if  the contribution or 
gift is made for exclusively public purposes.
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation—
(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof, or under 
the law of the United States, any State, the District o f Columbia, or any possession of the 
United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or 
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition 
(but only if no part of its activities involve the provision o f athletic facilities or 
equipment), or for the prevention o f cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part o f the net earnings o f which inures to the benefit o f any private 
shareholder or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) [26 USCS § 
501(c)(3)] by reason o f attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate 
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political 
campaign on behalf o f (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
A contribution or gift by a corporation to a trust, chest, fund, or foundation shall be 
deductible by reason of this paragraph only if  it is to be used within the United States or 
any of its possessions exclusively for purposes specified in subparagraph (B). Rules 
similar to the rules of section 501(j) [26 USCS § 501(j)] shall apply for purposes o f this 
paragraph.
* * *
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Sec. 183. Activities not engaged in for profit.
(a) General rule. In the case o f an activity engaged in by an individual or an S 
corporation, if  such activity is not engaged in for profit, no deduction attributable to such 
activity shall be allowed under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] except as provided in 
this section.
(b) Deductions allowable. In the case o f an activity not engaged in for profit to which 
subsection (a) applies, there shall be allowed—
(1) the deductions which would be allowable under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] 
for the taxable year without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit, 
and
(2) a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions which would be allowable under 
this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for the taxable year only if  such activity were 
engaged in for profit, but only to the extent that the gross income derived from such 
activity for the taxable year exceeds the deductions allowable by reason o f paragraph (1).
(c) Activity not engaged in for profit defined. For purposes o f this section, the term 
"activity not engaged in for profit" means any activity other than one with respect to 
which deductions are allowable for the taxable year under section 162 [26 USCS § 162] 
or under paragraph (1) or (2) o f section 212 [26 USCS § 212].
(d) Presumption. If the gross income derived from an activity for 3 or more of the taxable 
years in the period o f 5 consecutive taxable years which ends with the taxable year 
exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity (determined without regard to 
whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit), then, unless the Secretary 
establishes to the contrary, such activity shall be presumed for purposes o f this chapter 
[26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for such taxable year to be an activity engaged in for profit. In the 
case o f an activity which consists in major part o f the breeding, training, showing, or 
racing of horses, the preceding sentence shall be applied by substituting "2" for "3" and 
"7" for "5".
* * *
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Sec. 274. Disallowance o f certain entertainment, etc., expenses.
(a) Entertainment, amusement, or recreation.
(1) In general. No deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et 
seq.] shall be allowed for any item -
(A) Activity. With respect to an activity which is of a type generally considered to 
constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation, unless the taxpayer establishes that 
the item was directly related to, or, in the case o f an item directly preceding or following 
a substantial and bona fide business discussion (including business meetings at a 
convention or otherwise), that such item was associated with, the active conduct o f the 
taxpayer's trade or business, or
(B) Facility. With respect to a facility used in connection with an activity referred to 
in subparagraph (A).
In the case of an item described in subparagraph (A), the deduction shall in no event 
exceed the portion o f such item which meets the requirements o f subparagraph (A).
(2) Special rules. For purposes o f applying paragraph (1)~
(A) Dues or fees to any social, athletic, or sporting club or organization shall be 
treated as items with respect to facilities.
(B) An activity described in section 212 [26 USCS § 212] shall be treated as a trade 
or business.
(C) In the case o f a club, paragraph (1)(B) shall apply unless the taxpayer establishes 
that the facility was used primarily for the furtherance o f the taxpayer's trade or business 
and that the item was directly related to the active conduct of such trade or business.
(3) Denial o f  deduction for club dues. Notwithstanding the preceding provisions o f this 
subsection, no deduction shall be allowed under this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] for 
amounts paid or incurred for membership in any club organized for business, pleasure, 
recreation, or other social purpose.
(b) Gifts.
(1) Limitation. No deduction shall be allowed under section 162 or section 212 [26 
USCS § 162 or 212] for any expense for gifts made directly or indirectly to any 
individual to the extent that such expense, when added to prior expenses o f the taxpayer 
for gifts made to such individual during the same taxable year, exceeds $ 25. For 
purposes o f this section, the term "gift" means any item excludable from gross income of 
the recipient under section 102 [26 USCS § 102] which is not excludable from his gross 
income under any other provision o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], but such term 
does not include—
(A) an item having a cost to the taxpayer not in excess of $ 4.00 on which the name of 
the taxpayer is clearly and permanently imprinted and which is one o f a number of 
identical items distributed generally by the taxpayer, or
(B) a sign, display rack, or other promotional material to be used on the business 
premises o f the recipient.
* * *
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Sec. 446. General rule for methods of accounting.
(a) General rule. Taxable income shall be computed under the method o f accounting on 
the basis o f which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books.
(b) Exceptions. If no method o f accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if  
the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation o f taxable income shall 
be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect 
income.
(c) Permissible methods. Subject to the provisions o f subsections (a) and (b), a taxpayer 
may compute taxable income under any of the following methods o f accounting—
(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method;
(2) an accrual method;
(3) any other method permitted by this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.]; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing methods permitted under regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary.
(d) Taxpayer engaged in more than one business. A taxpayer engaged in more than one 
trade or business may, in computing taxable income, use a different method of 
accounting for each trade or business.
(e) Requirement respecting change o f accounting method. Except as otherwise expressly 
provided in this chapter [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.], a taxpayer who changes the method of 
accounting on the basis o f which he regularly computes his income in keeping his books 
shall, before computing his taxable income under the new method, secure the consent of 
the Secretary.
(f) Failure to request change o f method of accounting. If the taxpayer does not file with 
the Secretary a request to change the method of accounting, the absence o f the consent of 
the Secretary to a change in the method o f accounting shall not be taken into account—
(1) to prevent the imposition of any penalty, or the addition o f any amount to tax, under 
this title, or
(2) to diminish the amount of such penalty or addition to tax.
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Sec. 2036. Transfers with retained life estate.
(a) General rule. The value o f the gross estate shall include the value o f all property to the 
extent o f any interest therein o f which the decedent has at any time made a transfer 
(except in case o f a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or 
money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any 
period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not 
in fact end before his death—
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons 
who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom.
(b) Voting rights.
(1) In general. For purposes o f subsection (a)(1), the retention o f the right to vote 
(directly or indirectly) shares o f stock of a controlled corporation shall be considered to 
be a retention o f the enjoyment o f transferred property.
(2) Controlled corporation. For purposes o f paragraph (1), a corporation shall be treated 
as a controlled corporation if, at any time after the transfer of the property and during the 
3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death, the decedent owned (with the 
application o f section 318 [26 USCS § 318]), or had the right (either alone or in 
conjunction with any person) to vote, stock possessing at least 20 percent o f the total 
combined voting power of all classes o f stock.
(3) Coordination with section 2035. For purposes o f applying section 2035 [26 USCS § 
2035] with respect to paragraph (1), the relinquishment or cessation o f voting rights shall 
be treated as a transfer o f property made by the decedent.
(c) Limitation on application o f general rule. This section shall not apply to a transfer 
made before March 4,1931; nor to a transfer made after March 3, 1931, and before June 
7,1932, unless the property transferred would have been includible in the decedent's 
gross estate by reason of the amendatory language of the joint resolution o f March 3,
1931 (46 Stat. 15161.
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Sec. 2056. Bequests, etc., to surviving spouse.
(a) Allowance of marital deduction. For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001 [26 
USCS § 2001], the value o f the taxable estate shall, except as limited by subsection (b), 
be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the 
value o f any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his 
surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the 
value o f the gross estate.
(b) Limitation in the case o f life estate or other terminable interest.
(1) General rule. Where, on the lapse o f time, on the occurrence of an event or 
contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to 
the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this 
section with respect to such interest—
(A) if  an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate and 
full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to any person other than 
such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and
(B) if  by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may possess or 
enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure o f the interest so passing 
to the surviving spouse;
and no deduction shall be allowed with respect to such interest (even if  such deduction 
is not disallowed under subparagraphs (A) and (B))—
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse, pursuant to directions of 
the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee o f a trust.
For purposes of this paragraph, an interest shall not be considered as an interest which 
will terminate or fail merely because it is the ownership o f a bond, note, or similar 
contractual obligation, the discharge o f which would not have the effect o f an annuity for 
life or for a term.
(2) Interest in unidentified assets. Where the assets (included in the decedent's gross 
estate) out of which, or the proceeds o f which, an interest passing to the surviving spouse 
may be satisfied include a particular asset or assets with respect to which no deduction 
would be allowed if such asset or assets passed from the decedent to such spouse, then 
the value o f such interest passing to such spouse shall, for purposes o f subsection (a), be 
reduced by the aggregate value o f such particular assets.
(3) Interest o f spouse conditional on survival for limited period. For purposes o f this 
subsection, an interest passing to the surviving spouse shall not be considered as an 
interest which will terminate or fail on the death o f such spouse if—
(A) such death will cause a termination or failure o f such interest only if  it occurs 
within a period not exceeding 6 months after the decedent's death, or only if  it occurs as a 
result of a common disaster resulting in the death of the decedent and the surviving 
spouse, or only if  it occurs in the case of either such event; and
(B) such termination or failure does not in fact occur.
* * *
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Sec. 3121. Definitions.
(a) Wages. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3101 et seq.], the term "wages" 
means all remuneration for employment, including the cash value o f all remuneration 
(including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term shall not 
include—
(1) in the case o f the taxes imposed by sections 3101(a) and 3111(a) [26 USCS §§
3 101(a) and 3111(a)] that part o f the remuneration which, after remuneration (other than 
remuneration referred to in the succeeding paragraphs o f this subsection) equal to the 
contribution and benefit base (as determined under section 230 o f the Social Security Act 
[42 USCS § 430]) with respect to employment has been paid to an individual by an 
employer during the calendar year with respect to which such contribution and benefit 
base is effective, is paid to such individual by such employer during such calendar year. 
If an employer (hereinafter referred to as successor employer) during any calendar year 
acquires substantially all the property used in a trade or business o f another employer 
(hereinafter referred to as a predecessor), or used in a separate unit o f a trade or business 
o f a predecessor, and immediately after the acquisition employs in his trade or business 
an individual who immediately prior to the acquisition was employed in the trade or 
business of such predecessor, then, for the purpose o f determining whether the successor 
employer has paid remuneration (other than remuneration referred to in the succeeding 
paragraphs of this subsection) with respect to employment equal to the contribution and 
benefit base (as determined under section 230 o f the Social Security Act [42 USCS § 
430]) such contribution and benefit base to such individual during such calendar year, 
any remuneration (other than remuneration referred to in the succeeding paragraphs of 
this subsection) with respect to employment paid (or considered under this paragraph as 
having been paid) to such individual by such predecessor during such calendar year and 
prior to such acquisition shall be considered as having been paid by such successor 
employer;
* * *
(b) Employment. For purposes of this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3101 et seq.], the term 
"employment" means any service, o f whatever nature, performed (A) by an employee for 
the person employing him, irrespective o f the citizenship or residence o f either, (i) within 
the United States, or (ii) on or in connection with an American vessel or American 
aircraft under a contract o f service which is entered into within the United States or 
during the performance of which and while the employee is employed on the vessel or 
aircraft it touches at a port in the United States, if  the employee is employed on and in 
connection with such vessel or aircraft when outside the United States, or (B) outside the 
United States by a citizen or resident o f the United States as an employee for an 
American employer (as defined in subsection (h)), or (C) if it is service, regardless of 
where or by whom performed, which is designated as employment or recognized as 
equivalent to employment under an agreement entered into under section 233 o f the 
Social Security Act [42 USCS § 433]; except that such term shall not include—
*  *  *
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Sec. 3401. Definitions.
(a) Wages. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3401 et seq.], the term "wages" 
means all remuneration (other than fees paid to a public official) for services performed 
by an employee for his employer, including the cash value of all remuneration (including 
benefits) paid in any medium other than cash; except that such term shall not include 
remuneration paid—
(1) for active service performed in a month for which such employee is entitled to the 
benefits o f section 112 [26 USCS § 112] (relating to certain combat zone compensation 
o f members o f the Armed Forces o f the United States) to the extent remuneration for 
such service is excludable from gross income under such section; or
(2) for agricultural labor (as defined in section 3121(g) [26 USCS § 3121(g)]) unless 
the remuneration paid for such labor is wages (as defined in section 3121(a) [26 USCS § 
3121(a)]); or
(3) for domestic service in a private home, local college club, or local chapter o f a 
college fraternity or sorority; or
(4) for service not in the course o f the employer's trade or business performed in any 
calendar quarter by an employee, unless the cash remuneration paid for such service is $ 
50 or more and such service is performed by an individual who is regularly employed by 
such employer to perform such service. For purposes o f this paragraph, an individual 
shall be deemed to be regularly employed by an employer during a calendar quarter only 
if~
* * *
(b) Payroll period. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3401 et seq.], the term 
"payroll period" means a period for which a payment of wages is ordinarily made to the 
employee by his employer, and the term "miscellaneous payroll period" means a payroll 
period other than a daily, weekly, biweekly, semimonthly, monthly, quarterly, 
semiannual, or annual payroll period.
(c) Employee. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3401 et seq.], the term 
"employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official o f the United States, a State, 
or any political subdivision thereof, or the District o f Columbia, or any agency or 
instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term "employee" also includes 
an officer of a corporation.
(d) Employer. For purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 3401 et seq.], the term 
"employer" means the person for whom an individual performs or performed any service, 
o f whatever nature, as the employee o f such person, except that—
* * *
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Sec. 6015. Relief from joint and several liability on joint return.
(a) In general. Notwithstanding section 6013(d)(3) [26 USCS § 6013(d)(3)]—
( 1) an individual who has made a joint return may elect to seek relief under the 
procedures prescribed under subsection (b); and
(2 ) if  such individual is eligible to elect the application of subsection (c), such 
individual may, in addition to any election under paragraph (1), elect to limit such 
individual's liability for any deficiency with respect to such joint return in the manner 
prescribed under subsection (c).
Any determination under this section shall be made without regard to community 
property laws.
(b) Procedures for relief from liability applicable to all joint filers.
(1) In general. Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if—
(A) a joint return has been made for a taxable year;
(B) on such return there is an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous items of 
one individual filing the joint return;
(C) the other individual filing the joint return establishes that in signing the return he 
or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such understatement;
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the 
other individual liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such 
understatement; and
(E) the other individual elects (in such form as the Secretary may prescribe) the 
benefits o f this subsection not later than the date which is 2  years after the date the 
Secretary has begun collection activities with respect to the individual making the 
election,
then the other individual shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, 
penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such liability is 
attributable to such understatement.
(2) Apportionment o f relief. If  an individual who, but for paragraph (1)(C), would be 
relieved o f liability under paragraph (1), establishes that in signing the return such 
individual did not know, and had no reason to know, the extent o f such understatement, 
then such individual shall be relieved o f liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and 
other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent that such liability is attributable to the 
portion o f such understatement o f which such individual did not know and had no reason 
to know.
* * *
(f) Equitable relief. Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if—
(1) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the 
individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion o f either); and
(2 ) relief is not available to such individual under subsection (b) or (c), 
the Secretary may relieve such individual o f such liability.
* * *
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Sec. 6103. Confidentiality and disclosure o f returns and return information.
(a) General rule. Returns and return information shall be confidential, and except as 
authorized by this title—
(1) no officer or employee of the United States,
(2) no officer or employee o f any State, any local law enforcement agency receiving 
information under subsection (i)(7)(A), any local child support enforcement agency, or 
any local agency administering a program listed in subsection (1)(7)(D) who has or had 
access to returns or return information under this section or section 6104(c) [26 USCS § 
6104(c)], and
(3) no other person (or officer or employee thereof) who has or had access to returns or 
return information under subsection (e)(l)(D)(iii), paragraph (6 ), (12), (16), (19), or (20) 
o f subsection (1), paragraph (2) or (4)(B) of subsection (m), or subsection (n),
shall disclose any return or return information obtained by him in any manner in 
connection with his service as such an officer or an employee or otherwise or under the 
provisions of this section. For purposes o f this subsection, the term "officer or employee" 
includes a former officer or employee.
(b) Definitions. For purposes o f this section—
(1) Return. The term "return" means any tax or information return, declaration of 
estimated tax, or claim for refund required by, or provided for or permitted under, the 
provisions o f this title which is filed with the Secretary by, on behalf of, or with respect 
to any person, and any amendment or supplement thereto, including supporting 
schedules, attachments, or lists which are supplemental to, or part of, the return so filed.
(2) Return information. The term "return information" means—
(A) a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, 
receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax 
withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's return 
was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or any 
other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the 
Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence, or 
possible existence, o f liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under this title for 
any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense,
*  *  *
(3) Taxpayer return information. The term "taxpayer return information" means return 
information as defined in paragraph (2) which is filed with, or furnished to, the Secretary 
by or on behalf o f the taxpayer to whom such return information relates.
* * *
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Sec. 6213. Restrictions applicable to deficiencies; petition to Tax Court [Caution: See
prospective amendment note below.].
(a) Time for filing petition and restriction on assessment. Within 90 days, or 150 days if 
the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the notice o f deficiency 
authorized in section 6212 [26 USCS § 6212] is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, 
or a legal holiday in the District o f Columbia as the last day), the taxpayer may file a 
petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. Except as otherwise 
provided in section 6851, 6852, or 6861 [26 USCS § 6851, 6852, or 6861] no assessment 
o f a deficiency in respect o f any tax imposed by subtitle A or B [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq. or 
2001 et seq.], chapter 41, 42, 43, or 44 [26 USCS §§ 4911 et seq., 4940 et seq., 4971 et 
seq., or 4981 et seq.] and no levy or proceeding in court for its collection shall be made, 
begun, or prosecuted until such notice has been mailed to the taxpayer, nor until the 
expiration o f such 90-day or 150-day period, as the case may be, nor, if  a petition has 
been filed with the Tax Court, until the decision of the Tax Court has become final. 
Notwithstanding the provisions o f section 7421(a) [26 USCS § 7421(a)], the making of 
such assessment or the beginning o f such proceeding or levy during the time such 
prohibition is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court, including the 
Tax Court, and a refund may be ordered by such court o f any amount collected within the 
period during which the Secretary is prohibited from collecting by levy or through a 
proceeding in court under the provisions of this subsection. The Tax Court shall have no 
jurisdiction to enjoin any action or proceeding or order any refund under this subsection 
unless a timely petition for a redetermination o f the deficiency has been filed and then 
only in respect o f the deficiency that is the subject o f such petition. Any petition filed 
with the Tax Court on or before the last date specified for filing such petition by the 
Secretary in the notice o f deficiency shall be treated as timely filed.
(b) Exceptions to restrictions on assessment.
(1) Assessments arising out of mathematical or clerical errors.
* * *
(2) Abatement o f assessment o f mathematical or clerical errors.
(A) Request for abatement. Notwithstanding section 6404(b) [26 USCS § 6404(b)], a 
taxpayer may file with the Secretary within 60 days after notice is sent under paragraph
( 1) a request for an abatement of any assessment specified in such notice, and upon 
receipt of such request, the Secretary shall abate the assessment. Any reassessment o f the 
tax with respect to which an abatement is made under this subparagraph shall be subject 
to the deficiency procedures prescribed by this subchapter [26 USCS §§ 6211 et seq.].
(B) Stay o f collection. In the case o f any assessment referred to in paragraph (1), 
notwithstanding paragraph ( 1), no levy or proceeding in court for the collection o f such 
assessment shall be made, begun, or prosecuted during the period in which such 
assessment may be abated under this paragraph.
(3) Assessments arising out o f tentative carryback or refund adjustments.
* * *
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Sec. 6229. Period o f limitations for making assessments.
(a) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the period for assessing 
any tax imposed by subtitle A [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq.] with respect to any person which is 
attributable to any partnership item (or affected item) for a partnership taxable year shall 
not expire before the date which is 3 years after the later o f -
( 1) the date on which the partnership return for such taxable year was filed, or
(2 ) the last day for filing such return for such year (determined without regard to 
extensions).
(b) Extension by agreement.
(1) In general. The period described in subsection (a) (including an extension period 
under this subsection) may be extended—
(A) with respect to any partner, by an agreement entered into by the Secretary and 
such partner, and
(B) with respect to all partners, by an agreement entered into by the Secretary and the 
tax matters partner (or any other person authorized by the partnership in writing to enter 
into such an agreement), before the expiration o f such period.
(2) Special rule with respect to debtors in title 11 cases. Notwithstanding any other law 
or rule o f law, if  an agreement is entered into under paragraph (1)(B) and the agreement 
is signed by a person who would be the tax matters partner but for the fact that, at the 
time that the agreement is executed, the person is a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding 
under title 11 o f the United States Code, such agreement shall be binding on all partners 
in the partnership unless the Secretary has been notified o f the bankruptcy proceeding in 
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
(3) Coordination with section 6501(c)(4). Any agreement under section 6501(c)(4) [26 
USCS § 6501(c)(4)] shall apply with respect to the period described in subsection (a) 
only if  the agreement expressly provides that such agreement applies to tax attributable to 
partnership items.
(c) Special rule in case o f fraud, etc.
*  *  *
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Sec. 6320. Notice and opportunity for hearing upon filing of notice o f lien.
(a) Requirement o f notice.
(1) In general. The Secretary shall notify in writing the person described in section 
6321 [26 USCS § 6321] of the filing o f a notice o f lien under section 6323 [26 USCS § 
6323],
(2) Time and method for notice. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall be—
(A) given in person;
(B) left at the dwelling or usual place o f business o f such person; or
(C) sent by certified or registered mail to such person's last known address, 
not more than 5 business days after the day of the filing of the notice o f lien.
(3) Information included with notice. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall 
include in simple and nontechnical terms—
(A) the amount o f unpaid tax;
(B) the right of the person to request a hearing during the 30-day period beginning on 
the day after the 5-day period described in paragraph (2);
(C) the administrative appeals available to the taxpayer with respect to such lien and 
the procedures relating to such appeals; and
(D) the provisions o f this title and procedures relating to the release of liens on 
property.
(b) Right to fair hearing.
(1) In general. If the person requests a hearing in writing under subsection (a)(3)(B) and 
states the grounds for the requested hearing, such hearing shall be held by the Internal 
Revenue Service Office o f Appeals.
(2) One hearing per period. A person shall be entitled to only one hearing under this 
section with respect to the taxable period to which the unpaid tax specified in subsection
(a)(3)(A) relates.
(3) Impartial officer. The hearing under this subsection shall be conducted by an officer 
or employee who has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specified in 
subsection (a)(3)(A) before the first hearing under this section or section 6330 [26 USCS 
§ 6330]. A taxpayer may waive the requirement o f this paragraph.
(4) Coordination with section 6330. To the extent practicable, a hearing under this 
section shall be held in conjunction with a hearing under section 6330 [26 USCS § 6330],
(c) Conduct o f hearing; review; suspensions. For purposes o f this section, subsections (c),
(d) (other than paragraph (2)(B) thereof), (e), and (g) o f section 6330 [26 USCS § 6330] 
shall apply.
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Sec. 6321. Lien for taxes.
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the 
amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, 
together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the 
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, 
belonging to such person.
Sec. 6322. Period of lien.
Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by section 6321 [26 
USCS § 6321] shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the 
liability for the amount so assessed (or a judgment against the taxpayer arising out of 
such liability) is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason o f lapse of time.
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Sec. 6323. Validity and priority against certain persons.
(a) Purchasers, holders o f security interests, mechanic's lienors, and judgment lien 
creditors. The lien imposed by section 6321 [26 USCS § 6321] shall not be valid as 
against any purchaser, holder o f a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien 
creditor until notice thereof which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed 
by the Secretary.
(b) Protection for certain interests even though notice filed. Even though notice o f a lien 
imposed by section 6321 [26 USCS § 6321] has been filed, such lien shall not be valid—
(1) Securities. With respect to a security (as defined in subsection (h)(4))—
(A) as against a purchaser o f such security who at the time o f purchase did not have 
actual notice or knowledge o f the existence o f such lien; and
(B) as against a holder of a security interest in such security who, at the time such 
interest came into existence, did not have actual notice or knowledge of the existence of 
such lien.
(2) Motor vehicles. With respect to a motor vehicle (as defined in subsection (h)(3)), as 
against a purchaser o f such motor vehicle, if—
(A) at the time of the purchase such purchaser did not have actual notice or 
knowledge of the existence o f such lien, and
(B) before the purchaser obtains such notice or knowledge, he has acquired 
possession of such motor vehicle and has not thereafter relinquished possession o f such 
motor vehicle to the seller or his agent.
(3) Personal property purchased at retail. With respect to tangible personal property 
purchased at retail, as against a purchaser in the ordinary course o f the seller's trade or 
business, unless at the time of such purchase such purchaser intends such purchase to (or 
knows such purchase will) hinder, evade, or defeat the collection o f any tax under this 
title.
*  *  *
(c) Protection for certain commercial transactions financing agreements, etc.
(1) In general. To the extent provided in this subsection, even though notice of a lien 
imposed by section 6321 [26 USCS § 6321] has been filed, such lien shall not be valid 
with respect to a security interest which came into existence after tax lien filing but 
which—
(A) is in qualified property covered by the terms of a written agreement entered into 
before tax lien filing and constituting—
(i) a commercial transactions financing agreement,
(ii) a real property construction or improvement financing agreement, or
(iii) an obligatory disbursement agreement, and
(B) is protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as o f the time o f tax 
lien filing, out o f an unsecured obligation.
*  *  *
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Sec. 6330. Notice and opportunity for hearing before levy
(a) Requirement o f notice before levy.
(1) In general. No levy may be made on any property or right to property of any person 
unless the Secretary has notified such person in writing o f their right to a hearing under 
this section before such levy is made. Such notice shall be required only once for the 
taxable period to which the unpaid tax specified in paragraph (3)(A) relates.
(2) Time and method for notice. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall be—
(A) given in person;
(B) left at the dwelling or usual place o f business o f such person; or
(C) sent by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, to such person's last 
known address;
not less than 30 days before the day of the first levy with respect to the amount o f the 
unpaid tax for the taxable period.
(3) Information included with notice. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall 
include in simple and nontechnical terms—
(A) the amount o f unpaid tax;
(B) the right o f the person to request a hearing during the 30-day period under 
paragraph (2 ); and
(C) the proposed action by the Secretary and the rights of the person with respect to 
such action, including a brief statement which sets forth—
(i) the provisions of this title relating to levy and sale of property;
(ii) the procedures applicable to the levy and sale o f property under this title;
(iii) the administrative appeals available to the taxpayer with respect to such levy 
and sale and the procedures relating to such appeals;
(iv) the alternatives available to taxpayers which could prevent levy on property 
(including installment agreements under section 6159) [26 USCS § 6159]; and
(v) the provisions o f this title and procedures relating to redemption of property and 
release of liens on property.
(b) Right to fair hearing.
(1) In general. If the person requests a hearing in writing under subsection (a)(3)(B) and 
states the grounds for the requested hearing, such hearing shall be held by the Internal 
Revenue Service Office o f Appeals.
(2) One hearing per period. A person shall be entitled to only one hearing under this 
section with respect to the taxable period to which the unpaid tax specified in subsection
(a)(3)(A) relates.
(3) Impartial officer. The hearing under this subsection shall be conducted by an officer 
or employee who has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax specified in 
subsection (a)(3)(A) before the first hearing under this section or section 6320 [26 USCS 
§ 6320]. A taxpayer may waive the requirement of this paragraph.
*  *  *
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Sec. 6331. Levy and distraint.
(a) Authority o f Secretary. If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay 
the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to 
collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses o f the 
levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt 
under section 6334 [26 USCS § 6334]) belonging to such person or on which there is a 
lien provided in this chapter [26 USCS §§ 6301 et seq.] for the payment of such tax. Levy 
may be made upon the accrued salary or wages o f any officer, employee, or elected 
official, o f the United States, the District o f Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality 
o f the United States or the District o f Columbia, by serving a notice o f levy on the 
employer (as defined in section 3401(d) [26 USCS § 3401(d)]) of such officer, employee, 
or elected official. If the Secretary makes a finding that the collection o f such tax is in 
jeopardy, notice and demand for immediate payment o f such tax may be made by the 
Secretary and, upon failure or refusal to pay such tax, collection thereof by levy shall be 
lawful without regard to the 1 0 -day period provided in this section.
(b) Seizure and sale o f property. The term "levy" as used in this title includes the power 
o f distraint and seizure by any means. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a 
levy shall extend only to property possessed and obligations existing at the time thereof. 
In any case in which the Secretary may levy upon property or rights to property, he may 
seize and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible or 
intangible).
(c) Successive seizures. Whenever any property or right to property upon which levy has 
been made by virtue of subsection (a) is not sufficient to satisfy the claim of the United 
States for which levy is made, the Secretary may, thereafter, and as often as may be 
necessary, proceed to levy in like manner upon any other property liable to levy of the 
person against whom such claim exists, until the amount due from him, together with all 
expenses, is fully paid.
(d) Requirement o f notice before levy.
(1) In general. Levy may be made under subsection (a) upon the salary or wages or 
other property o f any person with respect to any unpaid tax only after the Secretary has 
notified such person in writing of his intention to make such levy.
(2) 30-day requirement. The notice required under paragraph (1) shall be—
(A) given in person,
(B) left at the dwelling or usual place o f business o f such person, or
(C) sent by certified or registered mail to such person's last known address, 
no less than 30 days before the day o f the levy.
(3) Jeopardy. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a levy if the Secretary has made a finding 
under the last sentence of subsection (a) that the collection of tax is in jeopardy.
*  *  *
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Sec. 6402. Authority to make credits or refunds [Caution: See prospective amendment
note below.]
(a) General rule. In the case o f any overpayment, the Secretary, within the applicable 
period o f limitations, may credit the amount of such overpayment, including any interest 
allowed thereon, against any liability in respect o f an internal revenue tax on the part of 
the person who made the overpayment and shall, subject to subsections (c), (d), and (e), 
refund any balance to such person.
(b) Credits against estimated tax. The Secretary is authorized to prescribe regulations 
providing for the crediting against the estimated income tax for any taxable year o f the 
amount determined by the taxpayer or the Secretary to be an overpayment o f the income 
tax for a preceding taxable year.
(c) Offset o f past-due support against overpayments. The amount o f any overpayment to 
be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any 
past-due support (as defined in section 464(c) o f the Social Security Act [42 USCS § 
664]) owed by that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State in 
accordance with section 464 of the Social Security Act [42 USCS § 664]. The Secretary 
shall remit the amount by which the overpayment is so reduced to the State collecting 
such support and notify the person making the overpayment that so much of the 
overpayment as was necessary to satisfy his obligation for past-due support has been paid 
to the State. A reduction under this subsection shall be applied first to satisfy any past- 
due support which has been assigned to the State under section 402(a)(26) or 471(a)(17) 
o f the Social Security Act [42 USCS § 602(a)(26) or 671(a)(17)], and shall be applied to 
satisfy any other past-due support after any other reductions allowed by law (but before a 
credit against future liability for an internal revenue tax) have been made. This subsection 
shall be applied to an overpayment prior to its being credited to a person's future liability 
for an internal revenue tax.
(d) Collection o f debts owed to Federal agencies.
(1) In general. Upon receiving notice from any Federal agency that a named person 
owes a past-due legally enforceable debt (other than past-due support subject to the 
provisions o f subsection (c)) to such agency, the Secretary shall—
(A) reduce the amount o f any overpayment payable to such person by the amount of 
such debt;
(B) pay the amount by which such overpayment is reduced under subparagraph (A) to 
such agency; and
(C) notify the person making such overpayment that such overpayment has been 
reduced by an amount necessary to satisfy such debt.
* * *
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Sec. 6501. Limitations on assessment and collection.
(a) General rule. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax 
imposed by this title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed (whether or 
not such return was filed on or after the date prescribed) or, if  the tax is payable by stamp, 
at any time after such tax became due and before the expiration o f 3 years after the date 
on which any part o f such tax was paid, and no proceeding in court without assessment 
for the collection o f such tax shall be begun after the expiration o f such period. For 
purposes o f this chapter [26 USCS §§ 6501 et seq.], the term "return" means the return 
required to be filed by the taxpayer (and does not include a return of any person from 
whom the taxpayer has received an item o f income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit).
(b) Time return deemed filed.
(1) Early return. For purposes of this section, a return o f tax imposed by this title, 
except tax imposed by chapter 3, 21, or 24 [26 USCS §§ 1441 et seq., 3101 et seq., or 
3401 et seq.], filed before the last day prescribed by law or by regulations promulgated 
pursuant to law for the filing thereof, shall be considered as filed on such last day.
(2) Return of certain employment taxes and tax imposed by chapter 3. For purposes o f 
this section, if  a return o f tax imposed by chapter 3, 21, or 24 [26 USCS §§ 1441 et seq., 
3101 et seq., or 3401 et seq.] for any period ending with or within a calendar year is filed 
before April 15 o f the succeeding calendar year, such return shall be considered filed on 
April 15 o f such calendar year.
(3) Return executed by Secretary. Notwithstanding the provisions o f paragraph (2) of 
section 6020(b) [26 USCS § 6020(b)], the execution o f a return by the Secretary pursuant 
to the authority conferred by such section shall not start the running o f the period of 
limitations on assessment and collection.
(4) Return of excise taxes. For purposes o f this section, the filing o f a return for a 
specified period on which an entry has been made with respect to a tax imposed under a 
provision of subtitle D [26 USCS §§ 4001 et seq.] (including a return on which an entry 
has been made showing no liability for such tax for such period) shall constitute the filing 
o f a return o f all amounts o f such tax which, if  properly paid, would be required to be 
reported on such return for such period.
(c) Exceptions.
(1) False return. In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, 
the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection o f such tax may be begun
without assessment, at any time.
* * *
(4) Extension by agreement.
(A) In general. Where, before the expiration of the time prescribed in this section for
the assessment o f any tax imposed by this title, except the estate tax provided in chapter
11 [26 USCS §§ 2001 et seq.], both the Secretary and the taxpayer have consented in
writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be assessed at any time prior to the
expiration o f the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by
subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration o f the period previously
agreed upon.
* * *
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Sec. 6511. Limitations on credit or refund [Caution: See prospective amendment note
below.].
(a) Period of limitation on filing claim. Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of 
any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a 
return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 
years from the time the tax was paid, whichever o f such periods expires the later, or if  no 
return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid. Claim for 
credit or refund o f an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title which is required to 
be paid by means o f a stamp shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time 
the tax was paid.
(b) Limitation on allowance of credits and refunds.
(1) Filing of claim within prescribed period. No credit or refund shall be allowed or 
made after the expiration of the period o f limitation prescribed in subsection (a) for the 
filing of a claim for credit or refund, unless a claim for credit or refund is filed by the 
taxpayer within such period.
(2) Limit on amount of credit or refund.
(A) Limit where claim filed within 3-year period. If the claim was filed by the 
taxpayer during the 3-year period prescribed in subsection (a), the amount o f the credit or 
refund shall not exceed the portion o f the tax paid within the period, immediately 
preceding the filing of the claim, equal to 3 years plus the period o f any extension o f time 
for filing the return. If  the tax was required to be paid by means o f a stamp, the amount o f 
the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion o f the tax paid within the 3 years 
immediately preceding the filing o f the claim.
(B) Limit where claim not filed within 3-year period. If the claim was not filed within 
such 3-year period, the amount o f the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion o f the 
tax paid during the 2  years immediately preceding the filing o f the claim.
(C) Limit if  no claim filed. If  no claim was filed, the credit or refund shall not exceed 
the amount which would be allowable under subparagraph (A) or (B), as the case may be, 
if  claim was filed on the date the credit or refund is allowed.
(c) Special rules applicable in case of extension of time by agreement. If an agreement 
under the provisions o f section 6501(c)(4) [26 USCS § 6501(c)(4)] extending the period 
for assessment o f a tax imposed by this title is made within the period prescribed in 
subsection (a) for the filing o f a claim for credit or refund—
(1) Time for filing claim. The period for filing claim for credit or refund or for making 
credit or refund if  no claim is filed, provided in subsections (a) and (b)(1), shall not 
expire prior to 6  months after the expiration o f the period within which an assessment 
may be made pursuant to the agreement or any extension thereof under section 
6501(c)(4) [26 USCS § 6501(c)(4)],
* * *
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Sec. 6532. Periods of limitation on suits.
(a) Suits by taxpayers for refund.
(1) General rule. No suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) [26 USCS § 7422(a)] for 
the recovery o f any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun before the 
expiration o f 6  months from the date o f filing the claim required under such section 
unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration 
o f 2 years from the date o f mailing by certified mail or registered mail by the Secretary to 
the taxpayer o f a notice o f the disallowance o f the part o f the claim to which the suit or 
proceeding relates.
(2) Extension o f time. The 2-year period prescribed in paragraph (1) shall be extended 
for such period as may be agreed upon in writing between the taxpayer and the Secretary.
(3) Waiver o f notice o f disallowance. If  any person files a written waiver o f the 
requirement that he be mailed a notice o f disallowance, the 2 -year period prescribed in 
paragraph (1) shall begin on the date such waiver is filed.
(4) Reconsideration after mailing o f notice. Any consideration, reconsideration, or 
action by the Secretary with respect to such claim following the mailing o f a notice by 
certified mail or registered mail of disallowance shall not operate to extend the period 
within which suit may be begun.
(5) Cross reference. For substitution o f 120-day period for the 6 -month period 
contained in paragraph (1) in a title 11 case, see section 505(a)(2) o f title 11 of the United 
States Code.
(b) Suits by United States for recovery o f erroneous refunds. Recovery o f an erroneous 
refund by suit under section 7405 [26 USCS § 7405] shall be allowed only if  such suit is 
begun within 2  years after the making o f such refund, except that such suit may be 
brought at any time within 5 years from the making of the refund if it appears that any 
part o f the refund was induced by fraud or misrepresentation o f a material fact.
(c) Suits by persons other than taxpayers.
(1) General rule. Except as provided by paragraph (2), no suit or proceeding under 
section 7426 [26 USCS § 7426] shall be begun after the expiration of 9 months from the 
date of the levy or agreement giving rise to such action.
(2) Period when claim is filed. If a request is made for the return of property described 
in section 6343(b) [26 USCS § 6343(b)], the 9-month period prescribed in paragraph (1) 
shall be extended for a period o f 1 2  months from the date of filing o f such request or for a 
period of 6  months from the date o f mailing by registered or certified mail by the 
Secretary to the person making such request o f a notice o f disallowance o f the part o f the 
request to which the action relates, whichever is shorter.
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Sec. 6651. Failure to file tax return or to pay tax.
(a) Addition to the tax. In case of failure—
(1) to file any return required under authority o f subchapter A of chapter 61 [26 USCS 
§§ 6001 et seq.] (other than part III thereof [26 USCS §§ 6031 et seq.]), subchapter A of 
chapter 51 [26 USCS §§ 5001 et seq.] (relating to distilled spirits, wines, and beer), or of 
subchapter A o f chapter 52 [26 USCS §§ 5701 et seq.] (relating to tobacco, cigars, 
cigarettes, and cigarette papers and tubes), or o f subchapter A o f chapter 53 [26 USCS §§ 
5801 et seq.] (relating to machine guns and certain other firearms), on the date prescribed 
therefor (determined with regard to any extension o f time for filing), unless it is shown 
that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be 
added to the amount required to be shown as tax on such return 5 percent o f the amount 
o f such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 month, with an additional 5 percent for 
each additional month or fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not 
exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate;
(2 ) to pay the amount shown as tax on any return specified in paragraph ( 1) on or 
before the date prescribed for payment o f such tax (determined with regard to any 
extension of time for payment), unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable 
cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount shown as tax on 
such return 0.5 percent o f the amount o f such tax if the failure is for not more than 1 
month, with an additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or fraction thereof during 
which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate; or
(3) to pay any amount in respect o f any tax required to be shown on a return specified 
in paragraph ( 1) which is not so shown (including an assessment made pursuant to 
section 6213(b) [26 USCS § 6213(b)]) within 21 calendar days from the date o f notice 
and demand therefor ( 1 0  business days if  the amount for which such notice and demand 
is made equals or exceeds $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ), unless it is shown that such failure is due to 
reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, there shall be added to the amount o f tax 
stated in such notice and demand 0.5 percent o f the amount of such tax if  the failure is for 
not more than 1 month, with an additional 0.5 percent for each additional month or 
fraction thereof during which such failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the 
aggregate.
In the case o f a failure to file a return o f tax imposed by chapter 1 [26 USCS §§ 1 et 
seq.] within 60 days o f the date prescribed for filing of such return (determined with 
regard to any extensions of time for filing), unless it is shown that such failure is due to 
reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect, the addition to tax under paragraph (1) 
shall not be less than the lesser of $ 1 0 0  or 1 0 0  percent o f the amount required to be 
shown as tax on such return.
* * *
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Sec. 6653. Failure to pay stamp tax.
Any person (as defined in section 6671(b) [26 USCS § 6671(b)]) w h o -
( 1) willfully fails to pay any tax imposed by this title which is payable by stamp, 
coupons, tickets, books, or other devices or methods prescribed by this title or by 
regulations under the authority of this title, or
(2 ) willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment 
thereof,
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable for a penalty o f 50 percent 
o f the total amount o f the underpayment of the tax.
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Sec. 6672. Failure to collect and pay over tax, or attempt to evade or defeat tax.
(a) General rule. Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any 
tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for 
and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax 
or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a 
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for 
and paid over. No penalty shall be imposed under section 6653 [26 USCS § 6653] or part 
II o f subchapter A o f chapter 6 8  [26 USCS §§ 6662 et seq.] for any offense to which this 
section is applicable.
(b) Preliminary notice requirement.
(1) In general. No penalty shall be imposed under subsection (a) unless the Secretary 
notifies the taxpayer in writing by mail to an address as determined under section 6212(b) 
[26 USCS § 6212(b)] or in person that the taxpayer shall be subject to an assessment of 
such penalty.
(2) Timing o f notice. The mailing o f the notice described in paragraph (1) (or, in the 
case o f such a notice delivered in person, such delivery) shall precede any notice and 
demand o f any penalty under subsection (a) by at least 60 days.
(3) Statute o f limitations. If a notice described in paragraph (1) with respect to any 
penalty is mailed or delivered in person before the expiration o f the period provided by 
section 6501 [26 USCS § 6501] for the assessment of such penalty (determined without 
regard to this paragraph), the period provided by such section for the assessment of such 
penalty shall not expire before the later o f -
(A) the date 90 days after the date on which such notice was mailed or delivered in 
person, or
(B) if there is a timely protest o f the proposed assessment, the date 30 days after the 
Secretary makes a final administrative determination with respect to such protest.
(4) Exception for jeopardy. This subsection shall not apply if  the Secretary finds that 
the collection o f the penalty is in jeopardy.
* * *
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Sec. 7201. Attempt to evade or defeat tax.
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by 
this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be 
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  ($
500.000 in the case o f a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, 
together with the costs o f prosecution.
Sec. 7206. Fraud and false statements.
Any person who—
(1) Declaration under penalties o f peijury. Willfully makes and subscribes any return, 
statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it 
is made under the penalties o f peijury, and which he does not believe to be true and 
correct as to every material matter; or
(2) Aid or assistance. Willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or advises the 
preparation or presentation under, or in connection with any matter arising under, the 
internal revenue laws, o f a return, affidavit, claim, or other document, which is fraudulent 
or is false as to any material matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with the 
knowledge or consent o f the person authorized or required to present such return, 
affidavit, claim, or document; or
(3) Fraudulent bonds, permits, and entries. Simulates or falsely or fraudulently executes 
or signs any bond, permit, entry, or other document required by the provisions o f the 
internal revenue laws, or by any regulation made in pursuance thereof, or procures the 
same to be falsely or fraudulently executed, or advises, aids in, or connives at such 
execution thereof; or
(4) Removal or concealment with intent to defraud. Removes, deposits, or conceals, or 
is concerned in removing, depositing, or concealing, any goods or commodities for or in 
respect whereof any tax is or shall be imposed, or any property upon which levy is 
authorized by section 6331 [26 USCS § 6331], with intent to evade or defeat the 
assessment or collection o f any tax imposed by this title; or
(5) Compromises and closing agreements. In connection with any compromise under 
section 7122 [26 USCS § 7122], or offer o f such compromise, or in connection with any 
closing agreement under section 7121 [26 USCS § 7121], or offer to enter into any such 
agreement, willfully—
(A) Concealment o f property. Conceals from any officer or employee o f the United 
States any property belonging to the estate o f a taxpayer or other person liable in respect 
of the tax, or
(B) Withholding, falsifying, and destroying records. Receives, withholds, destroys, 
mutilates, or falsifies any book, document, or record, or makes any false statement, 
relating to the estate or financial condition o f the taxpayer or other person liable in 
respect o f the tax;
shall be guilty o f a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $
100.000 ($ 500,000 in the case o f a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or 
both, together with the costs of prosecution.
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Sec. 7212. Attempts to interfere with administration o f Internal Revenue laws.
(a) Corrupt or forcible interference. Whoever corruptly or by force or threats o f force 
(including any threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede 
any officer or employee o f the United States acting in an official capacity under this title, 
or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening 
letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the 
due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $ 
5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, except that if  the offense is 
committed only by threats o f force, the person convicted thereof shall be fined not more 
than $ 3,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. The term "threats o f force", as 
used in this subsection, means threats of bodily harm to the officer or employee o f the 
United States or to a member o f his family.
(b) Forcible rescue o f seized property. Any person who forcibly rescues or causes to be 
rescued any property after it shall have been seized under this title, or shall attempt or 
endeavor so to do, shall, excepting in cases otherwise provided for, for every such 
offense, be fined not more than $ 500, or not more than double the value of the property 
so rescued, whichever is the greater, or be imprisoned not more than 2  years.
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Sec. 7402. Jurisdiction of district courts.
(a) To issue orders, processes, and judgments. The district courts o f the United States at 
the instance o f the United States shall have such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil 
actions, writs and orders o f injunction, and of ne exeat republica, orders appointing 
receivers, and such other orders and processes, and to render such judgments and decrees 
as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement o f the internal revenue laws. The 
remedies hereby provided are in addition to and not exclusive of any and all other 
remedies o f the United States in such courts or otherwise to enforce such laws.
(b) To enforce summons. If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to 
appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the 
United States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have 
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or production 
o f books, papers, or other data.
(c) For damages to United States officers or employees. Any officer or employee o f the 
United States acting under authority of this title, or any person acting under or by 
authority o f any such officer or employee, receiving any injury to his person or property 
in the discharge o f his duty shall be entitled to maintain an action for damages therefor, in 
the district court of the United States, in the district wherein the party doing the injury 
may reside or shall be found.
(d) Repealed.
(e) To quiet title. The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of any action 
brought by the United States to quiet title to property if  the title claimed by the United 
States to such property was derived from enforcement o f a lien under this title.
(f) General jurisdiction. For general jurisdiction o f the district courts o f the United States 
in civil actions involving internal revenue, see section 1340 of title 28 o f the United 
States Code.
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Sec. 7421. Prohibition of suits to restrain assessment or collection.
(a) Tax. Except as provided in sections 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6225(b), 
6246(b), 6330(e)(1), 633 l(i), 6672(c), 6694(c), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), 7429(b), and 
7436 [26 USCS §§ 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c), 6213(a), 6225(b), 6246(b), 6330(e)(1),
633 l(i), 6672(c), 6694(c), and 7426(a) and (b)(1), 7429(b), and 7436], no suit for the 
purpose o f restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any 
court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was 
assessed.
(b) Liability o f transferee or fiduciary. No suit shall be maintained in any court for the 
purpose o f restraining the assessment or collection (pursuant to the provisions o f chapter 
71 [26 USCS §§ 6901 et seq.]) of~
(1) the amount o f the liability, at law or in equity, o f a transferee o f property o f a 
taxpayer in respect o f any internal revenue tax, or
(2) the amount of the liability o f a fiduciary under section 3713(b) o f title 31, United 
States Code in respect o f any such tax.
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Sec. 7422. Civil actions for refund.
(a) No suit prior to filing claim for refund. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in 
any court for the recovery o f any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or 
illegally assessed or collected, or o f any penalty claimed to have been collected without 
authority, or o f any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully 
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, 
according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations o f the Secretary 
established in pursuance thereof.
(b) Protest or duress. Such suit or proceeding may be maintained whether or not such tax, 
penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
(c) Suits against collection officer a bar. A suit against any officer or employee o f the 
United States (or former officer or employee) or his personal representative for the 
recovery o f any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally 
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, 
or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected shall 
be treated as if  the United States had been a party to such suit in applying the doctrine of 
res judicata in all suits in respect o f any internal revenue tax, and in all proceedings in the 
Tax Court and on review of decisions of the Tax Court.
(d) Credit treated as payment. The credit o f an overpayment o f any tax in satisfaction of
any tax liability shall, for the purpose of any suit for refund o f such tax liability so
satisfied, be deemed to be a payment in respect o f such tax liability at the time such credit
is allowed.
* * *
(f) Limitation on right o f action for refund.
(1) General rule. A suit or proceeding referred to in subsection (a) may be maintained 
only against the United States and not against any officer or employee o f the United 
States (or former officer or employee) or his personal representative. Such suit or 
proceeding may be maintained against the United States notwithstanding the provisions 
o f section 2502 of title 28 of the United States Code (relating to aliens' privilege to sue) 
and notwithstanding the provisions o f section 1502 of such title 28 (relating to certain 
treaty cases).
(2) Misjoinder and change o f venue. If  a suit or proceeding brought in a United States 
district court against an officer or employee of the United States (or former officer or 
employee) or his personal representative is improperly brought solely by virtue of 
paragraph ( 1), the court shall order, upon such terms as are just, that the pleadings be 
amended to substitute the United States as a party for such officer or employee as o f the 
time such action commenced, upon proper service of process on the United States. Such 
suit or proceeding shall upon request by the United States be transferred to the district or 
division where it should have been brought if  such action initially had been brought 
against the United States.
* * *
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Sec. 7430. Awarding o f costs and certain fees.
(a) In general. In any administrative or court proceeding which is brought by or against 
the United States in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax, 
interest, or penalty under this title, the prevailing party may be awarded a judgment or a 
settlement for—
(1) reasonable administrative costs incurred in connection with such administrative 
proceeding within the Internal Revenue Service, and
(2 ) reasonable litigation costs incurred in connection with such court proceeding.
(b) Limitations.
(1) Requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. A judgment for reasonable 
litigation costs shall not be awarded under subsection (a) in any court proceeding unless 
the court determines that the prevailing party has exhausted the administrative remedies 
available to such party within the Internal Revenue Service. Any failure to agree to an 
extension of the time for the assessment of any tax shall not be taken into account for 
purposes o f determining whether the prevailing party meets the requirements o f the 
preceding sentence.
(2) Only costs allocable to the United States. An award under subsection (a) shall be 
made only for reasonable litigation and administrative costs which are allocable to the 
United States and not to any other party.
(3) Costs denied where party prevailing protracts proceedings. No award for reasonable 
litigation and administrative costs may be made under subsection (a) with respect to any 
portion o f the administrative or court proceeding during which the prevailing party has 
unreasonably protracted such proceeding.
(4) Period for applying to IRS for administrative costs. An award may be made under 
subsection (a) by the Internal Revenue Service for reasonable administrative costs only if  
the prevailing party files an application with the Internal Revenue Service for such costs 
before the 91st day after the date on which the final decision o f the Internal Revenue 
Service as to the determination o f the tax, interest, or penalty is mailed to such party.
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section—
(1) Reasonable litigation costs. The term "reasonable litigation costs" includes—
(A) reasonable court costs, and
(B) based upon prevailing market rates for the kind or quality o f services furnished—
(i) the reasonable expenses o f expert witnesses in connection with a court 
proceeding, except that no expert witness shall be compensated at a rate in excess o f the 
highest rate o f compensation for expert witnesses paid by the United States,
(ii) the reasonable cost o f any study, analysis, engineering report, test, or project 
which is found by the court to be necessary for the preparation of the party's case, and
* * *
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Sec. 7433. Civil damages for certain unauthorized collection actions.
(a) In general. If, in connection with any collection o f Federal tax with respect to a 
taxpayer, any officer or employee o f the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or 
intentionally, or by reason o f negligence, disregards any provision o f this title, or any 
regulation promulgated under this title, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for 
damages against the United States in a district court o f the United States. Except as 
provided in section 7432 [26 USCS § 7432], such civil action shall be the exclusive 
remedy for recovering damages resulting from such actions.
(b) Damages. In any action brought under subsection (a) or petition filed under 
subsection (e), upon a finding of liability on the part o f the defendant, the defendant shall 
be liable to the plaintiff in an amount equal to the lesser of $ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  ($ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 , in the 
case of negligence) or the sum o f-
( 1) actual, direct economic damages sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of 
the reckless or intentional or negligent actions o f the officer or employee, and
(2 ) the costs of the action.
(c) Payment authority. Claims pursuant to this section shall be payable out o f funds 
appropriated under section 1304 o f title 31, United States Code.
(d) Limitations.
(1) Requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted. A judgment for damages 
shall not be awarded under subsection (b) unless the court determines that the plaintiff 
has exhausted the administrative remedies available to such plaintiff within the Internal 
Revenue Service.
(2) Mitigation of damages. The amount o f damages awarded under subsection (b)(1) 
shall be reduced by the amount o f such damages which could have reasonably been 
mitigated by the plaintiff.
(3) Period for bringing action. Notwithstanding any other provision o f law, an action to 
enforce liability created under this section may be brought without regard to the amount 
in controversy and may be brought only within 2  years after the date the right o f action 
accrues.
(e) Actions for violations of certain bankruptcy procedures.
(1) In general. If, in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a 
taxpayer, any officer or employee o f the Internal Revenue Service willfully violates any 
provision o f section 362 (relating to automatic stay) or 524 (relating to effect of 
discharge) o f title 11, United States Code (or any successor provision), or any regulation 
promulgated under such provision, such taxpayer may petition the bankruptcy court to 
recover damages against the United States.
* * *
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
220
Sec. 7491. Burden of proof.
(a) Burden shifts where taxpayer produces credible evidence.
(1) General rule. If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence 
with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability o f the taxpayer for 
any tax imposed by subtitle A or B [26 USCS §§ 1 et seq. or 2001 et seq.], the Secretary 
shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.
(2) Limitations. Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to an issue only if—
(A) the taxpayer has complied with the requirements under this title to substantiate 
any item;
(B) the taxpayer has maintained all records required under this title and has 
cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, 
documents, meetings, and interviews; and
(C) in the case o f a partnership, corporation, or trust, the taxpayer is described in 
section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) [26 USCS § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii)].
Subparagraph (C) shall not apply to any qualified revocable trust (as defined in section 
645(b)(1) [26 USCS § 645(b)(1)]) with respect to liability for tax for any taxable year 
ending after the date o f the decedent's death and before the applicable date (as defined in 
section 645(b)(2) [26 USCS § 645(b)(2)]).
(3) Coordination. Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any issue if  any other provision of 
this title provides for a specific burden of proof with respect to such issue.
(b) Use of statistical information on unrelated taxpayers. In the case o f an individual 
taxpayer, the Secretary shall have the burden o f proof in any court proceeding with 
respect to any item of income which was reconstructed by the Secretary solely through 
the use o f statistical information on unrelated taxpayers.
(c) Penalties. Notwithstanding any other provision o f this title, the Secretary shall have 
the burden of production in any court proceeding with respect to the liability of any 
individual for any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount imposed by this title.
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Sec. 7602. Examination of books and witnesses.
(a) Authority to summon, etc. For the purpose o f ascertaining the correctness o f any 
return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability o f any 
person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity o f any transferee or 
fiduciary o f any person in respect o f any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such 
liability, the Secretary is authorized—
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or 
material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or 
employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care o f books of 
account containing entries relating to the business o f the person liable for tax or required 
to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary may deem proper, to appear before 
the Secretary at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, 
papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant 
or material to such inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or 
material to such inquiry.
(b) Purpose may include inquiry into offense. The purposes for which the Secretary may 
take any action described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) o f subsection (a) include the 
purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or enforcement 
o f the internal revenue laws.
(c) Notice o f contact o f third parties.
(1) General notice. An officer or employee o f the Internal Revenue Service may not 
contact any person other than the taxpayer with respect to the determination or collection 
o f the tax liability of such taxpayer without providing reasonable notice in advance to the 
taxpayer that contacts with persons other than the taxpayer may be made.
(2) Notice o f specific contacts. The Secretary shall periodically provide to a taxpayer a 
record o f persons contacted during such period by the Secretary with respect to the 
determination or collection o f the tax liability of such taxpayer. Such record shall also be 
provided upon request o f the taxpayer.
(3) Exceptions. This subsection shall not apply—
(A) to any contact which the taxpayer has authorized;
(B) if  the Secretary determines for good cause shown that such notice would 
jeopardize collection of any tax or such notice may involve reprisal against any person; or
(C) with respect to any pending criminal investigation.
(d) No administrative summons when there is Justice Department referral.
(1) Limitation of authority. No summons may be issued under this title, and the 
Secretary may not begin any action under section 7604 [26 USCS § 7604] to enforce any 
summons, with respect to any person if  a Justice Department referral is in effect with 
respect to such person.
* * *
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Sec. 7609. Special procedures for third-party summonses.
(a) Notice.
(1) In general. If any summons to which this section applies requires the giving of 
testimony on or relating to, the production o f any portion of records made or kept on or 
relating to, or the production o f any computer software source code (as defined in 
7612(d)(2) [26 USCS § 7612(d)(2)]) with respect to, any person (other than the person 
summoned) who is identified in the summons, then notice of the summons shall be given 
to any person so identified within 3 days o f the day on which such service is made, but no 
later than the 23rd day before the day fixed in the summons as the day upon which such 
records are to be examined. Such notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the summons 
which has been served and shall contain an explanation o f the right under subsection
(b)(2 ) to bring a proceeding to quash the summons.
* * *
(b) Right to intervene; right to proceeding to quash.
(1) Intervention. Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who is 
entitled to notice o f a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to intervene in 
any proceeding with respect to the enforcement o f such summons under section 7604 [26 
USCS § 7604],
(2) Proceeding to quash.
(A) In general. Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who is 
entitled to notice o f a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to begin a 
proceeding to quash such summons not later than the 2 0 th day after the day such notice is 
given in the manner provided in subsection (a)(2). In any such proceeding, the Secretary 
may seek to compel compliance with the summons.
(B) Requirement o f notice to person summoned and to Secretary. If any person begins 
a proceeding under subparagraph (A) with respect to any summons, not later than the 
close o f the 20-day period referred to in subparagraph (A) such person shall mail by 
registered or certified mail a copy o f the petition to the person summoned and to such 
office as the Secretary may direct in the notice referred to in subsection (a)(1).
(C) Intervention; etc. Notwithstanding any other law or rule o f law, the person 
summoned shall have the right to intervene in any proceeding under subparagraph (A). 
Such person shall be bound by the decision in such proceeding (whether or not the person 
intervenes in such proceeding).
(c) Summons to which section applies.
(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (2), this section shall apply to any 
summons issued under paragraph (2) o f section 7602(a) [26 USCS § 7602(a)] or under 
section 6420(e)(2), 6421(g)(2), 6427(j)(2), or 7612 [26 USCS § 6420(e)(2), 6421(g)(2), 
6427Q(2), or 7612],
* * *
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